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The following work explores the evolution of a resident-directed environmental activism that
challenged negative public perception to redevelop their community. Beginning in the 1950s,
city leaders justified the dislocation of non-white residents from Boston’s South End with the
argument that they failed to maintain personal property and degraded community institutions.
Most of these minority residents were forced to move to Roxbury. From 1963 to 1983, Roxbury
lost 2,200 housing units. The vacant lots led to illegal dumping, and increased toxicity in the air,
water, and soil from undesirable land use businesses such as asphalt plants. As a result, banks,
supermarkets and pharmacies refused to locate in the area. By 1985, the Dudley area of Roxbury
shared a median income with the poorest communities in the United States. The negative
perception of residents, abrogation of civil and property rights, and denial of essential services
led to isolation and vulnerability that instituted and enforced environmental racism.
The roots of the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) that gained public recognition in
Boston during the 1990s extend back to the nineteenth century. Minorities employed a variety of
environmental strategies and actions to control their community and shape policies that impacted
their community. In response to urban renewal and coupled with civil rights efforts, residents

developed an activist approach in the 1960s. In the 1970s, groups recruited participants, built
organizational capacities, and improved the networking capabilities of residents. While they did
not identify as environmentalists, their pragmatic pursuit of equality led to specific
environmental improvements.
In the 1980s, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) drew directly from the
experiences and personnel of previous efforts to build a national exemplar of environmental
justice. Building an “urban village” in Dudley Square facilitated a variety of environmentally
focused initiatives that increased access to public transportation, expanded clean energy use,
improved air quality, and reduced pollutants. Activist groups pioneered civic environmentalism,
the philosophy that environmentalism and civic activism begins in the home, street, and
neighborhood where one lives. Proponents of civic environmentalism contend that local
environmental stewardship leads to sound environmental policy on larger and more complex
scales.
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INTRODUCTION
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN BOSTON,
1900-2000
By the turn of the twenty-first century, minority led activist groups in Boston redeveloped the
Roxbury and North Dorchester communities with a sense of history and vision for the future.
Veronica Eady, executive director of Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE),
reflected on the state of environmental justice in an opinion editorial for the Boston Globe on
Earth Day in 1998. Eady characterized Martin Luther King as “a distinguished forefather of the
modern-day environmental justice movement.” Like those in the civil rights movement, minority
groups employed the strategies and tactics of the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) to
demand access to power in order to improve their communities. ACE initiatives pushed Boston
area residents to “expand our notion of environment” to include cities and minorities living in
them.1 The following work explores the themes of Veronica Eady’s opinion piece: the evolution
of a resident-directed environmentalism that challenged negative public perception to redevelop
their community.
The story begins in Boston’s South End where residents used the area’s ethnic enclaves and
nearby industrial employment to gain a foothold in the city. When urban renewal projects
promised federal dollars at the beginning of the 1950s, city leaders justified the dislocation of
minority residents with the argument that they failed to maintain personal property and degraded
civic institutions. By the 1980s, African American and Latinx, residential options were
increasingly restricted to the predominantly minority communities of Roxbury and North
Dorchester. During the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights groups in Boston promoted a variety of

1

Boston Globe, 4/22/1998.
1

improvements such as home ownership, access to city services, local economic growth, cultural
pride, and community control. While these groups did not identify as “environmentalists” they
employed strategies to improve their environment as a means to confront racial inequality. These
experiences contributed to the growth of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI)
during the 1980s. Using the Community Development Corporation (CDC) model, the DSNI
stabilized and redeveloped Roxbury’s Dudley Square, becoming a national example for a
pragmatic “from the bottom up” environmentalism.
During the twentieth century minority residents advocated for “urban villages” as a means of
allaying racism and rebuilding their communities. Urban villages or “mixed-use” areas contain a
variety of residences, restaurants, retail stores, repair shops, theatres, social organizations, and
civic resources. In the South End, the urban village model bolstered the local economy,
promoted sociability, and maintained the autonomy of local institutions. Businesses open at
different parts of the day provided “eyes on the street” that contributed to the well-being of the
neighborhood.2 Since the turn of the twentieth century, residents had connected housing quality,
property ownership, locally owned businesses, access to cultural resources, delivery of city
services, open and green space, and food options with personal and community well-being.
South End residents had employed the streets, alleys, poolrooms, bars, convenience stores, social
clubs, bawdy houses, theatres, and recreational areas as places of cultural expression. Because of
these factors the creation, use, adaptation, and ownership of the built environment proved crucial
in the South End, Roxbury, and North Dorchester. The urban village functioned as an object of

Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of American Cities (New York: Harper Collins, 1961), 78.
See also: Mark Roseland, “Dimensions of the eco-city,” Cities, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1997): 197-202;
Jennifer Light, The Nature of Cities: Ecological Visions and the American Urban Professions,
1920-1960 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2009).
2

2

racial and class struggle, the means by which groups sought to revitalize the area and
reinvigorate Boston’s minority community. 3
Environmental Racism
Tracing this narrative expands the definition of environmental racism to characterize how
minorities faced inequality in Boston. Environmental racism can be defined as the exclusion of
minorities from the decision-making and policy creation that impacts their lives and
environment, broadly conceived. The effects of environmental racism have been measured in
residents’ exposure to lead, proximity to waste sites, and air pollution. 4 In Boston, these factors
worked in conjunction to degrade the quality of life and as a barrier to upward mobility.
Preconceptions of how ethnic minorities impacted neighborhoods drove urban renewal policy
and limited housing options. By the 1970s, Boston’s black community lived within clearly
demarcated borders, which made them vulnerable to a battery of environmental issues that will
be discussed below. 5
The idea that non-white cultures were inherently flawed and posed a danger to society proved
decisive in the denial of their property and civil rights. Social workers and academics of the late
1800s argued that ethnic minorities degraded their surroundings. For example, urban sociologist
Robert Park’s 1915 essay “Human Behavior in the City Environment” charged that residents of
working-class areas displayed a “persistent and distressing uniformity of vice, crime, and
poverty” that made them “peculiarly fit for the environment in which they were condemned to
Giovanna Di Chiro, “Nature as Community: The Convergence of Environment and Social
Justice,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, edited by William
Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996): 299-320.
4
Shirley A. Rainey and Glenn S. Johnson, “Grassroots Activism: An Exploration of Women
of Color's Role in the Environmental Justice Movement,” Gender & Class Vol. 16, No. 3/4
(2009): 144-173.
5
For further background on African Americans in Boston, see: James and Lois Horton.
Black Bostonians (Boulder, CO: Holmes and Meir Publishing, 2000).
3

3

exist.” Park concluded “civilization, in the interest of the common welfare” demanded the
control of ethnic minorities’ “wild, natural dispositions.”6 These notions became codified in
academia, planning and building organizations, financial institutions, and different levels of
government during the 1930s and 1940s. 7 The Federal Housing Authority determined that
minority residents lacked the capacity to hold mortgages, famously “redlining” areas of cities. In
the 1950s, newspaper characterizations of the South End as a “skid row” shaped public opinion
and justified subsequent policy decisions. Mel King, who ran for mayor in 1983, grew up in the
South End and observed: “somebody else defined my community in a way that allowed them to
justify destruction of it.”8
Environmental racism in Boston functioned as a discourse to justify the marginalization of
minority communities and deny essential environmental rights. In the 1960s, predominantly
minority areas of the South End, Roxbury, and Dorchester lacked sanitation, housing code
enforcement, and public safety services. By the end of the 1970s, many in the metropolitan area
viewed Roxbury as a “race,” meaning a place synonymous with blackness, and its inhabitants as
dangerous. Housing quality spiraled downward, and arson cases skyrocketed. From 1963 to
1983, Roxbury lost 2,200 housing units, or forty-seven percent of its stock. Banks, supermarkets
and pharmacies refused to locate in Roxbury and North Dorchester. By 1985, the area shared a
median income with the poorest communities in the United States. Local building contractors

Robert Park, “Human Behavior in the City Environment,” American Journal of Sociology
Vol. 20, No. 5 (March, 1915): 585-615.
7
To examine how assumptions about minorities and urban space influenced government
policy, see for example, the work of: Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” American
Journal of Sociology Vol. 44 No. 1 (July, 1938): 1-24. Wirth, “Human Ecology,” American
Journal of Sociology Vol. 50 No. 6 (May, 1945): 483-488. Wirth, “Housing as a Field of
Sociological Research,” American Sociological Review Vol. 12 No.2 (April 1947): 137-143.
8
Chain of Change: Struggles for Black Community Development (Boston: South End Press,
1981).
6
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and car thieves illegally dumped old refrigerators, washing machines, vehicles and other items in
empty lots. Environmental racism in Boston deprived residents of their rights as citizens and
created barriers to people getting everyday items others took for granted. 9
Environmental Justice
Environmental justice advocates argue that all people have an equal right to protection from
environmental degradation and seek to defend areas that have been targeted for pollution and
unwanted land uses. In these efforts, the EJM pushes to shift the burden of proof from those
affected by pollution to the polluters themselves. Put another way, companies should have to
prove they are not harming a community, rather than residents have to prove an unwanted land

The pioneer of environmental racism research is sociologist Robert Bullard. See Bullard,
Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra
Club, 1997): 37-45; Robert D. Bullard, Dumping In Dixie: Race, Class, And Environmental
Quality (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2000); Geographers have examined environmental racism;
see, for example: Ryan Holifield, “Defining environmental justice and environmental racism,”
Urban Geography, No. 22, Is. 1 (2001): 78-90; Jim Glassman, “Critical geography II:
Articulating race and radical politics,” Progress in Human Geography, No. 34, Is. 4 (2010): 506512. David Smith, Geography and social justice, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
For an example of the philosophical literature on environmental racism, see: Laura Westra
and Bill Lawson. Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 1995).
Historians have been examining environmental racism beginning in the 1990s. See: Martin
Melosi, “Equity, Eco-Racism and Environmental History,” Environmental History Review Vol.
19, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995): 1-16. Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and
Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980 (University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
Historical research into environmental racism has explored its prevalence in minority and
underrepresented communities. See: Sylvia Hood Washington, Packing Them In: An Archeology
of Environmental Racism in Chicago, 1865-1954 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004);
Winona La Duke, All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life (Cambridge, MA: South
End Press, 1999); Laura Pulido, Environmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano
Struggles in the Southwest (Tucson, AZ: Arizona University Press, 1996); Taylor E. Doreceta,
Toxic Communities: Environmental Racism, Industrial Pollution, and Residential Mobility. (New
York University Press, 2014); Linda Nash, Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment,
Disease, and Knowledge. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Julie Sze, Noxious
New York: The Racial Politics of Urban Health and Environmental Justice. (Cambridge, MA:
M.I.T Press, 2007).
9

5

use will negatively impact them. To this end, the EJM pursues a policy of preventing public
health problems rather than reacting to negative health outcomes. This work argues that
minorities employed a variety of environmental strategies and actions to control their community
and shape policies that impacted their environment beginning in the mid 1960s. While they did
not typically self-identify as environmentalists, their pragmatic pursuit of equality led to specific
environmental improvements. 10
While the 1978, resident activism against toxic pollution in Warren County, North Carolina is
widely conceived of as the origin of the EJM movement on a national level, the minority-led
organizations that fought urban renewal policies in Boston began to develop the basic tactics,
strategies, and goals of environmental justice as early as the 1960s. In Boston during the 1960s,
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) demanded an end to segregation in public housing and
denial of city services, while it advocated for improved housing conditions, transportation
options, and employment opportunities. A coalition of groups thwarted plans for the proposed
southwest extension of Interstate-93 through Roxbury in the late 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s,
groups recruited participants, built organizational capacities, and improved the networking
capabilities of residents. Drawing upon the ideas of African decolonization movements, activists
declared that “self-determination” would lead to “community development.” The Lower
Roxbury Community Corporation (LRCC) built new homes in the area and directed the
construction of a new high school. Mel King pioneered CDC legislation in the Massachusetts

Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the
Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement. (New York University Press, 2001); Robert
Gottlieb, Environmentalism Unbound: Exploring New Pathways for Change (Cambridge MA:
M.I.T. Press, 2001); Roger Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American
Environmental Movement. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2005). For a philosophical
perspective on environmental justice, see: Peter S. Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1988).
10
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legislature in the 1970s, providing activists with a vehicle for community development strategies.
Efforts in Boston developed in conjunction with an “eco-populist” movement among Latinx,
American Indian, and African American groups across the United States. This networking
agenda helped them connect with academics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
bringing gravitas to the improvement agendas of the 1980s.
In the 1980s, the DSNI drew directly from the experiences and personnel of previous efforts to
expand participation and the durability of improvement plans. Because of the DSNI’s enlarged
civic capacity, it gained eminent domain rights to rebuild the area. During the 1990s, DSNI
programs built cooperative, multi-family, and single-family homes, revitalized buildings in
Dudley Square, and constructed Dudley Commons as a focal point for the area. Activist
organizations, including many CDCs, piloted a number of initiatives that increased access to
public transportation, expanded clean energy use, improved air quality, and reduced pollutants.
Residents spearheaded garden initiatives and park improvement plans to enliven empty lots,
augment green space, and provide locally-grown vegetables. The DSNI and ACE also removed
pollutants from old industrial facilities and converted the buildings for business development.
The proliferation of CDC’s and the rise of ACE in the 1990s demonstrated the effectiveness and
durability of environmentally-focused strategies. In this way, struggles against racism are
referred to as environmental justice or civic environmentalism. Proponents of civic
environmentalism argued that environmental stewardship in the community leads to sound
policy.11

There is extensive literature on civic environmentalism. See: Andrew Dobson, Citizenship
and the Environment, (Oxford University Press, 1993); William Shutkin, The Land that Could
Be: Environmentalism and Democracy in the 21st Century, (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press,
2000); Kent Portney, “Civic Engagement and Sustainable Cities in the United States,” Public
Administration Review Vol. 65, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 2005): 579-591; Julian Agyeman & Briony
11

7

By the early 1990s environmental justice developed into a sustained national movement, one
that the DSNI stood poised to lead. In 1991, the EJM organized the first National People of
Color Environmental Summit and introduced its “Principles of Environmental Justice.” The
declaration connected issues faced in poor rural and urban communities, arguing for “the right to
ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources.” Development strategies
must be pursued in “balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities
and providing fair access for all the full range of resources.” 12 The EJM embraced the democratic
tradition of city planning, arguing that “the built form of cities should come from the hands of
their citizens; that we should reject the tradition whereby large organizations build for people.” 13
The DSNI aligned themselves with the EJM and earned a reputation as a national leader in terms
of organization building and project execution.
The turning point in the story of environmental racism and environmental justice occurred
when activist groups changed how experts interacted with residents of Roxbury and North
Dorchester. For the first three quarters of the twentieth century, academics and professional
organizations studied minority residents as objects of analysis with little or no input from the
people themselves. The connections that activists made with scholars at MIT bore fruit in the
DSNI’s work in the 1980s. By the 1990s, the academics that helped to found ACE worked with
residents to identify and solve environmental problems by providing them with relevant

Angus, “The Role of Civic Environmentalism in the Pursuit of Sustainable Communities,”
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management Vol. 46 Is. 3 (2003): 345-363.
12
The principles of the first EJM sumit are widely available; see, for example,
https://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.pdf and Washington, Packing Them In, 99.
13
Peter Fitting, “Urban Planning/ Utopian Dreaming” Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh Today”
Utopian Studies Vol. 13 No. 1 (2002): 71.
8

resources and literature so that "they become their own experts.” 14 Instead of justifying
dislocation and alienation, professionals empowered residents. Regeneration efforts contributed
to changes in public perception and discourse about minority communities in Boston. By the
early 1990s, the Boston Globe began using the terms environmental racism and environmental
justice in the same fashion that Roxbury and North Dorchester residents did. 15 The EJM
publicity allowed residents to define issues for themselves.
Urbanizing Environmental History
The framework of urban environmental historian transforms our understanding of non-white
urban life and political mobilization in twentieth-century Boston. Beginning in the early 1990s,
scholars like Martin Melosi, Joel Tarr, William Cronon, and Roger Gottlieb pushed
environmental history to explore cities. Melosi’s “The Place of the City in Environmental
History” argued that four factors contribute to an urban environmental analysis: natural forces,
growth, spatial change, and human action. 16 Boston residents first backfilled areas of the harbor
and constructed wharves to establish economic and social stability. Warehouses, merchant shops,
and housing developed because of its proximity to natural features. Residents next demarcated
commercial, manufacturing, and residential areas. The growth of central arteries and bridges
sped transportation and access to lumber for building.17 Melosi’s categories function in a

Penn Loh and Jodi Sugerman-Brozan, “Environmental Justice Organizing for
Environmental Health: a Case Study on Asthma and Diesel Exhaust in Roxbury, Massachusetts”
The Annals of the American Academy, AAPSS No. 584 (2002): 110-124.
15
Boston Globe, 12/1/1994. See also: Bay State Banner 10/16/1997; Boston Globe,
11/16/1997.
16
Martin Melosi, “The Place of the City in Environmental History,” Environmental History
Review Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1993): 1-23. See also, Martin Melosi, “Cities, Technical
Systems, and the Environment,” Environmental History Review Vol. 14 No. ½ (SpringSummer, 1990): 45-64.
17
William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1992). This monograph explains the phenomenon described in this paragraph,
14
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dynamic and interactive manner as natural space shapes human activity, as natural space
becomes something new after human contact. Joel Tarr observed that the location of roads,
bridges, and waste treatment facilities reflected class, racial, and ethnic biases.18 Earlier urban
environmental historians illustrated how a city can be understood from an environmental
perspective, but as Tarr indicated, social forces shape the natural world and thus the distribution
of access to environmental resources and amenities.
To understand a city from an environmental perspective requires an analysis of the social and
economic forces altering natural and built space. Michael Rawson’s Eden on the Charles
explored the political, social, and economic forces that altered the natural environment in Boston.
During the nineteenth century, the city created the South End out of tidal flats in order to build
housing away from the noise and soot of downtown and its burgeoning immigrant population. In
the latter half of the century, a more ambitious land fill project gave birth to the Back Bay. Here
an orderly grid pattern of streets reflected the dictates of the Industrial Revolution and the
genteel class that called its side streets home. Rawson illustrated how Boston’s growth reflected
competing class and ethnic visions of how the city should be laid out. 19 Matthew Klingle’s
Emerald City employed a similar environmental and social analysis to explore the development
of Seattle. Railroad speculators and industrialists used the legal system to gain control of and fill
in tidelands that would serve as the downtown of the city. Its new owners eliminated the
demonstrating how the growth of Chicago impacted ecological and social changes in the
American West.
18
Joel Tarr, “The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Air, Land, and Water Pollution in
Historical Perspective,” Records of the Columbia Historical Society Vol. 51 (1984): 1-29; Joel
Tarr, “Water and Waste: A Retrospective Assessment of Wastewater Technology in the United
States, 1800-1932,” Technology and Culture Vol. 25 No. 2 (April, 1984): 226-263. See also:
Martin V. Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to
the Present (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2000).
19
Michael Rawson, Eden on the Charles: The Making of Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010).
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designation of tidelands as communal area for residents to fish and access resources provided by
tidal flux. In Boston and Seattle the adaptation of the natural environment to facilitate economic
development pushed working-class residents to the marginal areas of the city. 20 Applying an
environmental analysis to Boston in the twentieth century provides insight into the ways that
ordinary people participated in, perceived, interpreted, and reacted to changes such as these.
Historical monographs devoted to environmental racism have established the relationship
between racial inequality, residential locations, and environmental services. Andrew Hurley’s
Environmental Inequalities explored how minority residents and workers bore the brunt of the
environmental degradation from the steel mills of Gary, Indiana. Sylvia Hood Washington’s
Packing Them In established that the African American residents of Altgeld Gardens in the
South Side of Chicago lived in one of the most polluted urban neighborhoods in the nation.
Washington demonstrated how city planners in Chicago employed the designation of African
Americans and immigrants as a social “other” to segregate blacks and ethnic minorities to ensure
the health of society as a whole. Central to their justification stood the 1850 The Report of the
Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts, the first of its kind in the United States. 21 It portrayed
Boston’s poorest residents as sources of social and environmental problems, rather than as
people forced to live in poor conditions as result of economic structures and policy decisions. In
doing so, the report set a precedent for the logic planners used in designating and creating urban
space.

Michael Rawson, Eden on the Charles: The Making of Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010).
21
Lemuel Shattuck, Report of the Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1948). downloaded at archive.org. See also: Sylvia Hood Washington,
Packing Them In, 4.
20
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Roger Gottlieb’s pioneering research on EJM efforts provides further background for this
dissertation. Gottlieb’s Forcing the Spring argued that environmentalism has deep roots in the
concerns of ordinary and mostly urban people. Forcing the Spring gave voice to those whose
“vision of the environment is woven into an overall framework of social, racial, and economic
justice.” Gottlieb also demonstrated how minority groups carried out different aspects of EJM
work in Los Angeles. Minority areas of Los Angeles lacked markets selling fresh food. Limited
public transportation options blocked access to supermarkets in nearby areas. In response,
residents planted and harvested vegetables in abandoned plots, transforming areas of
environmental degradation into thriving urban farms. They created local markets that catered to
cultural and ethnic needs. In this way they combined environmental improvements with
economic development, social networking, and cultural expression. 22 The following effort
synthesizes the approaches Gottlieb employed to explain how working-class groups developed
an expansive interpretation of environmentalism to execute a variety of specific projects that
catalyzed community development.
The story that unfolds in the following chapters builds from the insights of several notable
monographs on Boston’s history. Michael Rawson’s Eden on the Charles, Thomas O’Connor’s
Building a New Boston, Lawrence Kennedy’s Planning the City Upon a Hill, and Sam Bass
Warner’s Streetcar Suburbs explored how major changes in Boston’s physical development
occurred.23 In contrast, this work explores working-class/minority responses to large scale
structural changes. Noted labor historian James Green studied and taught about the South End
during the 1970s, but never published books or articles on the topic. He employed a reading by
Roger Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 34.
Lawrence Kennedy, Planning the City Upon a Hill: Boston since 1630 (Amherst, MA:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1992); Sam Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of
Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
22
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Jane Jacobs on the mixed-use neighborhood at the outset of his course and assigned texts related
to ecology. While Green did not have a fully formed environmental history discipline to augment
his teaching, he understood that environmental conditions reflect social and economic
inequality.24 Boston has earned a reputation for racism in the past fifty years, but we know very
little about why or how Boston developed such a virulent racial climate. This work contends that
an environmental analysis assists in understanding both the way inequality functioned and how
white residents conceived of African Americans and the places that they lived. Castigated by
society as degrading to their environment, minority-led environmental groups responded by
creating models for community improvement and urban design. African American, Latinx, and
Cape Verdean residents drew upon cultural traditions and networks of mutual support to rebuild
their communities.
Civic Environmentalism: Pragmatic and Transformative
The founders of ACE and the DSNI pioneered civic environmentalism, or the philosophy that
environmentalism and civic activism begins in the home, street, and community where one lives.
Advocates of civic environmentalism offer that environmental deterioration cannot be separated
from persistent issues facing the United States like social inequality, growing disparity of wealth,
and flagging political and civic engagement. From the 1960s through 2000, the ideas of civic
environmentalism developed in both theory and practice in Boston. Activist minority groups
redeveloped their communities from the ground up, and in doing so developed the ideas of civic
environmentalism through experience and practice. Concurrently, a branch of environmental
See, for example, James Green, “Urban Renewal’s effect on Low-Income Housing in
Boston’s South End,” unpublished manuscript; Box 3, Folder 2:“Boston Politics and History:
South End History.” Green’s papers are located at Healey Library, University of Massachusetts
at Boston.
24
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philosophy developed focusing on agency in the everyday lived- in environment. Advocates of
civic environmentalism argue that the basic elements of citizenship must include environmental
considerations. These trends merged in Boston during the 1990s when the DSNI and ACE began
to work in conjunction with one another.
Civic environmentalists argue that the environmental movement has failed to inspire broad
public participation. The average individual feels neither responsibility for environmental
degradation nor a willingness to become involved in environmental issues. Mainstream
environmentalism’s focused on wilderness and placed the objects of preservation beyond the
reach of the individual, while fostering a sense of detachment regarding the environmental
degradation found in lived-in places. To the individual, the “environment” often exists apart
from ordinary life, a place where humanity is vulnerable. 25 The concept of an environment
narrowly applied to wilderness implies that cities fail to meet the standard of “environment.”
Such a conclusion marginalized the environmental concerns of urban non-white residents.
Environmental justice challenged the Sierra Club and other organizations in “The Group of Ten”
because of their white, male, and corporate leadership. A failure to engage the concerns of
minorities, women, working-class, and underclass groups inhibited the growth of a common
understanding and approach to environmental efforts.26 A lack of broad participation in
environmental campaigns leads to an “analytical myopia” that discounts the value of ecosystem
goods and services in maintaining human life in urban circumstances. If governments and the
business world contribute to the depletion of life sustaining resources and foster a mindset that

William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” In
William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (New York:
W. W. Norton 1995): 69-90; Steven Vogel, “Marx and Alienation from Nature” Social Theory
and Practice, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall, 1988): 371.
26
Martin V. Melosi, “Equity, Eco-Racism, and Environmental History.”
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ignores the situation, civic environmentalists argue that people should pressure economic and
political leaders to change their policies. 27
Framing urban issues in an ecological way means studying neighborhoods and their
inhabitants in relation to one another. The basic unit in ecological study is the landscape, defined
as a heterogeneous area consisting of a cluster of intersecting ecosystems, such as a watershed.
Ecologists examine how systems function, respond to different forms of feedback, and change
over time. Biodiversity creates resilience in an ecosystem because it can adapt in a variety of
productive ways. The ecology of urban areas includes the transfer of energy, the movement of
air, the quality of the soil, and the functioning of the hydrological cycle. Ecologists studying
cities find that heterogeneity encourages species diversity and “spatial resilience,” meaning that
different features of city space interact and adapt. Ecologists argue that the notion that
biodiversity creates resilience applies equally to wild, semi-wild, farm, residential, and urban
areas.28
Civic environmentalism provides a roadmap for public participation. Building from the notion
that communities with high social capacities and levels of democratic participation make
decisions that improve environmental quality, civic environmentalism channels the social capital
For extensive treatments of this issue, see: Shiva, Earth Democracy; Dobson, Citizenship
and the Environment.
28
Erik Andersson, “Urban Landscapes and Sustainable Cities,” Ecology and Society Vol. 11
No. 34 (2006): 1-7; Barbara Eckstein and James A. Throgmorton, eds., Story and Sustainability
Planning, Practice, and Possibility for American Cities (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 2003);
Mark Roseland, “Dimensions of the eco-city,” 197-202; Mark Roseland, ed. Eco-City
Dimensions: Healthy Communities, Healthy Planet, (Ottawa: New Society Publishers, 1997);
Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability, and Peace, (Boston, MA: South End
Press, 2005); Anne Whiston Spirn, “Ecological Urbanism: A Framework for the Design of
Resilient Cities” in The Ecological Design and Planning Reader edited by Forster O. Ndubisi
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2014).
Ecologists, such as Eugene P. Odum, have long sought to integrate the study of social
sciences with ecology. See, for example: Odum, “The Emergence of Ecology as a New
Integrative Discipline” Science, New Series Vol. 195 No. 4284 (3/25/1977): 1289-1293.
27
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of residents, organizations, businesses, institutions, and schools towards environmental efforts.
Social capital refers to how groups, from families to and fraternal or neighborhood associations,
to larger groups such as the DSNI, use characteristics such as mutual support, a sense of
obligation, and trust to direct collective energy. 29 Enlarged social capital allows communities
shape policies that affect the area. A healthy, empowered, and economically stable community
can then make choices to improve the health of the ecosystem that they live in. Civic
environmentalists initiate social practices and construct built environments that reduce
humanity’s ecological footprint. They focus on transportation methods and routes, housing type
and quality, energy sources and use, waste disposal and recycling, technology application, and
infrastructure. Public transit, driven by clean fuels and alternative energies, reduces the quantity
of automobiles on the road and emission levels. So-called industrial ecology employs local
resources, reuses materials, and recycles waste to mitigate the environmental impact of
production methods. Roads, bridges, sewer systems, and parks are encouraged to have maximum
functionality, economic viability, and resilience. Altering land use patterns to create “compact
and diverse” mixed-use communities featuring cooperative and multi-family houses reduces the
amount of land devoted to housing while encouraging foot and bicycle travel. Local agriculture
creates green space and contributes to cleaner air while minimizing the ecological impact of food
production.30 The story that unfolds in the pages that follow trace the deep roots of civic
environmentalism in Boston.

Carol Hardy-Fanta, Latina Politics, Latino Politics: Gender, Culture, and Political
Participation in Boston (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993): 1-14
30
Mark Roseland, “Dimensions of Eco-Cities” 197-207. William Shutkin, The Land that
Could Be.
29
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Table 0.1: Urban Ecosystems
Size Designations

Core Functions

Natural

Social

City

Feedback
↑↓
Adaptation
↑↓
Reorganization

Natural processes
↑↓
Energy
↑↓
Waste

Communication
↑↓
Exchange, cultures,
products, and
resources

District
Neighborhood

When ecologists examine cities, they divide urban areas into three size categories:
neighborhood, district, and whole city. Within these designations, areas are further
categorized in five ways: commercial, mixed-use, multi-family residential, single family
residential, and open space.

Table 0.2: Qualities of Resilient Urban Communities
Qualities of Resilient Urban Communities
Social

Ecological

Growth

Energy Transformation

Movement

Air quality and Movement

Communication

Soil Quality and Erosion

Making and Building

Hydrological cycle

Teaching and Learning

Green Space

Play and Work

Variety of Plant and Tree life

Reflection and Worship

Wildlife

Civic environmentalists argue that cities are habitats and that every being has biological and
social needs that include reproduction and growth, movement and exchange, communication,
making and building, teaching and learning, play, work, reflection, and worship.
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Table 0.3: Civic Environmentalist Orientation to the Environment
Individual Orientation to the Environment

Architectural Choices

➔land ownership choice (CLT)
➔home ownership choice (cooperative)
➔building choices (materials, orientation with nature)
➔Energy choices (use, efficiency-solar, wind)
➔sociability and autonomy
⬆⬇

Production and
Reproduction of the
Home

⬆⬇
➔consumer choices (clothing)
➔recycling and reuse of materials
➔cleaning materials and methods
➔energy use and methods
➔Food options (gardens and local agriculture)
➔yard choices (minimizing lawn, encouraging natural vegetation)
➔ clean and/or organic yard materials/plant food (no pesticides or
harsh fertilizers)
➔connection to nature and or green space
➔ethical interactions with animals
⬆⬇

Local Community and
Environment

⬆⬇
➔connection to foot and bike travel
➔transportation options and vehicle use
➔environmental maintenance and service
➔understanding and engagement with community and
environmental issues
⬆⬇

Interaction with Nature/
“Environmental Ethic”

⬆⬇
➔control of development and environmental management
➔ participation in civic and political issues
➔participation in environmental maintenance (hiking paths,
streams, bike trails)
➔ participation in land conservation and species preservation
➔reducing carbon footprint to/when interacting with nature
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CHAPTER 1
“THE SURVIVAL OF THE SPIRIT IS AT STAKE:”
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ROOTS OF URBAN RENEWAL IN BOSTON
One day in 1965 while walking in the city’s South End neighborhood, Martin Gopen saw
Boston authorities forcibly evicting a Puerto Rican family from an apartment by throwing their
mattresses and other belongings on the street. Howard Zinn, the noted historian, also happened to
be on the same street. Spontaneously, Gopen and Zinn began picking up the family’s belongings
and carrying them back upstairs and into the apartment. As a result of their empathetic efforts,
Boston police arrested both of them. The event had a profound impact on Gopen. Over the next
few years he worked with Mel King, an emerging black activist who ran for mayor in 1983. Mel
King inspired Gopen: “he was talking in terms of people, about the injustices done to people in
the name of urban renewal, in the name of progress.” Gopen reflected on his experiences and
planned for the future: “It is a war worth waging and the survival of the spirit is at stake,” he
concluded. The “mastery of the environment” was key to the future in Boston. 31
This chapter examines the conditions that shaped Martin Gopen’s experience in the South End
in 1965. How did city officials in Boston sanction forced removal as a normalized activity in
Boston? What conditions made it possible to forcibly remove the Puerto Rican family and many
others like them? What did Gopen mean when he said mastery of the environment was key and
the survival of the “spirit” was at stake? Discourse about working-class residents as
environmental agents drove urban renewal in Boston’s South End. At the turn of the twentieth
century, areas of cultural production—eateries, theatres, taverns, streets, parks, and social
organizations—became contested space that reformers attempted to shape according to their
Martin Neal Gopen, Box 3, File 3: “Personal Notes, General 1965.” Gopen’s papers are
archived at Snell Library Archives, Northeastern University, Boston, MA.
31
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worldview. Settlement house workers and their associates never controlled these areas of cultural
production they way that they had hoped. They did, however, function as the main conduit by
which city officials and the larger public conceived of the neighborhood. Negative perceptions
drove conceptualization of this problem, and access to resources and political power framed by
this mindset shaped the neighborhood’s history.

Figure 1.1:1898 map of the South End. In foreground stands the South End in relation to
downtown (upper right) and the Back Bay (upper left). In addition, the map shows the New
York Streets in relation to the South End and the rest of the city. (center right) (Image:
Wikimedia Commons)
The South End as Boston’s Premier Neighborhood
Boston’s development required construction of new land and transportation systems to
accommodate burgeoning economic activity and population. In the 1840s, the city filled in the
marsh southwest of downtown and west of Boston Neck to form the South End. Previously,
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Boston Neck provided the only means to get to downtown by land from the south. The creation
of the Boston and Albany Railroad provided separation from the noise, soot, and pollution from
industrial activity occurring downtown. The newly formed South End featured long avenues with
parks that broke up residential patterns with green space. Architecturally, brownstone row houses
with small backyards dominated residential design. Designers employed the British model of city
planning featuring the so-called city house, as well as other elements of British street design and
parks.32 From 1850 to 1873, wealthy and prestigious residents like Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and writer Louisa May Alcott resided in the South End.

Figure 1.2: Engraving of Blackstone Square. Done in the mid nineteenth century highlights
the affluence of the South End in its early days and its adherence to English notions of city
planning. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

Joel Blair, “History of Boston’s South End” Research Grant Application, unpublished
manuscript, 1979: 5. James Green papers, Box 3, Folder 3: “Boston Politics and History: South
End History and Ethnic Relations.”
32
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Three factors contributed to the decline of the South End as a premier address in Boston. First,
industry moved from downtown to cluster around the terminus of the Boston and Albany and
Boston and Maine Railroads. Garments, leather products including footwear, and pianos were its
most prominent industrial output. Second, the Depression of 1873 brought existing home values
down. Third, Boston’s latest landfill project, the so-called Back Bay, created a new frontier of
real estate development west of Beacon Hill and Boston Common.33 During the 1880s many of
the prestigious social clubs migrated north to the Back Bay, a leading indicator of an address
change for its benefactors. Separation by the railroad tracks, proximity to Boston Common,
further distance from working-class residents, and an organized grid layout featuring wide
avenues attracted upper-class residents. To the present day, the residences and business along
Commonwealth Avenue and Beacon Street are the most impressive in Boston. 34
Meanwhile, the built environment, population, and demographics of the South End changed
considerably. The trains that arrived in Boston from the west and north facilitated industrial
development and created a nexus of heterogeneous demography. Across northern New England,
farm families who eked out a living on the region’s thin soil sent their sons and daughters south
on the railroads to find work in Boston. From the southern United States, African Americans
migrated in search of work and less overt racial oppression. Residents from across Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia settled in the South End. Ethnic groups often formed a plurality on
specific streets, but not an overwhelming majority. While blocks remained heterogeneous,
ethnicities clustered in buildings.35

33
34

Mel King Chain of Change, 18-23; Thomas O’Connor Building a New Boston, 57.
Edwin M. Bacon, Bacon’s Dictionary of Boston (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1886):

108.
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Mel King, Chain of Change, 10-23.
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To accommodate population growth, landlords bought up properties as they declined in
value.36 As a result, many large residences became lodging houses where workers rented rooms
of varying quality for the night, week, or month. Lodging houses comprised about ten percent of
housing in the neighborhood while a majority of residents lived in tenements. Three quarters of
the South End was devoted to housing with the remainder to commercial endeavors. 37 State
census takers recorded 40,406 inhabitants in the neighborhood in 1895.38 With at least one
resident living in each room, wear and tear accelerated, and the quality of housing declined. 39 For
some men, drifting, hustling, petty criminality, and begging became a more attractive choice than
marriage and work. 40 Men who found regular employment might enjoy upward mobility, but
having a female partner contributing to the domestic economy proved the surest path to success.
Becoming a huckster, or street vendor, provided the most common way to add income to the
house. Taking in laundry or boarders, and preparing food offered other avenues. However, in the
South End, a majority of mothers worked outside of the home as domestic cleaners and or in
some type of laundry service. 41 Taken together, the area served an essential function for migrants
and industrial workers as a low-rent district. Sociologist Herbert Gans argued a crucial
distinction existed between the terms low-rent and slum district. As opposed to slum districts,

Margaret Supplee Smith and John C. Moorhouse, “Architecture and the Housing Market:
Nineteenth Century Row Housing in Boston's South End” Journal of the Society of
Architectural Historians, Vol. 52, No. 2 (June, 1993): 159-160.
37
Robert Woods ed. The City Wilderness: A Settlement Study (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Publishing, 1899): 17.
38
Albert B Wolfe, The Lodging House Problem in Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1906): 1.
39
Several sources discuss the migration and settlement patterns of South End residents. See,
for example: Alvan F. Sanborn, Moody’s Lodging House and Other Tenement House Sketches
(Boston, MA: Copeland and Day, 1895); Woods ed. The City Wilderness and Wolfe, The
Lodging House Problem in Boston.
40
Sanborn, Tenement House Sketches, 94.
41
Woods, City Wilderness, 89, 98-99; Sanborn, Tenement House Sketches, 103.
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low-rent areas “provide shelter that may be inconvenient, but that is not harmful.” 42 Accounts of
residential life in the South End support the utility of Gans’ distinction.
The adaptation of the built environment to this influx of working-class families demonstrates
the fundamentals of urban environmental history. Buildings have the potential to enhance or
inhibit human freedom, augment sociability, and promote intelligence, creativity, and selfgovernment.43 These possibilities shaped the South End, its social organizations, and its cultural
productions. Homes, lodging-houses, and tenements were divided into separate spaces for
specific roles and functions. Residents slept in small eight by six rooms and socialized on the
streets or in the cafes. 44 The built environment was oriented to the needs of industrial production,
and this bifurcated the social reproduction of lodging-house residents in South End. Yet within
the neighborhood, residents took their stand in the world.

James R. Green, The South End: Boston 2000 Neighborhood Series, The Boston 2000
Corporation, 1976: 4
43
Roger J.H. King, “Toward an Environmental Ethics of the Domesticated Environment,”
Philosophy and Geography, Vol. 6 (2003): 14.
44
Wolfe, Lodging House Problem, 52.
42
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Figure 1.3: South End looking from the Atlantic Ocean. In the foreground, the Boston and
Albany rail yard and New York Streets southwest of the yard. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
The South End as a Mixed-Use Neighborhood and Minority Archipelago
Demographic information supports the assertion that the South End operated as a mixed-use
neighborhood. At the turn of the twentieth century, the neighborhood contained 87 cafes, 65
basement diners, 41 saloons, 24 liquor-stores, 27 drugstores, 70 tailoring establishments, and 78
laundry service establishments. The 152 eating establishments were oriented to various ethnic
tastes, and in this and other ways the built environment shaped and reflected the South End’s
culture. Settlement house leader Robert Woods observed, “The sights and sounds of the street
constitute an important part of the recreative resources of the district. Their hold upon the people
is well seen.” Simply being present and observing the panorama of working-class life enlivened,
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as Woods said, “the monotony of existence.”45 These neighborhoods created many alternative
means of socialization because the streets themselves, along with their buildings, vacant lots,
pool rooms, bars, corners, stores, social clubs, bawdy houses, and alleys, conditioned human
behavior. 46
Residents of the South End created an endemic culture by colonizing social space. For
example, theatres facilitated social and information exchange, ethnic expression, and inter-ethnic
interaction. Robert Woods commented that the local theatre was “useful as a purveyor of
amusement to the people of the South End and of South Boston. It is the great popular resort for
these two large sections.” According to Woods, “every boy and man, many of the girls, and some
of the women” regularly attended the theatre. At one o’clock variety features provided the
opening act for the main performance at two. Between acts, musicians, comedians, magicians,
ventriloquists, and athletes entertained the crowd. Repeating the same sequence at seven for the
evening crowd, theatre performances allowed individuals and groups to express themselves in
both orthodox and subversive ways. 47
Business establishments took on multiple roles to meet residents’ needs. In turn, this
strengthened the neighborhood’s social networks. For example, Meyer Murray’s building had a
barbershop in the front, a pool hall directly behind it, and a bowling alley in the basement. The

Woods, City Wilderness, 198.
James Oliver, “The Streets: An Alternative Black Male Socialization Institution’” Journal
of Black Studies Vol. 36, No. 6 (July, 2006): 918-921. See also, William Foote Whyte, Street
Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1943).
47
Woods, City Wilderness, 177-178. For an expansive discussion of the impact the theatres
had on the South End see: Desiree J. Garcia “Subversive Sounds: Ethnic Spectatorship and
Boston’s Nickelodeon Theatres, 1907-1914 Film History Vol. 19, No. 3 Movie Business (2007):
217. For a general discussion of working-class neighborhoods as a space of cultural competition
see: Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What We Will (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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pool hall served as a lively place of competition and social interaction. 48 The neighborhood’s
social networks allowed migrants to find security and build a foundation for a new life. Minnie
Corder moved to the South End as a young woman from northern Ukraine in 1911 and obtained
employment at a clothing factory. She became involved in union activity. Eschewing the AFL
because of its conservative outlook, she joined the IWW and participated in socialist philosopher
Scott Nearing’s peace movement during World War One. She recalled: “I read as many books as
I had time for and I really became educated in my own way. Socialism became my new
religion.”49 The heterogeneity of the South End built environment facilitated social interaction
and personal agency.
Because of the South End’s relationship to the city’s railroad network, the black population of
the neighborhood expanded from 2,000 in 1890 to 30,000 by the Great Depression. 50 A portion
of these residents moved from the side of Beacon Hill that flowed down into Boston’s West End,
while others arrived from the southern United States. Some blacks in the South End joined A.
Phillip Randolph’s Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, but a majority became members of the
Dining Car Waiters Local 370. This union, associated with the Union of Hotel and Restaurant
Workers, served as a source of black empowerment in the South End. Like the larger and more
powerful Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the Hotel and Restaurant Workers extended their
labor activism into a quest for civil rights and social justice. The waiters on Boston’s trains
became leaders in the fight to desegregate dining cars, and later, the city and nation. 51
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Figure 1.4: Interior of the Castle Square Theatre. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 1.5: Postcard of Castle Square Theatre. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
28

Overall, however, the economic structure in Boston posed a challenge for African-Americans
in the South End. While black owned businesses populated the neighborhood, the labor force
struggled to integrate into the citywide economy. Long-time resident George Adams noted:
“there was no segregation in the schools, no segregation in the streets. It was only going into the
labor pool.”52 If blacks were not employed in railroad work, they most often filled low-level
construction and service jobs, with many women working as domestic cleaners. Resident Calvin
Hicks observed: “we owned nothing, we had no infrastructure… In the early morning and then
late every afternoon the public transportation system was converted into a virtual slave ship.” 53
Despite economic impediments, African-Americans formed a vibrant community in the South
End. By the turn of the twentieth century, the South End and Lower Roxbury became the nerve
center of African-American life in the city. William Monroe Trotter, Phi Beta Kappa graduate
from Harvard College, began publication of the Boston Guardian in 1901. Trotter, an advocate
of direct confrontation and immediate civil rights for blacks, became a catalyst for the emerging
movement opposing Booker T. Washington’s much more moderate agenda for civil rights.
Trotter’s writing in the Guardian sparked the thinking of WEB Dubois. In 1903, Dubois wrote
the seminal Souls of Black Folk, which provided an intellectual foundation for opposition to
Washington. In the same year, Washington visited Boston to discuss and defend his platform.
Trotter played a role in what became known as the “Boston Riot,” in which Washington and his
associates were verbally and physically rebuked. In addition, Trotter opposed Woodrow
Wilson’s segregationist policies. When summoned for a meeting with the president, Trotter
spoke out against racist federal policies and was thrown out of the Oval Office by Wilson.
James Green, The South End, 17-18.
Calvin Hicks, “The Issue of Turf in Boston,” presentation to the Greater Boston Civil Rights
Coalition, University of Massachusetts Boston (1981). Green Box 4, Folder 3.
52
53

29

Trotter also interrupted performances of Birth of a Nation in Boston with stink bombs and verbal
bombast. His efforts garnered Boston, and thus the South End, the characterization of the
“radical center” of African-American life in the United States at the turn of the twentieth
century.54
Long-time resident and jazz musician Calvin Hicks noted that African-Americans developed
a sense of “turf” in the South End. For Hicks, the smells emanating from shoeshine stands,
taverns, hairdressers, and fried chicken from the Hi-Hat jazz club created a sense of security and
belonging for members of the community. At the Hi-Hat, the sight of black chefs decked out in
white suits and ornate hats impressed onlookers. Behind the front area, the jazz club attracted the
likes of Charlie Parker, Ella Fitzgerald, and Oscar Peterson. Often referred to as “Little Harlem,”
the South End hosted the barnstorming Bunk Johnson Band; the group paraded up and down the
streets of Columbus Avenue performing for onlookers in the summer. 55
Formal social organization developed from peer networks in the South End’s African
American community. For example, the League of Women for Community Service was
“Boston’s protest style par excellence.” Black residents used these social organizations to
express their opinions about regional, national, and global affairs. In the 1930s many residents
protested Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, a nod to African-Americans’ cultural and ancestral ties in
Africa. Residents had an anti-colonial outlook, an ethic cultivated by Trotter’s Boston Guardian
and African-American churches in the South End, in particular St. Cyprian’s church on Tremont
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Street.56 Historian Joseph Heathcott observed that areas like the South End can be termed a black
archipelagos because they “carved out dense networks of civil and religious institutions, political
alignments, and cultural practices” during the early twentieth century. Minority archipelagos
allowed black and ethnic communities to “establish a sense of permanence on the land, and to
bolster black power in urban affairs”57
The South End in the Industrial Era: The Settlement House
Isolation had salutary effects, but it made the neighborhood vulnerable. Middle-class writerobservers and settlement house workers shaped the general public’s conception of the South End.
Three observers played a central role: writer Alvan Sanborn, Harvard economist Albert Wolfe,
and settlement house leader Robert Woods. They shared similar backgrounds in that they
attended Amherst College. As an Amherst student, Woods learned of the settlement house model
studying abroad in London. His alma mater had been a hotbed of Calvinist thought and had a
reputation for missionary zeal in its institutional beliefs and actions.58 Traces of this ethic are
evident in the writings of all three men. The publications of Sanborn, Wolfe, and Woods
provided a way for outsiders to think about the South End, and this influenced the policies that
spelled the fate of the neighborhood. 59
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Figure 1.6: Labor Day Parade on Tremont Street in 1896. The image illustrates how the
neighborhood had undergone a transformation from genteel enclave to a working-class area by
the eve of the twentieth century. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

Sanborn, Wolfe, and Woods each hoped to transform South End cultural space, but they came
to contradictory conclusions. The intelligence and empathy of the lodging house residents
surprised Alvan Sanborn. The resident “could usually read and write, and does read the
newspapers.” Residents, he discovered, also showed strong interpersonal skills, including a
“perception of the workings of the human heart and mind (that) is keen and almost unerring.” He
also discovered a “real esprit de Corps: among them. The social obligation is heartily accepted.
32

Not to share one's luck with one's pals is the only unpardonable sin.”60 He concluded that “the
lodgers' code of honor is not essentially different from that which prevails in the world of
trade.”61 According to Sanborn, cultural customs and mores, rather than intellectual ability and
ethical framework, proved the major difference between different social classes in Boston.
Albert Wolfe, by contrast, observed a “selfish individualism” among South End residents
with deep economic roots: “modern competitive industry is a grimly contested game, in which
every man's hand is against his fellow.”62 Individualism was especially deleterious in the South
End because its neighborhoods were “made up of people who have no local attachments and are
separated from one another by distinctions of race and religion. There is no concerted action for
a better social life, no watchfulness over common interests.” 63 Wolfe viewed the streets and the
subsequent social and cultural production as a source of division that led to neighborhood
malaise. The choices that residents made within the South End milieu caused these problems.
According to Woods, formal organizations were ill suited to assist in solving the
neighborhood’s issues. Instead, corrupt political organizations and morally debasing forms of
association commanded residents’ attention. Internecine strife resulted and in turn occluded the
neighborhood’s growth. In this way, the overall structure of urban life constrained human
potential. Wolfe agreed, positing that “country and village and town know what community-life
is. The city knows chiefly group-life. And within and between the groups constant conflict in an
all but Darwinian struggle is the normal condition.” 64 Wolfe offered a nod to New England’s
Puritan roots in his assessment. In the past, New England communities had been focused on a
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single church and town meeting. Reformers saw the heterogeneity of the South End as the
fundamental difference between contemporary urban life and the “ideal” communities of the
region’s past. The fact that the neighborhood was the most diverse in Boston, not necessarily its
poorest, made it the focal point of outside attention. 65
Robert Woods had difficulty connecting the poor modes of social organization and negative
behavior, however. He admitted that crime proved no more of a problem in the South End than
in other sections of the city. It was not “confined to any one locality or section [of the city], but
may happen anywhere throughout the entire district. In the South Cove [in the South End] even,
with its traditions of lawlessness, crime is hardly more frequent than elsewhere.” He concluded,
“there are today no criminal centres in the South End.”66 At the same time, Woods viewed the
neighborhood as fertile ground for the “microbe of criminality.” In tenement areas, for example,
he witnessed “debasing sights and sounds,” and concluded that “contact with the vicious and
depraved, induces, if it does not compel, the development of the worst morbid tendencies. A
child born in such a place is almost predestined to a vicious if not criminal life.” 67 For Woods,
“crime and immorality” could be attributed to certain industrial areas and racial groups.68
Researchers surveyed the South End in order to make recommendations regarding problems
and potential solutions. In important ways, these recommendations were progressive and
thoughtful. For example, Albert Wolfe argued that each lodging house should contain a public
parlor on its first floor where residents could socialize with one another and entertain guests. In
addition, he wanted local industries to provide public cafeterias for workers to obtain affordable
meals. Furthermore, he and other reformers sought to work with existing social organizations.

65
66
67
68

Shapiro “Woods and the Settlement House Impulse,” 216.
Woods, City Wilderness, 148.
Woods, City Wilderness, 152.
Woods, City Wilderness, 170.
34

Woods wanted the South End House to engage in a symbiotic relationship with existing
neighborhood organizations: “Whatever trade unions, workingmen's clubs, temperance societies,
and even political clubs there are, ought to receive the sympathy, and so far as is possible
without compromise, the active support of the settlement.” 69 Woods and his associates
recommended neighborhood empowerment and autonomy in a way that was quite progressive in
the context of the time period. Woods argued, “The reestablishment of a degree of local
government in this great district is positively necessary, not only for the political training of
citizens, but for securing the local identity and local loyalty out of which the feeling of social
responsibility springs.”70
However, Wolfe, Woods, and the operators of the South End House as a whole sought to alter
the space in which residents produced and reproduced their culture. For example, Wolfe’s public
parlors and eateries would have provided middle class folks more opportunities to direct the
behavior and thought of residents. The South End’s eateries represented a choice of food
matched with ethnic tastes and peer associations. Eating habits were part of their heritage. In
addition, neighborhood eateries functioned as a place for information exchange and social
expression. Wolfe’s reforms would have limited the choices and activities of residents.
Furthermore, his recommendations regarding public parlors would have brought residents out
from behind closed doors and into a place where social superiors could observe and direct their
behavior.
Woods viewed the range of the social organizations in the neighborhood as deficient in
providing structure to residents’ lives. He felt theatres represented a lost opportunity to instruct
residents of the neighborhood in more socially responsible forms of behavior: “the important
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point is not the harm done, but the good left undone. The power of the theatre over the masses of
the people constitutes one of its greatest educational fields.” 71 Moving his way up from small to
large organizations, Woods observed that “It seems to be repugnant to Catholic theory that the
church should enter into the non-religious life of its adherents, aside from its traditional work of
education and charity.”72 Both Wolfe and Woods represented the settlement house as the social
organization with the means to solve to the South End’s problems.

Figure 1.7: Washington Street, 1899. The image shows the South End as a mixed-use
neighborhood. The area in the right foreground, adjacent to the Cathedral of the Holy Cross
would eventually become the area of one of Boston first renewal projects: Cathedral Project.
(Image: Wikimedia Commons)
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Despite the fact reformers identified the root cause of the neighborhood’ issues as economic,
they formed conclusions that blamed residents rather than structural economic disadvantages.
Woods admitted that: “the economic bearing of these things is important, though elusive.”73
Because he could not precisely identify the problem he sought to answer, he concluded with
frustration: “so much of the social wreckage must be dredged out. Any other course with this
class itself is hopeless”74 This would leave only “the honest unemployed, no longer confused
with the loafer or the vagabond.”75 While not sketched out in detail, a clear pattern of thinking
can be delineated. The idea that residents degraded the neighborhood began to take shape, thus
justifying their removal.
The South End House played a major role in the neighborhood for years to come. The
documentation of fieldworkers provides a record of the settlement’s attempt to alter the culture
of the South End. Woods posited that: “The first and constant effort of the settlement should be
to have its men or its women come into relations of friendliness and intimacy with the people in
their homes.” As a result, “the homes of the neighborhood will be better in their sanitary
condition, in their food, in their reading, in their enjoyments, in their morals, and in their
religious life.”76 Esther Barrows, who worked at the South End House, called on residents in
their homes: “if the neighborhood was our temple, then its homes were the holy of holies. The
place whereon thou standest is holy ground,' was the thought impressed upon would-be
callers.”77 In the home, middle-class settlement house workers instructed residents in morality
and domestic economics, a practice that extended back to New York’s Bowery district in the
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early nineteenth century. 78 The settlement house codified and systematized this practice, marking
out a dominance ritual that became part of life in the South End.
Patterns Coalesce in the Early Twentieth Century
During the first thirty years of the twentieth century, a new pattern of thought regarding
settlement work, urban planning, sociology, science, and social work coalesced. In general,
planners feared that urban expansion could lead to social decay. The Swiss-French urban planner
Le Corbusier, for instance, championed the “skyscraper in a park,” which took form in many
places, notably the Prudential Center in Boston. The Prudential, built in the early 1960s after
Boston’s New York Streets project, straddles the South End and Back Bay. Here employees
could work, shop, and eat without ever walking on a city street. Frank Lloyd Wright championed
the Garden City, designed with nature beyond the city limits.79 This type of planning reflected a
longstanding pastoral ideal in American life.80 The expansion of the suburbs and the attempts to
sanitize cities were both a result of trends like these.
At the center of this new perspective on the city was the Chicago School of Sociology and its
influential practitioners, Ernest Burgess, Louis Wirth, and Robert Park, who coined the term
urban ecology to describe their understanding of how cities functioned. Their research argued for
restructuring cities in a way that limited organic forms of development and the types of culture
that developed from it. Park felt that residents who lived in run-down districts created the poor
living conditions that characterized their neighborhood. Residents of working-class sections
displayed “a persistent and distressing uniformity of vice, crime, and poverty.” Quoting Freud,

Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1789-1860 (Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1992): 65-75.
79
Peter Fitting, “Urban Planning/Utopian Dreaming: LeCorbusier’s Chadigrarh Today.”
80
Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America
(Oxford University Press, 1964): 3-33.
78

38

Park argued that “Civilization, in the interest of the common welfare, demands the suppression
sometimes, and the control always, of these wild, natural dispositions.” 81 Consequently, Park
believed that people living in run-down districts could not control their behavior. That control
would have to come from external forces. 82
Under the terms outlined by the new school of urban ecology, obsolescence became a key
term in planning discourse. Horace F. Clark’s book, Appraising the Home defined obsolescence
as "social deterioration,"83 caused by a particular building’s “comparative advantages for use or
enjoyment.”84 Examining the ecological “growth and shift of land use districts” became the basis
for this determination.85 By the mid 1930s, terms such as neighborhood obsolescence and blight
became common ways of describing and understanding the menu of options planners used to
reform cities. Racial and ethnic composition directly influenced thinking. Once a neighborhood
received the designation of “blighted” or “slum,” it would have a difficult time obtaining
resources for continued survival. 86
The New Deal Accelerates Patterns of Thought and Behavior
The opportunity for federal dollars from the New Deal brought the issue of “slum clearance” to
the center of city leaders’ attention. In doing so, it called existing bureaucracies to action and
hastened the creation of new organizations. The United States Housing Authority (USHA) acted
as the bureaucratic apparatus to institute the guidelines associated with professional planners
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discourse regarding neighborhoods and their quality. The Boston Housing Authority (BHA),
created as a subdivision of USHA and the Boston City Planning Board (BCPB), acted as local
arms of federal purview. Formed in 1913, the BCPB functioned as Boston’s original urban
planning organization. Employing information provided by the Works Progress Administration
(WPA), the BCPB led efforts to formulate a “master plan” for Boston. 87
In 1938 the New Deal offered the Boston city council the use of funds for urban
improvement. The prospect of federal money inspired a debate over what urban improvement
meant and how it could be properly accomplished. Clement Norton argued that “opponents of
slum clearance who cover up by claiming that the real poor will not benefit…belong to the same
Tory element that opposed public schools.” Norton, a long-time thorn in Mayor James Curley’s
side, felt too many government dollars bypassed Boston because of well-documented corruption
in city administration. Since federal programs offered guaranteed dollars, Norton asked: “Why
not Boston?” The city paid federal taxes, and so they may as well take advantage of money the
federal government offered. In addition, the funds would allow officials to disperse political
patronage.
Councilor Perlie Dyar Chase, a Back Bay attorney, opposed the plan because it offered no
improvements for current residents. The “20-odd millions of taxpayer money” would not solve
problems for “the poor unfortunate who will be evicted from their homes and will have to seek
quarters elsewhere.” Chase pointed out that “These are the people who should really benefit by
this government program and under the current circumstances they are not.” 88 However, at this
point, the weight of institutional thought and practice favored Norton.
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The plan to develop government sponsored housing projects gained support. Churches and
universities joined government officials in calling for slum clearance. BHA member Reverend
Thomas Reynolds argued that with potential federal money on the line, the city could not stay
neutral: “If we do not avail ourselves of the money offered by the Federal Government…then
some other place will get it and you will pay for it.” According to Reynolds’s calculation, “Fifty
percent of the people of Boston are living in old and dilapidated housing.” Due to these
circumstances, Reynolds felt urban improvement followed one path: “The only way to get rid of
these places will be through new building.” 89
In 1940, the city used eminent domain to remove residents along a block perpendicular to
Harrison Ave, a main thoroughfare in the South End, to create one of the city’s first housing
projects. World War Two disrupted the project, which did not resume until 1946. This
undertaking, which became known as the Cathedral Housing Project, and several others around
the city, such as the Old Colony Housing Project in nearby South Boston, functioned as the city’s
first foray into wholesale destruction and rebuilding. 90 While officials undertook this project
they mulled programs of increased scope in the adjacent New York Streets neighborhood. In
1943 and 1946 the BCPB commissioned studies to examine Boston’s neighborhood and housing
conditions and make policy recommendations.
The resulting studies identified problems occurring in the South End and made
recommendations. The 1940 census indicated “decentralization” led to middle-class whites
leaving cities en masse, utilizing mass transit and parkways to commute from the suburbs.
“Blighted areas,” the report concluded, “dragged down the rest of the community.” City officials
should instead endeavor to make “conditions of urban life less repellent” in order to “draw
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desirable citizens back to the city.”91 The studies’ conclusions illustrate that planners
contemplated “two profoundly different ways to approach rehabilitation of the blighted areas.”
The first plan centered on boldness, with an eventual goal of a “redeveloped city” at which point
“subsidiary neighborhood plans” could emerge. Neighborhood plans should be “unconfused” by
“too careful adherence to present considerations.” The opposing position required taking
“everything as it is” and then proceeding “block-by-block” with neighborhood rehabilitation, but
such an approach would render neighborhoods “frozen with the present disharmonies” and leave
the city saddled with costs. Researchers in the 1940s concluded that “A constructive approach
lies between these extremes and much nearer to the first.” Larger-scale plans could reorganize
the landscape with the added benefit of removing human causes of blight. The opportunity to
employ eminent domain would reduce roadblocks to property acquisition.92
Environmental Conditions and Discourse
The assessment of environmental conditions proved key to the fate of the neighborhood.
BCPB officials used Works Progress Administration (WPA) research to inform its conclusions.
According to their findings, many residents in Boston’s working-class neighborhoods lacked
essential components of proper housing. Of applicants for government housing, ninety-five
percent relied on oil burners in kitchens rather than central heating. More than half lacked a
bathroom; most families shared one toilet in a central location. Apartments had common issues:
no electricity, lack of air and light, bedrooms that could only be reached through other bedrooms,
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and three or four people sleeping in the same room. 93 BCPB writers concluded that lack of
homeownership led to a decline in pride in the neighborhood and corresponding physical
decline.94 According to this information the actual physical structures were not in disrepair, but
the subsidiary components, such as wiring and plumbing, required a major overhaul. Residents
were being victimized twice: landlords either could not or did not update their housing; and the
residents were seen as the cause of the problem because they were blamed for failing to improve
houses they did not own.
Two factors caused housing conditions to decline. On one hand, absentee landlords often
failed to update residences, instead allowing them to decline, in many cases to a point beyond
repair. In other cases, landlords did not have the capital to provide for substantial improvement.
One startling example illustrates how renters were affected by the decline of housing conditions.
When the rear wall of his tenement collapsed, police arrested South End resident Frank Costanza
for drunkenness. Officials condemned the building the previous week, but Costanza and a few
former tenants squatted in the apartment because they had no other options for housing. The
occupants were portrayed as nuisances that placed an unnecessary strain on city services.
Boston’s building commissioner lamented “there was nothing he could do” beyond serving
eviction notices and demand absentee landlord Rose Bornstein of Mattapan do the same. 95 It is
unclear if Bornstein had the money to perform the maintenance and refused, or simply lacked the
funds. Either way, no one advocated for Costanza as a resident who deserved a livable residence.
The Globe portrayed the residents rather than landlords as the problem.
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As its residents struggled to maintain essential services, the image of South Enders as
environmental detriments was reinforced. City officials provided statistics to the Globe that
emphasized the neighborhood’s financial drag on the city as a whole. Each acre of South End
land cost the city an additional eighteen thousand dollars compared to other neighborhoods over
one year’s time. In addition, each resident of a blighted area brought in thirty-four dollars in
revenue, while costing the city eighty-two. Catholic leaders, present with city officials when they
provided these statistics at a news conference, stated in bold terms: “One of the most malignant
defects in our social system is the tolerance of the American city slums.” Church leaders felt
residents created the malignancy. The commission and BHA agreed: “disease ridden areas” must
be razed.96
Newspapers followed in step with the arguments of city leaders. The negative depiction of
residents was intended to impact public opinion on potential slum clearance. Take, for example,
a story about the “trash” problem in the South End. According to a non-attributed source in a
Boston Globe story, “Housewives quite frankly report the situation is mostly of their own
making.”97 The assumption that residents did not bring trash to agreed upon sites for removal
implicated residents in despoiling their surroundings. The author, Betty Dipessa, did not broach
the issue of sanitation services performing its required duty, even though it should have been the
central question in the story. Residents, Dipessa implied, destroyed their own living space.
Studies of crime in the South End again connected residents’ supposed immorality with the
physical conditions of the environment. Staff writer William J. Lewis of the Globe interviewed
Back Bay precinct Captain Louis Disessa, who recently transferred from the South End. Disessa
performed “a statistical survey of police stations throughout the world and came up with a report
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that Boston’s South End station leads the pack for pure action.” Lewis did not press on the
approaches used to acquire the statistics, the data itself, how it compared, and what “action”
meant. As far as possible causes of crime, Disessa noted, there were “28 different nationalities
and races” living in close proximity to one another. 98 The notion of neighborhood heterogeneity
as a negative influence developed during the settlement house era; Disessa demonstrates how
these notions had become systemic in city organizations.
Police arrested numerous South End residents on “moral charges.” Often such arrests acted as
code for sexual misconduct, assault, and exposure, but these charges also illustrate the expansive
interpretation of law and the intrusive capabilities of the police in the South End. In one case,
police raided a “card game” and arrested twenty-seven citizens for “gaming on the Lord’s Day.”
In another, they arrested a man for setting up small-scale betting tournaments on pinball games
in his store. 99 Media dissemination of crime helped cement perceptions about the
neighborhood’s qualities.
The Early Stages of Urban Renewal in Boston
Boston’s urban planners considered the New York Streets important because of its geographic
location south of downtown and proximity to proposed new transportation corridors. These
streets were named for the towns, such as Oswego, Oneida, and Rochester on the railroad line
that connected to Albany. In 1943, the BCPB studied the area and concluded it would be "best
used, as it always has been, as low-cost residential with ancillary business only on chosen
streets.” The authors noted the possibilities for rehabilitating existing structures, the proximity of
transportation and employment opportunities, and the availability of recreational facilities in
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support of their conclusions. Its writers hoped possible renewal projects could create additional
parks and outdoor recreational opportunities for residents.100
The demographics of the neighborhood began to change in the late 1940s, resulting in the
further decline of its social status. This, in turn, would contribute to city officials’ changing
analysis of the neighborhood. African-American resident George Adams noticed changes to the
neighborhood as more blacks moved into the South End following the war. He observed:
“segregation increased as white people migrated to suburbia and black people migrated in from
the southern farm areas.” This trend caused an “imbalance” in the South End’s housing situation:
“schools began to break down and blacks were refused housing in suburbia.” In addition,
African-Americans choices became constrained due to government policy: “the banks made it
quite difficult, if not impossible, for minority people or blacks to secure loans.”101
A 1952 BHA proposal for redevelopment of the New York Streets reflected a strongly
changed tone from the two BCPB reports produced in the 1940s. Title I of the 1949 Federal
Housing Act promised large amounts of federal dollars for urban renewal projects, provided
officials designed a “master plan” for the whole city. In the master plan, the New York Streets
area stood right next to the proposed north-south highway, soon to be Interstate 93. The new
transportation network’s focus on the automobile signaled the decline of railroads. For the South
End, this meant a further decline of industry after suffering from capital flight over the preceding
decades. These factors coupled with the demographic changes sealed the neighborhood’s fate.
The BHA’s 1952 report described the South End as a threat to the city as a whole. Its authors
argued that the South End was “a menace to housing and a barrier to proper business
development.” The layout and function of the existing neighborhood reflected “indiscriminate”
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development. Consequently, it stood “disfigured” by its own “filth.” These deplorable conditions
occurred because “any vestige of pride in the surroundings has long since been abandoned by the
people there.” Countering previous conclusions regarding housing, recreation, and employment
opportunities, the authors declared: “the unfavorable neighborhood conditions are so obvious in
the New York Streets area that no statistical survey of these environmental factors was
undertaken.” Instead the report recommended that the city “offer to potential users a level tract of
land of substantial size situated close to the business heart of the city” and near to transportation
junctions. Officials acknowledged that this project would require taking “most” of the land in the
New York Streets area from current residents. 102
Following the dispersal of the New York Streets assessment in 1952, both major newspapers,
the Herald and Globe, featured stories on the neighborhood’s purportedly deplorable conditions.
The Herald produced a series titled “Boston’s Skid Row” and the Globe devoted numerous
articles to the benefits of slum clearance in the South End, concluding that “for our money, the
sooner the tired old brick walls come tumbling down, the better.” When surveying the
neighborhood, Paul Kneeland, real estate editor for the Globe, imagined a “broken home with
judgments for unpaid bills piled high on a broken kitchen table.” Kneeland concluded by noting
Boston had been witnessing “the slow, smokeless burning of decay” in the South End. In
imagining what occurred in these private homes, Kneeland connected their residents’ behavior
with environmental degradation. 103
In addition to its human toll, the New York Streets project proved a financial loss for the city.
At the outset of the urban renewal, the Boston Redevelopment Authority targeted rooming
houses, the essence of what made the South End a “low-rent” district. Overall, the BRA intended
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to purchase 186 acres, or 30% of the total land area of the neighborhood, where it would
demolish all of the buildings including 5,215 residences. In doing so, it slated a total of 7,500
residents for removal and relocation. According to the BRA, most of the residents would be
moved into public housing. However, only 31% of these individuals were eligible for public
housing and fewer still were relocated successfully. Most individuals reported that they never
heard from the BRA. The BRA set up its relocation office in the neighborhood with only four
weeks remaining before the neighborhood’s slated demolition. The organization charged with
relocation was also supposed to collect rents from apartment dwellers. This contributed to a
dysfunctional dynamic.104 In addition, the city had paid a total of $3,486,000 to landlords in the
neighborhood, or $5.40 per acre. In 1959, 40 percent of the land still lay vacant. It sold the
remaining land for a total of $467,969, or 70 cents per acre. Of the 22 acres that had
encompassed the New York Streets, 6.2 acres was set aside for the relocation of the Boston
Herald. This comprised 45 percent of the developable land in the area. Where the BRA left off,
private speculators picked up. Real estate developers made deals with “slumlords” that allowed
residents to be forcibly evicted from their homes.105
The New York Streets project set in motion the project to realign the South End’s economic
and residential orientation. The streets now stand directly to the southwest of the junction of
Interstates 90 and 93, the two major highways that service Boston. The development of the Mass
Pike and Prudential Center signaled the changing role of the South End. The east-west Mass Pike
made the Boston and Albany Railroad, and its largely African-American labor force, obsolete.
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The Prudential signaled a post-industrial future. While these changes portended gentrification,
city officials hastened this process with the expulsion of minority residents in the 1960s.
Conclusion
Mel King grew up in the New York Streets and has always defended his neighborhood as a
viable place. Discourse about the South End was a manifestation of the city’s power over the
neighborhood. City politicians, businesses, the media, and the universities assumed the mentality
of the residents, and based on this assumption, characterized their physical surroundings—and
this justified their removal. King connected the development of “the highway, the universities,
and the hospitals” that were “pushing people out” and the “expansion of racism that is
institutionalized in our society.”106 For King, this is how racism functioned in Boston. The
average residents had no way to shape the events that were altering the South End. That ability
would come in time.
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CHAPTER 2:
"NO MORE ROADS OVER PEOPLE:"
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN BOSTON, 1955-1970
This chapter explores the South End, Roxbury, and North Dorchester neighborhoods of
Boston from 1955-1970. During this time, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
dislocated African American and Latinx residents from the South End as urban renewal funneled
minorities to Roxbury and North Dorchester. In response to these challenges, minority groups
developed organizations and programs to control the institutions that shaped life in their
community.107 While urban renewal policies employed environmental rhetoric to justify
dislocation, they also employed environmental strategies in degrading the quality of residential
life and making service denial a defining feature of racial inequality. Residents’ geographic and
social isolation allowed the community to be cut off from government programs and financial
services. Poor sanitation, lack of housing code enforcement, and neglect by city institutions
denied residents’ environmental right to a healthy and safe community. Blaming the victim
solidified a discourse about ghettos and their inherent “pathology.” Urban renewal advocates
acted on this premise to justify slum clearance and to explain the problems of the new ghetto in
Roxbury and Dorchester. In doing so, it normalized the methods of abrogating individuals’
property, human, and civil rights.
The efforts of civil rights groups in Boston demonstrate that environmental justice has
existed longer than historians have previously traced. Instead of one or two events sparking a

For an informative overview of gentrification as the process concluded in the South End,
see: Deborah A. Auger, “The Politics of Revitalization in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: The Case
of the South End” Journal of the American Planning Association (1979): 515-522. For a
monograph that justifies urban renewal policy in Boston see: Thomas O’Connor, Building a
New Boston, 187.
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national movement, environmental justice tactics developed over time through practical
experience. In Boston civil rights activists focused on environmental issues and improvements,
including increasing the quality of housing, access to city services, and social capabilities of
residents. The community development movement was a way for minority residents to increase
land and property ownership and gain control local institutions. In the 1960s, the Congress of
Racial Equality (CORE) demanded an end to segregation in public housing and denial of city
services, while it advocated for improved housing conditions, transportation options, and
employment opportunities. The Lower Roxbury Community Corporation (LRCC) built new
homes in the area and directed the construction of a new high school. The Black United Front
(BBUF) employed a radical framework to oppose urban renewal and develop racial pride in the
community. A coalition of groups thwarted plans for the proposed southwest extension of
Interstate-93 through Roxbury in the late 1960s. The efforts of civil rights era groups
demonstrate that environmental justice predates what is considered its official genesis at the end
of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. While not working under such an operation title, groups
fighting for a better life in Boston labored for the same objectives their peers would a generation
later.
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Figure 2.1: Census tracts with 50% African Americans, 1960.108

The Roots of Environmental Racism: Alienation and Isolation
The alienation residents felt in the South End led blacks to conclude that “being a Negro in
Boston is the worst thing in the world.” In the early 1960s, fewer than 1,500 of the 63,165
African American residents of Boston lived outside a boomerang-shaped area that consisted of
parts of the South End, Roxbury, and North Dorchester. Real estate agencies, landlords, and

Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report on
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developers demarcated these borders and sustained de facto segregation patterns that limited
African Americans’ residential options. According to contemporary observers, the South End
functioned as “a ghetto, a reservation, set aside for beings who do not properly qualify as human.
The South End’s silence strikes the outsider. It is the silence of remoteness—the absence of
life.”109 Isolation made it so that residents had “no way to communicate with anybody. You can't
find a decent job or a decent place to live.” A local reverend noted that his community “leads an
existence largely independent of the city that surrounds it.” At a 1966 town hall meeting
designed to elicit feedback from the community, residents: “made the point that no one listens to
them, no one consults them, no one considers their needs.” The report on the meeting concluded
“the Negro in Boston is devoid of political power.” 110
Economic conditions for Boston’s blacks resembled a permanent economic depression. After
1940, African Americans migrated in substantial numbers from the American South. Before
1940, African Americans numbered around three percent of the city’s total population, however
by 1980, the group claimed just over 20 percent. 111 African American migrants faced a different
economic situation in Boston than previous groups. Capital flight impacted the city as the shoe,
textile, and leather industries moved semi-skilled jobs to the southern United States. Many
blacks worked as porters on the railroads, an industry in serious decline with the rise of the
interstate system in the 1950s. The percentage of the African American workforce in laboring
and service jobs reflected these macroeconomic changes, dropping from 65 percent in 1940 to
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about 27 percent in 1970. Furthermore, blacks faced stiff challenges in the remaining industries.
For example, in 1960, Massachusetts had 1,297 apprentices in the building trades, but only 15
blacks. By 1965, the number of apprentices had grown to 2,680; however African Americans
still only held 15 positions. Blacks reported being barred from union membership, even while
these same unions imported workers from other states to fill jobs. A black building contractor
noted, “In all this the Negro is left out, left unemployed or underemployed.” Wage earnings
mirrored the declining job prospects of the black community. The difference between the white
and black male median income jumped from $785 in 1950, to $1,601 in 1960, and 4,914 by
1970. In 1965, between 24.2 and 47.4 percent of Boston’s of black community reported “serious
employment problems.”112
For Boston’s black residents, finding a decent place to live proved “a long, discouraging,
humiliating experience.” The black community’s isolation and low socioeconomic status
negatively impacted the quality and quantity of housing. Residents reported that rooms in
lodging houses were infested with rats and cockroaches, resulting in an increase in health issues
including tuberculosis cases and infant mortality. Social workers told residents to relocate, but
offered no assistance on how to obtain a better room. De facto segregation further limited
housing options. A white landlord reported in 1963 that "we have come to an agreement that we
will not rent to Negroes on this street." Researchers tested the housing market and found that
blacks with similar income levels were rejected for the same apartments that accepted white
tenants. For example, a black man was told “his family was too large” and that he had

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, A Time to Listen, A Time To Act: Voices from the
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insufficient income. The next day, a white man of the same familial and economic profile
applied for the same apartment and was accepted without having to provide any financial
documentation. The city’s housing board guidelines for selecting tenants included the ability to
pay rent and to respect the rights of others. 113 Since these guidelines were rarely followed, blacks
in Boston entered into a “free market” that illegally colluded against them.
Table 2.1: Housing quality in Boston, white and non-white residents, 1960.
Housing

Non-White (Expressed in %)

White

Sound

47

78

Deteriorating

37

13

Dilapidated

10

2

Table 2.2: Percentage of income on housing, white and non-white residents, 1960.114
Non-White

White

Under 17 percent

37

58

Between 17.5 and 22.4
percent

17

12

Over 22.5 percent

46

30

Because they lived in a socioeconomic cluster with low status and clearly demarcated
boundaries, minority residents were denied city services. Pearl Lee, a black resident of Roxbury,
observed that streets had not been swept in five or six months while on Beacon Street in the Back

“Commission on Civil Rights, Report on Housing in Boston,” 20-21.
These figures summarize information presented in the Commission on Civil Rights, Report
on Housing in Boston, 11-15.
113
114

55

Bay “the street sweeper was there every morning.” In the largely black section of Blue Hill
Avenue, trash set outside for collection on Friday night would often stand out for days before
being picked up. Neglect led to crime. A South End resident noted that “Police have isolated the
South End as an area, giving it only token protection.” As a result, prostitution, bookmaking, and
speakeasy types of establishments flourished. A local reverend noted that a hotel known for
prostitution across the street from police headquarters in the South End remained open and its
existence undocumented by the media. The reverend concluded that “anything goes in the South
End.” According to residents, response times for police calls varied depending on which ethnic
or racial group made the call. Black residents that called for assistance reported that it took
police over 20 minutes to arrive, if at all. When a black resident called and reported, "get out
here quick, there is a Negro beating up a white man" to test the response times, the police arrived
in less than two minutes. 115
In 1967, Mel King penned an essay that contended minority groups had been denied a
“physically and psychologically” fulfilling existence. King explained that: “the public and
private institutions that exist in black communities are almost totally controlled by business
structures from outside.” These institutions advanced their own interests, and their decisionmaking often degraded life for residents in those communities. King drew parallels between the
condition non-whites lived in Boston to the “emerging countries” of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. King proclaimed that the “nature of the colonial system is exactly parallel to the nature
of the system under which black people find ourselves living in America.” To solve these
problems, minority residents needed to take control of the institutions that shaped life, such as
better housing, good schools, and increased quantity and quality of jobs. His essay concluded
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that “the power that comes from being able to participate in the changing of one’s condition” was
the surest means of developing a “viable and healthy” community. 116

Figure 2.2: Rear of houses on Harrison Avenue, 1952. This area comprised the New York
Streets project. (Image: Boston City Archives) (available at:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/cityofbostonarchives)
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Figure 2.3: Intersection of Tremont and Shawmut Streets, 1952. (Image: Boston City
Archives)

Urban Renewal in the South End: Dislocation and Dispossession
Urban renewal dislocated minority residents and decimated the institutions that made the area
a minority archipelago. While residents of the South End demanded improved environmental
conditions, the BRA shaped discourse about urban environments and determined which factors
warranted analysis. Planners and city officials prioritized the density of settlement, air pollution,
and noise pollution rather than sanitation services, regulations for the built environment, water,
and sewer systems. These choices were employed to justify dislocation and allow incoming
residents to dictate the agendas of their new communities. With the help of community
institutions, urban renewal removed the foundation of what made the South End a mixed-use
ethnic community: its working-class housing, ethnic eateries, markets, and shops that sustained
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life for residents. By the close of the 1960s, minorities protested that urban renewal “shunted”
them into “concentration camps.”117
Mayor John Collins appointed Edward Logue as the “czar” of urban renewal in 1960, and in
doing so accelerated the pursuit of a “New Boston.” Logue had directed the renewal plans of
New Haven, Connecticut. Contemporaries considered Logue a visionary of urban regeneration,
on par with New York City’s Robert Moses.118 Logue and the BRA labelled the South End as a
"high priority" for urban renewal. To this end, Logue called for $24.2 million dollars for a place
"too promising to ignore, too near the edge of disaster for remedial action to be delayed." By
1963, the BRA had developed a plan for “massive rehabilitation” for the South End through a
consortium of banks it helped develop: Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group (BBURG). 119
In the early 1960s, the South End offered attractive features to young professionals due to its
location, architecture, and layout. The neighborhood’s proximity to Boston’s new commercial
developments extending down its east to west avenues, including the Christian Science Church
and the new Prudential Center, offered employees a chance to live close to work. 120 The potential
for more building along the new Massachusetts Turnpike, which had replaced the Boston and
Albany Railroad, foreshadowed real estate values appreciating in the following years. According
to BRA officials, the second round of urban renewal would emphasize rehabilitation rather than
demolition. The BRA claimed it would renew the neighborhood and retain low-rent housing for
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working-class residents. Despite the plan’s optimistic tone, it also called for 5,900 individuals,
including 3,550 households to be displaced; 1,730 of these households included an elderly parent
living with their children. The city chose not to include relocation services to displaced persons,
and as a result many residents moved elsewhere upon hearing the news of the plan. In 1963, the
BRA announced that 279 units existed for displaced residents, offering this as evidence that
relocation housing existed, even though the plan fell far short of the number of residents that
moved.121
By the late 1950s, BRA initiatives in the South End had failed to generate economic growth.
The area cleared for the New York Streets project stood vacant for several years, until the Boston
Herald built a new headquarters along the northeastern boundary of the neighborhood at the
junction of Interstates 90 and 93. Castle Square, adjacent to the New York Streets area, had been
proposed for demolition in 1959. BRA officials suggested that Castle Square’s proximity to the
new highways and South Station made it ideal for office space, light industry, and new housing.
Residents in the South End petitioned the BRA to ensure new housing for the current residents of
Castle Square, a project that eventually dislocated 644 residents. The BRA contracted with the
local settlement house, United South End Settlements (USES), who in turn received
compensation from the BRA when families moved. Only 77 of the 644 residents, or 12 percent,
moved to BRA replacement housing; the rest dispersed throughout the city. 122
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Figure 2.4: Castle Square Project area, 1965. (Image: Boston City Archives)

The settlement houses in the South End ensured urban renewal benefitted incoming white
professionals over established residents. In 1964, United South End Settlements (USES) received
a grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to study the condition
of housing in the South End, with an emphasis on the brownstone row houses that predominated
in the area. The settlement house gathered a committee of five representatives from the business
community, five professionals, five officials from South End institutions, and 23 residents to
develop plans for rehabilitation. At the outset, the committee created questionnaires to elicit
feedback from the community. However, the committee’s questions and methods of developing
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community participation created a backlash from the neighborhood’s working class. The final
report submitted by USES argued that white middle class professionals would improve the
quality of housing and the social fabric of the neighborhood.123
The housing plans for the South End targeted minority residents for dislocation. Proposals
called for the retention of 75 percent of the neighborhood’s housing. Of the housing set aside,
brownstone row houses comprised 98 percent of the 2,900 residential structures chosen for
rehabilitation. If BRA plans were to serve low to moderate-income people, the South End row
house would be an important source of housing for that population. However, incoming residents
made brownstone housing highly sought after. During the 1960s, the number of occupants in
buildings and the median age of residents decreased, while the occupation of the new residents
changed from working class to middle class. Most of the incoming residents moved from
suburban towns.124 In 1965, the BRA stated it would demolish 5,215 of the South End’s 26,128
housing units. By 1975 the South End had lost 15,328 units, down to only 10,800. Martin Gopen
reflected on his work with working-class residents that: “efforts to ameliorate housing is [sic] not
working. There is no support at the state and federal level for activities and programs.” 125 The
BRA argued that the private market would sort out displacement. However, reducing supply,
increasing demand, and providing financial compensation for incoming residents while forcibly
evicting others created distinct advantages for new residents.
In 1970, the BRA produced a “working paper” on changes to Boston generally and South
End specifically during the 1960s and provided an overview of how the neighborhood would
evolve during the ensuing decade. See: Alexander Ganz and Tina Freeman, Population and
Income of the City of Boston: Recent Evolution and Future Perspective Boston Redevelopment
Authority, 1970. See also: Margaret Suplee Smith, Between City and Suburb: Architecture and
Planning in Boston South End Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University, 1976.
124
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Figure 2.5: Urban Renewal Sign in the South End, mid 1960s. (Image: Boston City Archives)

Resident experiences with the Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD)
demonstrated that efforts seemingly designed to assist the city’s working class contributed to a
decline in status. With an infusion of two million dollars from the Ford Foundation, ABCD
began operating with the charge of functioning as the “human side” of urban renewal in Boston
in 1962. In 1965, federal policy altered ABCD’s mission when it became charged with
overseeing the War on Poverty in Boston. A participant described ABCD’s evolution: “before
one set of nebulous local goals could be defined and digested another group of even more
nebulous objectives, backed by big federal money, was thrust upon it.” Federal funds came with
few guidelines or administrative controls. As a result, the “Johnson rush” doomed the group’s
work as federal funds were consumed by patronage networks and otherwise inefficiently applied.
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Elliot L. Richardson, the state’s Lieutenant Governor, observed ABCD was a “spectacular
disappointment” because of its “sloppy and confused administration.” Minority participants in
ABCD maintained that the organization would have been more effective if it could have
developed a set of policy initiatives without outside interference. 126
A lack of support from key government officials left minority residents without any
influential advocates. Mel King petitioned Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secretary
Robert C. Weaver, the first black cabinet secretary in US history, explaining that he had been
sold a “bill of goods” on urban renewal. He cautioned Weaver that residents of Roxbury would
make every effort to halt government programs undertaken without widespread resident input.
King convinced Weaver to tour Roxbury so that he could, according to King, witness the failures
of urban renewal first hand. King’s tour and explanation of conditions persuaded Weaver that
urban policies harmed minority residents. Weaver promised to make “recommendations” to his
superiors, however the meeting and tour failed to generate any changes in policy. In December
1966, Mel King and a group of black community leaders from across the United States met with
Vice President Hubert Humphrey to discuss the condition of minority neighborhoods in the
nation’s cities. King reported that Humphrey, one of the most liberal politicians in the US, knew
little about the “actual conditions” in cities. If a close ally in the federal government existed, it
would have been a liberal politician like Humphrey, but King surmised a disconnect between
minority residents and those in the highest positions of government. 127
The BRA limited the information it provided to South Enders, discounting the working-class
response to urban renewal and displacement. Residents reported that the BRA’s South End office
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could not specify the number of subsidized houses for low-income residents in the neighborhood.
Individuals in the neighborhood that provided assistance to the BRA in one area such as housing,
transportation, schools, and recreational facilities reported they received little information
regarding other endeavors, or how the pieces fit together as a whole. Henry Wood, a resident of
the South End, noted that “as a result of a lack of leadership and a lack of information, a void has
been created. Rumors and misinformation pervade, encouraging fear and suspicion within the
community." A 1975 report on urban renewal in the South Ended concluded, “the original
process for dealing with the community had not been effective in filtering information down to
the neighborhood and street level.”128 City officials reacted to a human rights crisis—the influx
of working-class blacks from the American South—by blaming the migrants, dislocating them,
and contributing to their inferior status. The BRA treated a human rights crisis with an
environmental component as a “social problem.”
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Figure 2.6: BRA Advertisement for Urban Renewal, circa 1952. (Image: Boston City Archives)

Figure 2.7: Muriel Snowden, Co-Founder of Freedom House. (Image: Boston City Archives)
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Figure 2.8: Architect’s Rendering of the Prudential Center, late 1950s. (Image: Boston City
Archives)

Civil Rights’ Environmental Focus
The Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) dealt with issues in Boston through the lens of
environmental justice, employing the same methods that the Dudley Street Initiative (DSNI)
would implement 20 years later. For example, CORE developed businesses owned and operated
by community members and petitioned First National Bank for loans to redevelop the area. It
also established a standing employment committee that completed a study of Boston’s businesses
67

and potential job opportunities for the city’s minorities. The group engaged in direct action with
a variety of organizations, including supermarkets, in an attempt to bring more food options to
Roxbury and North Dorchester. These efforts include a price comparison of basic staples to
ensure local markets charged fair prices. In an attempt to combat negative stereotypes in the
media, CORE induced local newspapers to cover housing conditions in Roxbury and the South
End. Finally, CORE cleaned up its community without the help of city services. Upon going
weeks without trash pickup, Roxbury residents brought their trash to city hall and dumped it with
a sign that read, “Signed: The Citizens and Taxpayers of Roxbury.” CORE established some
important precedents in analyzing and acting upon environmental inequality broadly.129
CORE’s philosophy and tactics facilitated activism in Boston’s black community. Organized
in Boston in 1964, CORE functioned as a local chapter of a national organization that fought to
end racial discrimination by using direct and non-violent methods. An activist approach required
the “arousal and action” of blacks’ political self-consciousness to engage in concerted action for
an agreed upon set of objectives. The group addressed schools, training programs, welfare, and
housing as specific points of inequity that undermined life for African Americans. Action
towards these goals required “a multi-pronged movement” that would counter the “economic and
political powerlessness of the Negro community.” CORE developed multiple non-violent
approaches, including demonstrations, street corner rallies, canvassing, and community
organization, with a goal to “crystallize the issues and mobilize the people.” The group organized
welfare recipients to collectively “fight the abuses” of the city’s welfare programs; demanded
improved housing conditions; called for increased employment opportunities; and argued for
increased budgets for mostly black schools and for the integration of schools in mixed-race
Miranda: Box 2, Folder 1. See 3/11/1966- “There’s A Real Community Action Program:
Trash dumped where the city will notice it” and 1/31/1966.
129
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school districts. CORE also created its own educational program, opening “freedom schools” in
which small seminar-like teaching environments educated participants about political issues and
voter registration efforts.130
Boston’s chapter of CORE made housing problems the focal point of its activism. The group
participated in picket lines, sit-ins, rent strikes, community organization, negotiation, and
legislation proposals to improve housing conditions. They attacked slumlords and petitioned the
state to improve housing conditions for Boston’s black residents. In 1964, CORE authored a
brochure called “Why we Picket” that demanded the landlord at 90 through 96 Hammond Street
repair his rental unit, including removing mice and cockroaches, repairing broken windows,
removing fire hazards, and replacing exposed sewage pipes. By 1966, CORE had established
guidelines for rent strikes in response to housing code violations. Tenants had to have a specific
identifiable issue from a list that included rats, roaches, plumbing leaks, flooding, or holes in
ceilings, floors, or walls. To participate, the resident needed to be up to date on the rent and have
provided a complaint in writing to the landlord. At that point, the tenant could call the housing
inspection department to inspect the apartment and find visible defects. After these requirements
had been met, residents could receive assistance at the CORE office and work with a lawyer to
file a complaint in Boston Superior Court. CORE distributed a rent strike fact sheet to residents
of Roxbury to encourage participation.131
CORE made housing improvements and ownership the centerpiece of its efforts. The group
argued that the BRA offered only “lip service” when attempting to solve the problems of housing
for the working-class. Because of the limited supply of housing for African Americans, plans to
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demolish housing and construct the proposed Southwest expressway through Roxbury proved
non-negotiable. Such plans, the organization argued, worsened housing prospects for Roxbury
residents and benefitted suburban commuters. While residential options declined due to urban
renewal policy, the public housing system suffered from poor management. In 1965, 4,500
applicants competed for 500 new units in public housing while the bureaucracy dealing with
public housing proved inefficient and insensitive to tenants’ needs. In 1965, CORE acted on
behalf of residents currently living in or eligible for public housing. The group charged that the
“City acts weakly on CORE’s slum demands,” asserting that officials inspected rental housing in
Roxbury but failed to ensure landlords perform necessary repairs.132 In 1967, the group created a
“Proposal for New CORE Housing Program” that outlined methods for funding the purchase,
rehabilitation, and construction of cooperative housing. Efforts made toward the development of
cooperative housing would include residents in the planning process and provide for a tenant
education program designed to assist them with navigating the housing market. 133
As a leading advocate for civil rights in Boston, CORE became a liaison between the federal
government and the black community, a role that greatly expanded during Lyndon Johnson’s
War on Poverty program. According to federal legislation, money designated for so called
community action programs would fund groups representing minority neighborhoods so they
could “have a powerful and effective voice in planning for and bringing about needed
improvements in their own communities.” For CORE, this included assisting in the development
of a Head Start program and neighborhood youth corp. CORE also developed and supported
Mothers for Adequate Welfare (MAW), a group of concerned women organized to demand
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improvements to the welfare offices and programs. These problems involved, as one participant
put it, “not knowing our rights, not having good hospitals we can go to, (and) not having enough
money.” MAW demanded that mothers on welfare hold positions on the department’s board of
appeals, help to run day care centers, and to get the maximum amount of money allowed by
law.134
In May 1967, the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation (LRCC) developed as a vehicle
for African American opposition to urban renewal. A 1962 report by the Harvard Graduate
School of Education that recommended a 5,000 student campus style high school in Boston
spurred the development of the LRCC. The plan called for 60 acres to be set aside in the
Madison Park area of Lower Roxbury, of which 57 acres would be claimed by eminent domain.
In response to the BRA’s plans, members of LRCC created a petition signed by 350 residents
and met with the BRA, including Ed Logue. 135 In 1968, when the federal government charged
city planning boards with eliciting greater resident participation, the LRCC countered that these
committees failed to represent the community. LRCC members opposed legislation that
suggested the construction of prefabricated homes in Roxbury, on the grounds that it diminished
both the quality of housing and potential employment opportunities from construction. Finally,
the LRCC demanded an end to the BRA contracting with suburban developers to direct renewal
projects, arguing that it put money into the hands of private developers who sought profit over
rebuilding communities.136
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Figure 2.9: Proposed Campus High School Area, 1967. (Image: Boston City Archives)

The LRCC’s plan for community development identified the objectives, and developed the
strategies and tactics of environmental justice. The group developed a cadre of individuals who
could function as a consultant to residents and liaison to city agencies. To advocate for residents’
needs, the group initiated five committees to address areas of concern in Roxbury: housing,
services, business development, relocation, and education. The housing committee suggested that
cooperatively owned housing, including new buildings and rehabilitation of existing structures,
would quell displacement, increase supply, and keep real estate prices down. Out of its
committee work, the LRCC demanded that the community be provided essential services,
including food, banking, laundry, health and beauty stores. The services committee argued for
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healthcare, dental care, family counseling, daycare, recreation, speech and hearing, drug and
alcohol counseling, and programs for the elderly. The LRCC also instituted short term and
concrete objectives such as a field day in July of 1968. A local resident commented on the “fun
and excitement. The games, booths, and entertainment all were great!” 137 In 1968, the group
designed the Campus High School in Roxbury and the housing component of the project. The
Model Neighborhood program made the LRCC sponsor/developer of renewal activity in Lower
Roxbury.138
Minority Residents Fight for Community Control
Urban renewal activated the political consciousness of individuals who viewed increased
control over local institutions as means to confront racism and improve the quality of life for the
community. One such individual, Martin Gopen, grew up in Brookline, an affluent suburb of
Boston, and as a graduate student in English at Boston University during the late 1950s, heard
Mel King speak during his campaign for the Boston school board. King, an emerging black
activist who would eventually publish several books and run for mayor in 1983, changed
Gopen’s academic and life plans that evening: “He was talking in terms of people, about the
injustices done to people in the name of urban renewal, in the name of progress.” As a result of
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hearing this perspective, Gopen took a position with King in USES working in the literacy and
employment training programs. 139
In 1967, Gopen and King formed Citizens for a United South End (CAUSE) to provide a
voice for the dispossessed. At a March 1969 city council meeting, CAUSE demanded a quid pro
quo for displacement in the South End. The group advocated for five thousand housing units in
Lower Roxbury and demanded that the BRA acquire houses for rehabilitation and development
for and by the minority community. According to CAUSE, minorities should “carry out the
programs to the fullest extent possible including, management, administration, and construction
activity.” For its part, the BRA claimed that it had no jurisdiction to “delegate any of its
authority” to neighborhood associations. Martin Gopen reflected that, “right now I’m
experiencing much pain in that I see the goals and realizations of our efforts becoming less and
less attainable while justification for the struggle escalates.” 140
In 1968, the Puerto Rican community merged with CAUSE and won the development of the
Villa Victoria (Victory Housing) along Tremont Street, constructing nearly 400 units housing
and rehabilitating another 200 units. In January 1967, nine Puerto Rican families along West
Newton Street near Massachusetts Avenue participated in a rent strike after the landlord turned
off the heat. The families’ effort activated a political consciousness in the neighborhood’s six to
seven thousand Latinx residents. While the landlord turned the heat back on, the residents
channeled their efforts into an “Action Center” designed to assist residents with their housing
concerns. The center insisted that city building inspectors examine buildings with broken sewer
pipes and rat infestations. City officials inspected and condemned buildings and assisted
residents with finding other homes, but the problem of housing shortages still existed. The
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Action Center argued that urban renewal severed trust with Latinx residents after USES
contracted with the BRA to displace Puerto Rican residents and encourage middle class families
to move in. Tony Molino, an action center leader, charged the BRA and Lyndon Johnson’s War
on Poverty with marginalizing Latinx residents by attempting to break up “the ghetto.” Rather
than work with the “paternalistic” settlement house, Puerto Ricans joined CAUSE. Together with
CAUSE, Latinx residents won a hard-fought victory to direct their own lives and community
through the establishment of Villa Victoria. 141
In 1968, plans for a parking lot in the South End developed into a microcosm of the class and
race-based struggle for land in the neighborhood. John Hynes, Boston’s mayor, facilitated plans
for a parking lot adjacent to John Hancock corporate headquarters. In opposition to city agencies,
CAUSE developed “sound plans for low and moderate-income housing” at the same site. At
first, Martin Gopen and several members of CAUSE blocked the entry to the proposed parking
lot as a symbolic act of resistance. However, when a van accelerated and knocked Mel King to
the ground, resistance among protesters stiffened. Gopen ran next to the van, ripped off its
antenna and pounded his fist on its windshield. A ruckus ensued. The Boston Police arrived, put
Mel King in handcuffs, and placed him in the back of a police van. Gopen climbed into the back
of the van, grabbed King, and ran for an escape. They were both arrested, and Gopen charged on
multiple counts.
The arrest of Gopen and King led to the “Tent City” protest. This organic expression of
opposition to urban renewal helped protesters to develop further interventions on behalf of
working-class residents. In the parking lot, participants organized tents into arts and residential
Harvard Crimson, 11/16/1967. See also: Mario Luis Small, Villa Victoria: The
Transformation of Social Capital in a Boston Barrio Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2004; Rachel Bratt, “Community Based Housing: Potential for a New Strategy” The Trotter
Institute, Paper 21 (1985).
141
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districts, connecting the different sections with roads, including a main thoroughfare. The
students at the graduate school of urban planning at MIT assisted with the logistics. King and
Gopen convinced suburban commuters to park their cars in the driveways of the residences to
give the neighborhood a greater sense of authenticity. Together, the group created, “a carnival
like atmosphere.” As the time wore on, activists developed competing visions of the protest’s
mission. In addition, undercover police infiltrated the makeshift neighborhood, shaking the
confidence of the participants. When a local reverend offered ten thousand dollars for the
activists to disband, a quorum viewed it opportune time to acquiesce. For his part, King felt
ending the protest was “one of the biggest mistakes that we ever made” because it gave the
appearance that the group could be bought off. Despite the setback handed to Tent City, CAUSE
continued to push forward with its housing agenda. 142
A “New Environment” Worsens Inequality in Roxbury
Urban renewal activity impacted Roxbury through several initiatives: the Washington Park
program, the development of public housing, and the availability of home improvement loans.
Upon assuming control of the BRA, it became imperative for Edward Logue to see existing
projects through in order to gain approval for new endeavors from the federal government. Put
simply, the overhaul of the downtown core would not happen if Washington Park remained
incomplete.143 Logue recalled asking: "’what does the neighborhood need?' Back came 'police
station, courthouse, housing, schools, and parks.’” Middle-class blacks, who had seen their
community drastically changed by low-income migrants, viewed urban renewal as a lifeline to a
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sinking section of the city. Logue reflected in 1990 that Washington Park “was increasingly
becoming a ghetto. There was a need for stability.” 144 Urban renewal in Roxbury subordinated
the concerns of residents most in need because planners viewed working-class blacks as a
problem society must control rather than a product of society’s problems.
In 1963 Mayor John Collins and the BRA presented a redevelopment proposal for the
Washington Park area that offered to “plan with the residents” of Roxbury to create “a new
environment for the people who live there.” Previously, however, Logue had announced that the
BRA held no responsibility for finding new housing for residents displaced by renewal. So when
Logue and Collins announced their desire for “maximum feasible participation” from resident
groups, it implied working with established middle-class organizations. BRA authors noted that
many residents in the Washington Park organized block associations charged with maintaining
the environmental quality of the neighborhood but concluded these groups could not fully
implement their improvement agendas without the assistance of a “master plan.” The report
concluded that some residents “pose a serious threat to the community” because of their
inadequate home maintenance. According to BRA planners, “such blighted areas” led to rat
infestations, disease, including tuberculosis, and a growing number of fires that would require
demolition. In the late 1950s, 81% of residents in the Washington Park area could not afford the
median apartment rental in the city. Since Boston’s African Americans had limited housing
options outside the immediate vicinity, renewal of housing in the area would be crucial to the
residents’ fortunes.145
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The black middle-class Freedom House (FH) signed off on urban renewal and contributed to
the marginalization of working-class blacks. Started in 1949 in Roxbury by Muriel and Otto
Snowden, FH functioned as an African-American civic group created in the settlement house
model. Muriel Snowden, a graduate of Radcliffe, considered herself the voice of the black
community and chief interlocutor with BRA officials. FH organized improvement projects in the
late 1950s, but while doing so, it kept many block associations separate. Preventing the
associations from combining limited cross-pollination of ideas and development of
neighborhood-wide leaders and leadership organizations. In addition, FH preferred to work with
homeowners as opposed to renters, assuming that renters lacked “character.” Muriel Snowden
argued residents needed to develop their “social standards” in order to keep the neighborhood
clean.146 Ed Logue reflected that the Snowdens opposed low-income housing in Washington Park
– “period.”147
The BRA rebuilt Washington Park as a “complete community” to fix the perceived social ills
that plagued the area. Ed Logue explained: “there will be no long-range solution to the social
problems unless we get rid of bad housing.” The city paid $25 million of the estimated $75
million cost to rebuild the streets, clear land, and install water, sewer, and electricity, at which
point it planned to sell the land to private developers to facilitate construction and rehabilitation,
with 1,772 houses slated for improvements. The BRA promised that dislocated residents would
be moved into “decent, safe, and sanitary housing.” The plan offered to build 1,500 new units of
“attractive and modern” public housing dispersed throughout the area in town and row houses.
According to planners, five new schools, a library, police station, recreational facilities, and
parks would avert the juvenile delinquency that had become prevalent. For Dudley Square, a new
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civic center and shopping mall would replace several “seedy and rundown” buildings. In total,
the renewal area comprised 502 acres, 71 percent of which consisted of residences, or 356 acres.
Eighty-five acres with 985 buildings on it met the bulldozer. The greatest housing clearance
occurred on the streets where the poorest African American migrants resided. 148
Mel King characterized Lower Roxbury’s “renewal” as “neo-colonialism in its most subtle
form,” a process that kept blacks “in their place.” By 1967, 2,500 households had moved
permanently, to which the BRA added an additional 900 families before 1970. In 1968, the BRA
invested over twenty-seven million dollars in federal funds to renovate 2,300 apartments on a
“crash” schedule. Designed to encourage developers to rehabilitate housing for low income
residents in great quantity in a short amount of time, plans for Lower Roxbury intended to “break
away from traditional concerns with financial soundness and without red tape to respond to the
needs of ghetto residents.” The BRA announced that Section 220 of the Housing Act called on
area banks to “stand ready with loans.” In reality, the BRA directed banks to offer market rate
loans to minority residents. This policy offered access to mortgages that most minorities could
not otherwise attain, but without assistance most could not meet the requirements. Many of the
property owners who obtained loans through BRA programs displaced their tenants at the outset
of rehabilitation. This population went unrecorded by the compilers of official statistics. 149
Rather than providing renewal funds for residents and locally owned businesses, the BRA
gave contracts to suburban companies to rehabilitate sections of Roxbury, thus channeling
money away from, rather than into the community. Within two years, the BRA claimed success
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by noting that 2,291 residences had been rehabilitated and were on the market for at or below the
market rate in 1969. Residents, however, viewed the project as a failure, charging the housing
rehabilitation with creating “human hardships and inequities caused by the program’s initial
design and administration.” Only about 38 percent of the designated “Washington Park Urban
Renewal Area” residents were eligible for relocation benefits as displaced households.
Furthermore, critics of the plan argued that rehabilitation of rental housing increased
displacement instead of providing increased housing and a path to home ownership. Martin
Gopen charged that suburban contractors essentially colluded with local officials to rob Roxbury
residents.150
The blockbusting of Mattapan pushed the geographic cluster of African Africans to the south
so that Roxbury functioned as the northern border, North Dorchester as the midpoint, and
Mattapan as the southern border. In the late 1960s, a federally guaranteed loan program provided
a path to homeownership for the city’s minority community. BBURG organized access to and
directed the federal loans, and in doing so selected Jewish sections of Dorchester and Mattapan,
where a majority of residents had paid off their mortgages. Blockbusting ensued. In this process,
unscrupulous real estate agents used lies and disinformation to stoke racial animosity. As a
result, many Jewish residents sold their homes, which were in turn financed through the federal
program facilitated by B-BURG.151
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BRA policies bifurcated the Mission Hill section of Roxbury along racial lines. Mission Hill
had functioned as one of the many ethnic neighborhoods in Boston, turning over from Polish to
Irish at the turn of the twentieth century. The loss of industrial jobs and concurrent trend toward
suburban living in Boston caused white residents to move from Roxbury after World War Two.
Increasingly, the BRA looked to the area to put its new public housing projects. During the
1950s and 1960s, the BRA constructed Columbia Point, Bromley Heath, and Mission Hill
Extension housing projects in order to house displaced minority residents. Along the west side of
Mission Hill, near Brookline, Harvard University acquired property to develop teaching hospitals
for its medical school, a trend other universities and institutions quickly followed. An affluent
young white population moved into the western side of Mission Hill while African Americans’
choices were limited to the areas closest to the predominantly black Lower Roxbury. 152
Public housing contributed to a decline in minority residents’ status and became connected
with racial conflict and poverty in public perception. Gilbert Avery, a pastor of a black church in
Roxbury, noted that in 1965 the Mission Hill housing project was 97 percent white, while
Mission Hill Extension was 98 black. Avery noted that “Parser Street which divides the two
projects is like the Berlin Wall.” The rental office had two windows for service requests and
payments. Avery observed that “except for the absence of two signs saying ‘white’ and ‘colored’
it might as well be Birmingham, Alabama.” In the late 1960s, white residents fled and blamed
African Americans migrants for the decline of the neighborhood.153 Conditions in subsidized
housing suffered. For example, prior to a scheduled bathroom renovation at Mission Hill
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Extension, residents never met with project managers. Residents had suggested new sinks and
medicine cabinets but instead had their showers moved and unwanted tiles put in place. When
tenants filed a complaint, they were told the project had run out of funds. The BHA contracted
with the same construction companies despite documented fraud and faulty work. In turn, BHA
officials looked at the tenants’ policy as a product of “outside agitators.” 154
The Development of Black Radicalism
The Boston Black United Front (BBUF) demanded that minority residents control the
institutions that shaped life in Lower Roxbury. In June of 1967, a Mothers for Adequate Welfare
(MAW) sit-in protest at the Grove Hall Welfare Office sparked the establishment of BBUF.
Boston police removed MAW members and welfare office employees. The police became
overwhelmed with the volume of people, and when chaos ensued, they used batons to quell the
surge of protesters. According to eyewitnesses they employed excessive force. Later that
evening, a group of tactical patrol policemen assembled in front of the Operation Exodus office
and fired between 40 and 100 shots in the air. The incident left the community outraged that they
were attacked while bringing forward a legitimate complaint. Stokely Carmichael gave a speech
in the wake of the MAW protest urging the development of a “United Front in Black
Communities” across the nation. Carmichael emphasized the black community’s need to identify
common ground in order to increase participation and organizational strength of united front
efforts.155
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The united front demanded that urban renewal be arrested and any further plans enacted with
it as the principal developer. In April of 1968, the BBUF issued a “Statement of Demands” that
called for the transferring of ownership of white businesses to black business owners, fully
staffing every school by blacks, and hiring black police captains to command stations in black
neighborhoods. The BBUF’s manifesto argued that wresting control of city bureaucracies
interacting with Roxbury would strengthen the local economy, give residents more political clout
in planning decisions, and allow residents access to greater services. To that end, the manifesto
insisted that ABCD cease operating as an “umbrella agency in the black community,” arguing
that it could function more effectively. Instead, the BBUF and other resident-directed
organizations should direct all renewal funds to black-owned businesses and cooperative housing
developments. Finally, the BBUF asserted that the black community should own and operate all
of the public housing in the area.
The BBUF outlined a “self-help” plan for local economic growth as a means of community
development. The group appealed to banks for loans and offered to work with consulting firms in
the design and execution of plans. To this end, BBUF called for local financial institutions to
make $100,000,000 in loans available to black residents and organizations. It envisioned
Boston’s various agencies contracting with black-owned businesses, including street repair,
garbage collection, and maintenance functions by utility companies. An increased number of
black personnel in city agencies, departments, divisions, and bureaus would assist this effort. In
the long term, BBUF hoped to develop individual wealth, secure an economic foundation for the
community, and reduce the cost of living for blacks in Boston.156
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The BBUF dubbed the Community Research Review Committee (CRRC) “community
control in action.” The group featured representatives from various professions, organizations,
schools, and agencies. The committee posited that a network of professionals and scholars would
create a common understanding and framework for disseminating social science research. CRCC
efforts defended the community from racial stereotyping. For example, its flyer declared “CRRC
is needed because the black community needs to protect itself from being researched to death!
The studies that have been done, have been used to justify the exploitation and oppression that
we know.” The assumption that minorities inherently degrade their surroundings continued to
inform the decision making that impacted the area. Noting that scholars attempted to show that,
“black people are retarded and maladjusted to control their urge to change their environment.”
the CRRC worked to counter bureaucrats’ longstanding practice of defining black culture in
order to justify dispossession.
The BBUF, coupled with a variety of organizations, blocked the proposed Southwest
expressway through Roxbury. The removal of approximately 5,000 housing units for highway
projects in Boston between 1962 and 1969 heightened Roxbury residents’ sensitivity to potential
incursions. “Operation Stop the Southwest Corridor” developed in earnest at the outset of 1969.
In the summer of 1969, the BBUF conducted a study of the proposed highway and concluded the
project would negatively impact the community and instead suggested improvement of the
Orange Line, the city’s main form of public transportation through Roxbury. A rented storefront
served as a “Community Information House” to distribute pamphlets, flyers, and handbills to
residents in order to enlist them in opposition plans. Charles Turner noted in the summer of
1969, “Operation Stop demonstrates our position of no more roads over people. This land is ours
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and we will use it for our own purposes.” BBUF proved an effective force as Governor Francis
Sargent cancelled plans for the proposed highway in 1970.157
Conclusion
Urban renewal demonstrated a fundamental fear of working-class residents because it declared
that such people had to be removed to improve the area. Long held racist stereotypes were
employed to color perception and shape policy initiatives. While dislocation posed challenges to
residents, the removal of community institutions made it more difficult for displaced persons to
recover. Civil rights group challenged urban renewal by demanding redress for the housing and
community institutions that they had seen decimated. To institute its agenda, activists raised
issues that were environmental in scope: controlling land, providing adequate housing, and
accessing services other citizens took for granted. Activist organizations coalesced around
community-built cooperative housing, arguing this model provided a buttress against urban
renewal policies and put power in the hands of ordinary residents. To forward its agenda, civil
rights groups expanded participation, built organizational capacities, and strengthened the
networking capabilities of residents. These achievements set the stage for the EJM of the
1980s.158
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CHAPTER 3
“THE DREAM IS IN THE PROCESS”
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 1970 to 1980
The period from 1970 to 1980 in the South End, Roxbury, and North Dorchester illustrates
how government policy and jurisprudence reshaped the environment of these communities.
During this time, the city encouraged gentrification in the South End while the federal
government drastically reduced the funding available to minority residents and groups. While
urban renewal marketed the South End for white middle class professionals, the “new
environment” of Roxbury and North Dorchester, reflected a fundamental fear of minority
residents.
The examination of life in Roxbury as a result of urban renewal makes clear how
environmental racism degraded the community and life for its residents. De facto segregation
created an “enclosure” of geographic and social isolation. In Roxbury, the BRA constructed
subsidized housing projects designed to contain and isolate minority residents. The newly
installed civic buildings inhibited social interaction, instead projecting a desire to “rule” the
residents. Urban renewal’s housing rehabilitation efforts in Roxbury allowed outsiders to profit
from shoddy workmanship while the built environment suffered. Urban renewal made the
community and its residents vulnerable to the denial of essential environmental services,
including housing and sanitation. The lack of city services acted as a leading indicator for the
loss of secondary services such as supermarkets, banks, pharmacies, and retail stores that deemed
Roxbury too dangerous. Environmental degradation continued as the area became a target for
arson, illegal dumping, and increased toxicity in the air, water, and soil from undesirable land
use businesses such as asphalt plants. Residents felt the effects of environmental racism in their
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everyday lives: in homes that could not keep the damp out, in air that contributed to asthma, in
long trips to acquire healthy foods, and in a fundamental sense of insecurity created by
dislocation and a distinct lack of concern or protection by city officials.
Facing dispossession and dislocation, the minority community began rebuilding through the
community development model. These activists challenged racial stereotypes and demanded
control of the institutions that shaped life in the community. Drawing upon the ideas of African
decolonization movements, activists declared “self-determination” would lead to “community
development.” Latinx organizations defended residents from dislocation and retained subsidized
housing in the South End. Durable social service agencies assisted the Latinx community in a
variety of endeavors. The BBUF surged forward with its “nation building” effort to build
positive cultural identity in the black community. The Lower Roxbury Community Corporation
(LRCC) built new homes in the area and directed the construction of a new high school,
connecting residents with planners in the process. Mel King pioneered Community Development
Corporation (CDC) legislation in Massachusetts as a state representative in the 1970s, providing
activists a vehicle for community projects. The philosophy, strategies, and actions of these
groups demonstrate that environmental justice in Boston emerged from groups focused on
community development as a means of confronting racism. These objectives would come to
fruition with the emergence of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) during the
1980s.
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Figure 3.1: Allen Crite, “Douglass Square Boston,” 1936. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
Allen Crite was a longtime resident of the South End who illustrated and painted his
neighborhood as an urban village with a variety of different ethnic groups in his cityscapes.
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Figure 3.2: South End from the old John Hancock Building, 1959. (Image: Boston City
Archives)

The South End: Gentrification Amid Declining Resources
Scholars have drawn the connection between modern-day gentrification and more
straightforward land takeover schemes. For example, gentrification and the first territorial
acquisition undertaken by the Puritans in the Pequot War hold much in the way of similarities,
and this trend continued throughout the history of contemporary North America. Puritans
dehumanized the Pequots and used divide and conquer tactics in order to occupy Indian territory
and remove an opposing group. Afterwards, the Puritans colored popular perceptions with a
narrative that blamed the enemy in order to justify their own behavior and to free them to act
similarly in future scenarios. This process became codified in jurisprudence in 1823, when the
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U.S. Supreme Court ruled that after settlers “discovered” land, Indian groups could not own or
sell that same land. In doing so, the court abrogated American Indians’ land rights based on the
notion of European cultural superiority. This reflected a belief that social “others” failed to act as
effective stewards of land. 159 The same ideas and actions undergirded urban renewal and
gentrification. It is telling that so-called urban pioneers functioned as the principal catalyst of
gentrification, echoing a term used to describe settlers of the American West a century earlier.
James Green, a historian who lived in the South End, argued that his community’s
constructive inter-ethnic relations offered a much-needed example to rest of the city. Much like
his mentor at Yale, C. Vann Woodward, Green challenged prevailing assumptions about race
relations, albeit in twentieth century Boston rather than in the Jim Crow South.160 He attacked
the Boston Globe for providing uncritical support of urban pioneers, offering instead that the
South End offered a “hidden history” of racial cooperation. In a 1974 article, he observed that
“Boston’s South End does indeed have a unique history of racial harmony and community
solidarity.” For 77-year-old Olive Decosta, race had proven “no issue at all” in the 1920s and
1930s because “we were all poor.” Ruby Smith, a long-time African American residents of the
South End, observed: “our kids are used to playing together, black, white, and Spanish.” 161 To
Green, the policies of the 1970s increased racial strife because they sharpened the boundaries
between race and class, particularly in the last bastion of heterogeneity in Boston, the South End.
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James Green chronicled the history of the South End in order to recommend a course of
“corrective action.” He authored “Urban Renewal’s Impact on Low-Income Housing in the
South End” during the mid-1970s to document how urban renewal obliterated the South End’s
core functions as a starting point for migrants, a home for Boston’s poorest residents, and a place
for residents to obtain low-skill or semi-skilled work. Renewal activity displaced working-class
residents and subsidized residential improvements for white migrants to the neighborhood while
failing to produce viable replacement housing in the same area for working-class residents. To
confront the economic and racial segregation challenging working-class residents, Green and his
peers, including Ro Whittington, who became a key figure in the DSNI, and Martin Gopen,
organized a “Tenants’ Rally Against Racism.” The protesters demanded an end to the “racist
hysteria” that had triggered unlawful and unjust evictions against minorities. However, police
continued to break up public protests against urban renewal projects, particularly those that
concerned African-Americans and colonized people in Africa and Southeast Asia. Minority and
working-class residents denounced the police force’s violation of their constitutional right to
freedom of speech and assembly. 162
Following a longstanding practice, incoming urban pioneers denigrated their new neighbors
in order to shape public perception. They took leadership roles in the South End Historical
Society to emphasize its brief period as the WASP capital of the city. City officials and
newcomers removed signs of the South End’s past as a working-class enclave: Dover Street, the
epicenter of “skid row,” became East Berkeley Street. They provided stories to media outlets
claiming that working-class people had stirred up “racial hatred.” 163Affluent South End residents
William Worthy, “Recollections of a Black Childhood in the South End” Boston Globe
Magazine, 12/5/1971. Green: Box 3, Folder 3.
163
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initiated a lawsuit that charged that low income housing would have a negative “environmental
impact,” Relying on racist assumptions to characterize what would be considered an
“environmental” concern. As a result of winning the case, they implemented sanctions against
noise and high population density that excluded low-income residents from the South End. 164
The sanctions placed CORE’s demand for improved housing code enforcement and standard
sanitation services as less important than the environmental expectations new pioneers. As
working-class holdovers in the South End observed, the city had “marketed” the South End for
incoming white professionals.165
The argument that minority residents degraded their environment continued to undergird
arguments for displacement. This perspective was expressed clearly by Dr. Frank Horn, who
wrote “A Frank Look at the South End and Its Future.” A chemist by profession, Horn employed
his “expertise” to justify gentrification and displacement. Horn’s essay charged that African
Americans, “have an inimical and harmful disregard for physical and aesthetic maintenance of
personal property and a higher propensity for criminal behavior.” Horn distorted reality to argue
that minority residents degraded their community. He declared: “the filth in some parts of the
South End is testimony, not to poor [trash] collection, but to the filthy habits of some tenants.”
Middle class “experts” had employed similar sentiments since the inception of the South End as
a working-class neighborhood, and their assumptions are essential to understanding how racism
functioned in twentieth century Boston. 166
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Over the course of the 1970s, the federal government accelerated gentrification by reducing
funds provided to Boston. The decline in federal funding denied minority residents fair housing
opportunities. The new policies “streamlined” urban renewal, model cities, historic preservation,
housing rehabilitation, and water and sewer improvements into one block grant community
development revenue sharing program, referred to as CDRS. Policy makers touted the changes
as an opportunity for community-based organizations to apply for money and improve
neighborhoods under their own direction. However, the nature of grant writing limited the
number of groups that could obtain funding. In 1973, President Richard Nixon “impounded”
federal urban renewal funds. The following chart displays the Nixon administration’s funding
plan for Boston from fiscal year 1974 to 1980.
Table 3.1: Federal Funding for Urban Renewal Programs in Boston 1974-1980

Year

Amount Provided or Expected
(in millions USD)

1974

44

1975

30.3

1976

28.7 (expected)

1977

27.2 (ex)

1978

20.2 (ex)

1979

15.8 (ex)

1980

11.9 (ex)

Martin Gopen and Mel King charged that the design and implementation of urban renewal
institutionalized racism in Boston. They argued the budget choices, and the subsequent reduction
in housing vouchers for poorer residents, violated civil rights laws that mandated non93

discrimination in the delivery of federal funding and services. In addition, the new federal
budgets ceased subsidizing groups that had provided a voice for less well-off residents of the
South End, silencing residents advocacy. 167 According to King, people with “limited physical
and economic resources” had been unfairly labelled as having “no values.” Newcomers with
more resources determined “what my life is going to be about or what is going to happen in my
neighborhood.” The newfound homogeneity of the area created a “sterile” environment as a
result.168 King observed that the BRA’s “dislocation program” allowed junkyards to remain
while destroying viable housing.” Housing, environment, and services” had been compromised
“to accommodate the monetary interests of a few.” As a result of these experiences, longtime
South End residents had been “brutalized.” He concluded, “policy based on a model which
emphasizes physical development as opposed to human development will never create positive
changes in the city.” The city had enriched itself, its corporate entities, and its universities, but
had pushed minorities aside to accomplish this goal. 169
Over the course of the 1970s, government agencies accelerated gentrification. The root word
of gentrification, gentry, indicates the group that benefited from this process: those who drew
upon their status and wealth to further increase their standing in society. Incentivizing
gentrification for suburban residents functioned as “anti-local economic development.” Rather
than improving the community for its existing residents, or simply allowing them the same tools
that other citizens had to improve their lives, gentrification pushed low-income residents further
to the margins in an ongoing “othering” of status. Those negatively impacted witnessed a decline
in economic opportunity, employment options, educational quality, and public health. In sum,
Gopen: Box 10, Folder 6: “Federal Urban Policy, 1978.”
Melvin H. King, “To: My South End Neighbors” date unknown, circa mid 1970s. Green:
Box 3, Folder 3.
169
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gentrification functioned as a set of political and economic practices designed to elevate the
status of incoming residents over long-time denizens.170
Urban Renewal Degrades the Environment in Roxbury
Over the course of the 1970s, the BRA completed its work in Roxbury and North Dorchester
with the construction of several civic buildings and subsidized housing projects. By the end of
the 1970s, to many residents of metropolitan Boston “Roxbury was a race” and a place that white
residents feared. The fate of the area was evident during the 1976 bicentennial celebration. To
celebrate Boston’s important historic role, the city produced an essay and photos for a
“Neighborhood Series” collection. The series producers chose not to represent Roxbury in the
collection despite its importance in the American Revolution. Instead, the series devoted a
selection to “Boston’s Blacks” during the revolution, but little since. The omissions in the
centennial celebration were indications of a much larger racial divide. Many middle-class whites
viewed Boston’s neighborhoods in terms of strict boundaries that could not be crossed. For
example, in 1974, Louise Day Hicks, Boston’s steadfast opponent of racial integration, vetoed
improvements to Roxbury’s expansive Franklin Park as chairwoman of the city’s ways and
means committee, noting “our people can’t even go to it.” Hicks’s assertion suggests the subtle
functions of this racial divide. Black residents could not control where they lived or lift the
weight of political, social, and economic institutions contributing to poverty and inequality in
their communities.171
Civic buildings constructed during urban renewal revealed what Richard Heath, a BRA
planner and academic, called the “architecture of fear.” Heath commented in his retrospective

James Jennings "Gentrification as Anti-Local Economic Development: The Case of
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analysis of the Washington Park project in 1990 that architecture “speaks to how society sees
itself” because it “sends messages and impulses to the resident as well as the passerby.” Heath
concluded that the newly constructed built environment in Washington Park “responded to a city
seen as threatening.” The new police station, with its low roof and long windows directly under
the roofline resembled a “bunker.” The modernist style civic center/courthouse created a
physical sense of control, representing a “very dramatic statement about the way government
saw itself and the way it wanted to portray itself to the citizens.” Heath concluded the civic
center “speaks the language of brute power,” as its design reveals a desire to “rule the
community.” Rather than large doors and a grand entrance like many libraries have, Roxbury’s
branch library featured entrances on the side shaped like funnels. Such a design limited
interaction with the community and could be easily cordoned off in case of danger. Logue
attributed the library’s appearance to the perception the general public had of Roxbury residents,
reflecting that “I wanted to see large glass windows so that from the street you could look in and
see people reading. What we got was this big wall of glass bricks.” He concluded, “I guess that's
the way people thought about Roxbury in the late '60s." Once constructed, the buildings shaped
the thought patterns, individual behavior, and social activities of residents and outsiders. Taken
together, the architecture of Washington Park contributed to a negative perception of the
community.172
Rather than rehabilitate the neighborhood, BRA housing projects created “blight.” The design
and construction of housing communicated planners’ view that blacks were maladapted to
society because the new structures “had no relationship to its surrounding community.”

Heath, An Act of Faith, 107 and Logue appendix; BRA, Roxbury: Background Information,
Planning Issues and Preliminary Neighborhood Improvement Strategies (1975) BRA,
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Thousands of units faced inward away from streets or stood at the end of cul-de-sacs or behind
large parking lots. For example, the BRA constructed Westminster Court as a “cloistered” space,
while Academy Homes was an “enormous, cold, and intimidating” structure with difficult to
locate entrances, standing on a dead-end road. The homes were accessed through a courtyard and
the development ended in a “pile of concrete and weeds.” The Warren Gardens housing complex
shared “nothing of itself with the rest of Roxbury.” With respect to housing built during the
1970s in Roxbury, Richard Heath concluded: “the architecture predicts the problem and plans for
the solution.”173

Figure 3.3: Construction of Academy Homes, 1967. (Image: Boston City Archives)

Heath, An Act of Faith, 10; 99-101; Bill Weismantel, Design Coordination in the
Redevelopment of a Boston Streetcar Suburb, Boston, MA: BRA, 1967.
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Figure 3.4: Construction of Academy Homes, 1967. (Image: Boston City Archives)

The city of Boston failed to initiate new construction programs or prevent pollution in the
area, even as the city itself was becoming affluent. Incomplete projects created vacant lots when
the Model Cities Administration (MCA) pioneered the Infill Housing program in the early 1970s.
The BRA selected 300 vacant lots across the city for its “prefabricated system” of “instant
housing.” The Development Corporation of America (DCA) took charge of the program’s
construction but overextended financially and subsequently folded. The two blocks where the
DCA began construction were never completed, while the remaining land remained vacant for 15
years. The area that comprised the former Notre Dame Academy, slated to be a part of the
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Academy Homes subsidized housing, lay vacant until the 1980s. The “planned” mom and pop
stores were graded and curbed but remained vacant, converted into vegetable gardens for 25
years.174
Washington Park had been “made by planners” but had to exist on “the political whims of
government and city agencies which could often prove arrogant and elusive.” When Kevin White
became mayor in 1968, his administration chose against assigning a project manager and staff to
complete Washington Park renewal plans, as they “simply had other things on their mind."
Richard Heath observed that “no one in government had the courage” or pride to take up the
funding to complete housing and/or provide standard city services. Heath offered the words of
Boston’s first political leader, John Winthrop, to reprimand contemporary city leaders. He
challenged them to "make others’ conditions your own. No man is made more honorable than
another." 175
While city policies limited residential options for minorities, subsidized housing provided
less of a support system due to mismanagement and neglect. A 1992 congressional committee
studied the so-called “severely distressed public housing” system and found that contrary to
popular perception, ninety-four percent of housing stock stood in good repair. Residents of
Boston’s subsidized housing projects stood in contrast to the national experience. For example,
in the Orchard Park project during 1976 and 1977 tenants complained of lack of lighting in entry
ways, which increased break-ins and vandalism; malfunctioning hot water and heating systems
in bathrooms; and mice, cockroaches, and large accumulations of trash in vacant dwellings.
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Despite the major renovations and repairs required across the city’s public housing, in 1978 the
mayor reduced funding from $2.5 million to $600,000. In 1979, a resident report argued that
given the residents’ low income, they should be given an opportunity to perform sweat equity to
supplement rent. The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) and its associated contractors opposed
the plan.176
Despite millions in federal and state modernization grants, conditions remained “deplorable.”
The BHA had a backlog of $54 million from the federal and state level dating to 1970. In
addition, money for BHA projects often became the object of competition between city
organizations. For example, in 1980 Mayor Kevin White and the BHA feuded over federal
funds, as White denied the BHA access to two million dollars. 177 In 1980 federal judge Paul
Garrity placed Boston’s housing projects in receivership. With forty thousand tenants living in
the city’s twenty-five subsidized housing areas, a BHA administrator admitted that "we're the
biggest slumlord in the state of Massachusetts." The BHA had 5,000 vacant and uninhabitable
apartments, a rate more than twice that of any large housing authority in the United States. When
he placed the BHA in receivership, Judge Garrity explained that "indescribable conditions,"
caused "incalculable human suffering" for many of the BHA's tenants. Garrity condemned the
BHA’s ineffective administration, remarking that "if the BHA were a private landlord it surely
would have been driven out of business long ago or jailed or most likely both." 178
As a result of policies impacting their community, minority residents “learned how racist this
goddamned city is,” leading many to conclude that those in power considered them “still
niggers.” A student from Roxbury Community College (RCC) argued that the city had created a
TPC: Box 5, Folder 10: “Mission Hill Main, 1976-1977” and Folder 15: “Orchard Park
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177
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“war zone.” Students in the RCC survey identified uncompleted public housing projects, ,
inability to get mortgages, lack of recreational opportunities, social isolation, and alienation for
youth as major obstacles challenging the neighborhood.179 During the 1970s, arson cases
skyrocketed as absentee owners sought to collect insurance money. A Dudley resident observed
that for a while, “every night there was a fire.” A local reverend recalled: “I can remember kids
being dragged out already dead, kids being dragged out in flames, the father in flames, running
out of the house screaming and the neighborhood just stunned. And it happened again and again
and again.” From 1963 to 1983, 47 percent of housing stock, or about 2,200 units were
destroyed. Local building contractors illegally dumped garbage in the vacant lots, while car
thieves left stripped down and/or burned automobiles, attracting further dumping by small-scale
operators. Longtime resident Che Madyun remarked: “No human being should have to live in
that kind of situation… there is nothing that says because you don't make a whole lot of money,
that you should live in filth.”180
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Figure 3.5: Abandoned appliances behind Roxbury homes, 1959. (Image: Boston City
Archives)
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Figure 3.6: Abandoned Vehicle behind Roxbury tenements, 1960. (Image: Boston City
Archives)

Community Development Confronts Environmental Racism
Community development necessitated a focus on environmental conditions. Chuck Turner
argued for a “philosophy that talks about how we live day to day as we are going to our goal.”
Archie Williams could not “go into homes where the roof is falling and the walls are falling and
there’s no heat and the kids are hungry and not want to do something.” During the 1970s, the
black community came to understand that “the priority for low income families is HOUSING.”
According to Mel King, land and homeownership would help residents “expand the concept of
shelter to contribute more directly to community,” and in doing so “change their relationships to
each other and their environment in a positive way.” Such efforts would counteract the
103

frustration, depersonalization, and fragmentation that had defined life in Roxbury and North
Dorchester. Improving everyday conditions implied that “the community must control the
action,” a process that entailed understanding “the relationship between self-determination,
community control, and the support of community-based institutions.” Pursuing community
development implied residents taking control of institutions that influenced housing, food
options, service delivery, and the local economy. 181
Local residents channeled their frustrations by confronting the daily injustices that shaped
their lives. Protesting fulfilled a desire to express agency and helped residents to gain a greater
understanding of policies impacting the minority community. Tenant organizer Alajo
Adegballoh, observed, “I’m still finding out about myself. What can I achieve? What can I do in
this whole area where I see problems?” Chuck Turner, who went to Harvard and became a state
representative from Roxbury, reflected on his personal journey: “I almost did not survive the
torment of trying to figure out why everything was so crazy.” The totality of events made
residents conclude they lived in an “unjust system” that made “it impossible to fulfill yourself
completely.” People living in the neighborhood did not initially seek recourse through activism,
but the problems that they faced on an everyday basis forged a determination to fight back.
CORE member Dennis Blackett noted that “I wasn’t ready to go south” and join the SNCC;
however, he did have the urge to “do something” and “got very pissed off on the inner belt
thing.” After his first protest with SNCC, Noel Day recalled, “the city stomped the shit out of
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us...that was my radical education. It was interesting, ‘cause all those cops were doing was
creating radicals.”182
Pan-African anticolonial strategies and actions provided a framework for community
development. Minority residents saw the cumulative effects of racism as analogous to conditions
experienced in colonial African nations, decrying their removal to a so-called “enclosure.”
Activists referred to Roxbury as a Bantustan, or apartheid town. Leaders argued the community
needed to “alter some of the colonial economic mechanisms that marginalize them.” The new
civic buildings performed their necessary functions, but they were flawed in both
implementation and design, pushing minority residents to the margins of an increasingly affluent
city. Residents connected the ideas, methods, and bureaucratic structures that undergirded urban
renewal and European imperialism. In each case black populations dealt with the ill effects of
having resources and self-determination limited.183 Ted Parrish noted that the system kept
“people, not only in our community, but in the rest of the world in a dependent and oppressed
position.” As a result of these conclusions, activist groups adapted the ideas of their African
compatriots to improve Roxbury and North Dorchester.184
During the first half of the 1970s, the BBUF strengthened the consciousness of the black
community in Boston. By developing cultural pride, the united front defined itself in opposition
to the image that American society projected on to black communities. The BBUF wanted to
create a so called New Black Nation in areas that blacks dominated demographically because of
its belief that “black people everywhere must unite or perish.” To accomplish its objectives, the
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BBUF went forward, “politically organizing the community, culturally educating the masses of
black people, and providing for the protection and defense of black people.” Employing the term
“operational unity” as its guiding principle, affiliated organizations agreed on the general
principles of self-determination and community development while retaining their own
organizational autonomy. The front hoped such networking would overcome the weaknesses and
augment the strengths of the community as a whole. Halting the construction of the southwest
expressway and funding community activities acted as examples of effective operational unity.
Such “collective action” would provide the black community the ability to take control of the
economic and social “forces that shape our lives.” To this end, the united front sought to develop
cooperatively owned housing and businesses, with a focus on retail, healthcare, social service,
security, and communications. 185
The front facilitated the process of community development through its “nation building”
program. The BBUF’s “Basis for a Black Nation,” explained its philosophy. For example, the
front defined unity and self-determination as being able to “speak for ourselves instead of being
defined and spoken for by others.” Collective work and responsibility meant the black
community had to understand one another’s issues and work cooperatively towards solutions. It
meant maintaining small businesses by pooling profits to assists upstart entrepreneurs.
Participants vowed “to leave our community more beautiful and beneficial than when we
inherited it.” To promote its agenda, the group promoted holidays to celebrate black cultural
heritage, such as Malcolm X’s birthday which the group called “Black Solidarity Day in
Boston.”186 In the long term, the united front hoped to create its own “black city” in Roxbury by
BBUF: Box 1, Folder 4: “Administrative Files: Goals, 1970-1974”: see “Goals of the
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seceding from Boston in order to “create the independent institutions we must have if we are to
survive.”187
The front developed programs to bring their goals to fruition. For example, the Black
Economic Development Association of Roxbury functioned as a wholesale manufacturing
cooperative that also facilitated loans to local businesses. It supported black music through the
Roxbury Action Program (RAP) and the Boston Cooperative Music Industry. These music
groups also participated in a neighborhood clean-up. In the 1970s, the BBUF worked with the
Black Panthers to begin an intercommunal youth institute, a program facilitated by Northeastern
University.188 Classes included community health and survival; wealth, power, and racism; speed
and analytical reading; strategies for community change; black civilization past and present;
history of the black revolt, Swahili; and black education for self-determination. Finally, the
united front helped develop a big brother and big sister program.189
While the group facilitated the community development movement in its critical early stages,
the BBUF dissolved due to external pressures and internal missteps. The group struggled to
defend a statement of demands that many observers characterized as “a little strong.” United
front leaders supported its statement as “urgent and reasonable” given conditions in the minority
community, but the damage had been done. At the same time, the group altered its leadership
format, switching from co-chairs to one leader, a situation that proved too much stress for one
person. And while the group successfully raised $500,000 for community development, it was
beyond the organization’s institutional capacity to manage, maintain, grow, and distribute these
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funds. Demands changed as the organization moved to a stable institutional structure, and as the
BBUF reacted to evolving circumstances it succumbed to the pressure.190
In the early 1970s, the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation (LRCC) connected
ordinary residents with the planning process. The LRCC acted as an intermediary, negotiating
with the Model City Administration (MCA) and enlisting community participation. The
proposed “Campus High School,” originally designed to house most of Boston’s 5,000 plus
pupils, evolved into the Madison Park High School which still serves the community of Roxbury
in 2018. The LRCC’s partnership with the MCA also yielded hundreds of units of viable low
rent housing designed by black architects. Under the auspices of the MCA, the organization also
built and developed social service agencies integrated into the complex. In contrast to other
housing built by the city during urban renewal, the LRCC constructed durable houses that were
part of the community.191 Through its efforts, the LRCC initiated a model that other groups
would emulate to rebuild the community
The New Urban League (NUL) developed to build the financial strength and social capital of
local residents. To make black communities “healthy livable sections of the city,” the NUL
demanded that marginalized residents participate in planning their own communities. The NUL’s
slogan of “one person, one vote” challenged affluent white residents’ disproportionate amount of
power. Urban renewal and gentrification augmented the social, political, and economic status of
those who lived outside the neighborhood. Mel King described the NUL’s efforts as “first time
the poor stood up and spoke” as a unified organization in opposition to polices deleterious to
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their lives. The group focused on educational, youth, and economic development to create
“vehicles” for poor minority residents to control the institutions that shaped their lives.
“Operation Making it Work” facilitated community control of small businesses and local
service agencies. However, toggling between providing interventions and working to build stable
community institutions kept the group in constant crisis mode, unable to crystalize a clear set of
operational procedures. Each problem that the group attacked connected to another set of
interconnected issues. For example, the NUL’s effort to address educational issues related to
students’ health, nutrition, housing, parents’ employment status, and the ability of parents to
obtain clothing for their children. Because of the pressing needs of these issues, the NUL formed
committees to study issues and plan solutions. However, pressures exerted by these problems
forced the group to push out the committee work prematurely. In addition, some of these groups
had overlapping objectives. Failure to discuss their strategies and objectives with one another
further complicated these initiatives. 192
In 1969, resident Hubie Jones created Alianza Hispana so that the Latinx community could
“control its own fate.” Jones hired Frieda Garcia, a graduate student at the New School for Social
Research who organized residents, particularly women, to develop La Alianza into a social
service agency on Dudley Street by 1971. 193 For instance, Betsy Tregar, a teacher at the
Winthrop School, served as a board member of La Alianza from its founding until 1995. 194 In
1971, the organization established a bilingual school in Roxbury-North Dorchester at Denison
settlement house to help assist newcomers acclimate to the area. 195 By 1976, La Alianza
augmented and reorganized its services by creating one central organization that connected the
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educational, employment, housing, psychological services, and youth needs of the area’s Latinx
population. The group functioned as a legal advocate for residents and lobbyist for legislation
impacting the community. These activities led it to act as a real estate representative for potential
homeowners. In addition, La Alianza connected with technical schools and local colleges to
assist area youth with gaining access to training and educational programs. 196
By the late 1970s, the Latinx community had developed durable social service organizations.
Nuestra Comunidad, or “New Community,” advocated for residents housing needs and to
preserve Dudley Square from developers who lived outside of the area. Nuestra demanded that
residents “own or have a stake” in all institutions that impact life in the community. The group
held public meetings and brought a number of stakeholders together to share information and
direct resident energy toward improvement projects. Nuestra organized tenants in apartment
buildings to confront landlords regarding maintenance and improvement projects. The group
developed architectural plans and constructed an apartment complex that housed twenty
residents, stewarding the project from concept to completion. Most importantly, it prevented 375
through 385 Dudley Street, a building that functioned as the “epicenter” and “strategic core” of
Dudley Square, from being auctioned by city officials. By the mid-1980s, Nuestra staff found it
difficult keeping up with its development plans and potential opportunities.197
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Figure 3.7: Bruce Bolling (Images: Wikimedia Commons)

Mel King and the Institution Building Stage
Mel King stands as the key figure from the period of urban renewal in the 1950s to the
subsequent revival of the Dudley Street area in the 1990s. At each stage of his career, he
championed minority residents’ interests while building an intellectual and pragmatic framework
for environmental justice in Boston. He grew up in the South End during the 1930s and 1940s
and saw his home meet the bulldozer in the New York Street project. As a result of his
experiences, King became an activist in the 1960s, a state representative in the 1970s, and runner
up in the 1983 mayoral election. King argued the issues facing Roxbury and North Dorchester
required an educational strategy that challenged the negative perception of the community. For
King, education facilitated a problem-solving mindset that allowed individuals to provide a
“critical intervention” in society. King’s 1981 book, Chain of Change: Struggles for Black
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Community Development, argued that self-determination through community development
would counter the problems racial inequality posed. Civil rights work evolved from the 1960s,
when minorities demanded the same rights and privileges as white residents, to the 1970s, when
activists improved the living conditions and social capital of residents. 198 King facilitated
institutions that would help improve large sections of the city and a multitude of residents in the
ensuing decade.
As a state representative during the 1970s, King pioneered first-in-the-nation legislation that
facilitated resident-activist groups’ ability to redevelop their communities through Community
Development Corporations (CDC). King enlisted the participation of concerned residents,
leaders of local organizations, students, and academics for a weekly breakfast in which attendees
researched specific topics and presented their findings for discussion and debate. King and
fellow attendees crafted the legislation introduced to the Massachusetts House of Representatives
at these morning symposiums. His peers reflected that King proved “indefatigable” in forcing
legislators to “do the right thing” and pass the bill. The legislation defined a CDC by its nonprofit status and its operation in a specific area with low-income residents. Once it was
established, any resident in the purview of a CDC qualified for membership. Members elected
the board, of which at least half would be comprised of residents from the CDC area. The
legislation included the creation of Community Development Finance Corporations (CDFC) that
operated as a bank designed to serve CDC’s. King’s bill became a national model that helped
CDC’s to proliferate in the next decades. 199
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To develop CDC legislation, King drew upon the ideas of the Community Land Trust (CLT)
movement. By acquiring land for various development or residential projects, CLT’s offered an
organizational blueprint for marginalized groups to achieve self-determination. CLT principles
drew upon a history of rural cooperatives, credit unions, and utopian and socialist movements
and first appeared in the “New Community” of Albany, Georgia. At the same time that Martin
Luther King undertook a more noted civil rights struggle in Albany, his cousin, Slater King,
started the first CLT in response to the negative effects of sharecropping. Landowners thwarted
tenant farmers protest for racial justice with the threat of eviction. Canvassers arrived at a simple
solution: if blacks owned property they would increase their economic and social status and be
able to protest for political rights.
A CLT combines multiple parcels under one non-profit owner and permanently removes the
land from the market. CLT’s protect an individual homeowner’s investment through “shared
equity” in housing. The use of a ground lease restricts the resale price of homes and directs
homeowners to sell their property to those in need of affordable homes. Homeowners retain
investment equity and often earn a modest profit. In 1972, the first CLT in the nation published a
detailed explanation of its ideas and methods in the Guide to a New Model for Land Tenure. The
regular newsletter, Community Economics, expanded upon how CLT’s could challenge
displacement, facilitate cooperation, and increase homeownership for marginalized residents in
both rural and urban areas. Mel King’s legislation helped CLTs to obtain nonprofit status and
gain access to government funding. 200
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Conclusion: The Dream is in the Process
During the 1970s, Boston’s black community moved beyond the objectives of the civil rights
movement by connecting it to the ideas and practice of African anti-colonial movements and
then applying a pragmatic environmental focus to improvement efforts. These efforts provided a
crucible of experience and paved the way for the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the
flourishing of a full-fledged environmental justice movement in the 1990s. The organizations
cultivated cultural pride, networked with government and financial institutions, gained control of
land, and built housing. At a 1979 New Year’s Eve party Mel King presented a poem to his
peers. A reflection on what occurred in the previous decade, it projected an optimism about the
future, as King’s poem proclaimed:
Thoughts on a Dream Deferred
The dream is in the process
And not the outcome
It is found in the struggle
For Peace
And not achieving it
In the working of the artist
And not in the creation
In the sun’s rays
And not the sun
In the belief that we can.
12/31/1979 11:58 PM.201
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Table 3.2: Boston Demography, 1950 to 2010: Roxbury and the South End
Date

1950

1980

Total
Total
Population Population

Place

Boston
Roxbury
South End

2010
% change
Total
+/Population

+/-

+/-

% change
+/-

801,444

562,994

-238,450

-29.80%

617,594

+ 54,600

+8.9%

101,326

43,571

-57,755

-57.00%

49,111

+5,528

+11.3%

49,753

25,672

-24,081

-51.60%

29,612

+5,511

+13.4%

Table 3.3: Comparison of Housing Statistics, Boston and Roxbury, 1950 to 2015
Date

1950

1980

Place

Total Housing
Units

Total
Housing
Units

Boston

218,103

Roxbury

28,215

2015

# +/-

% change
+/-

Total
Housing
Units

# +/-

% change
+/-

218,456

+353

+.02%

261,492

+
43,036

+12.9%

18,234

-9,981

-35.40%

18,373

+1,139

+ 6.20%
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Table 3.4: Racial Demography in Boston and Roxbury, 1950
Date

1950

Place

Total Population

White

Non-white

% non-white

Boston city

801,444

758,700

42,744

6%

Roxbury

101,326

75,893

25,331

25%

Table 3.5: Racial Demography in Boston and Roxbury, 1980
Date

1980

Place

Total Population

White

Non-white

% non-white

Boston city

562,994

395,000

190,000

21.00%

Roxbury

43,571

2,701

34,373

80%

Table 3.6: Racial Demography in Boston and Roxbury, 2010
Date

2010

Place

Total Population

White

Non-white

% black

Boston city

617,594

295,886

373,583

55.40%

Roxbury

49,111

3,683

28,484

58%

Table 3.7: Comparison of Immigration Statistics, Boston and Roxbury, 1950-2015202
Date

1950

1980

2010

Place

Foreign Born

Foreign Born

% of Boston
pop.

Foreign Born

% of Boston
pop

Boston city

144,092

84,000

15%

177,563

26%

Roxbury

NA

4,793

11%

7,121

25%

The preceding figures are adapted from: Historical Trends in Boston Neighborhoods Since
1950 provided by the Boston Planning Development Agency research division, December 2017.
http://www.bostonplans.org/research
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CHAPTER 4
“THE NEIGHBORHOOD HAS DECIDED WHAT IT WANTS:”
THE DUDLEY STREET INITIATIVE IN THE 1980s
During the 1980s, Roxbury and North Dorchester residents established a durable community
development organization that confronted inequality through a variety of environmental
improvements. African American, Latinx, and Cape Verdeans drew upon their cultural traditions
to plan and prioritize the objectives of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), an
effort in which women took a leading role. The DSNI balanced the needs of stakeholders in the
community, developed plans for an urban village in Dudley Square, acquired a level of political
stature that allowed it to advance its agenda, and obtained outside funding for major projects.
The DSNI accomplished these objectives with the help of leadership who had been veterans of
the community development movement extending back to the 1960s. Short-term goals such as
pollution prevention and neighborhood clean-up activities brought a greater number of
participants into the activist fold than any previous organization in the area. Nowhere was this
more apparent than the DSNI’s “Force” campaign that served as a unifying strategy and rallying
cry for residents: “The Force is with You!”
The DSNI efforts in the 1980s turned the community around after years of decline. The
“Don’t Dump on Us!” effort confronted polluters and led the city to shutter three illegal transfer
stations. Muralists, sponsored by the DSNI, painted expressions of positive identity meant to
confront negative stereotypes about residents. Winning eminent domain rights to a total of thirty
acres, fifteen taken from private property owners and the other fifteen contributed by the city,
established the DSNI as a leading activist organization in Boston and the United States. In turn,
the DSNI secured two million dollars from the Ford Foundation for the development of
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affordable housing and had architects devise plans at their direction. By the close of the 1980s,
residents had achieved the first step towards self-determination in community development.
Through learned ethnic traditions and lived experience, DSNI leaders and members took a
different view of what constitutes civic activity and political participation. People who
participated in the DSNI examined the world closest to them: their houses, yards, streets, and
neighborhood. La Alianza and Nuestra Comunidad began working with urban planners in 1981
and by mid-decade the DSNI employed experts to help articulate improvement schemes. After
decades of confronting objectification by bureaucracies and financial institutions, the DSNI dealt
with these organizations as equals. This turning point allowed residents to rebuild an urban
setting that supports civic life and environmental stewardship. The DSNI empowered the social
organizations and institutions that had sustained life for the community before urban renewal
altered the course of Boston’s history. As the 1990s dawned, the area stood ready to build
housing and create an urban village in Dudley Square.
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Figure 4.1: Dudley Area in the context of Boston. (image: DNI.org)
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Figure 4.2: Land owned by Dudley Neighbors community land trust, 2019. (Image: Dudley
Neighbors Inc.) (available at: https://www.dudleyneighbors.org/ )
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Figure 4.3: Map depicting the Dudley Triangle,1984. Vacant lots shown in black (Image:
Dudley Neighbors Inc.)
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Figure 4.4: Dudley Triangle within “Dudley Village Campus.” This shape is roughly the same
as the Dudley Area in the context of Boston map. The DSNI developed the land in yellow.
(Image: Dudley Neighbors Inc.)
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Dudley Street in 1980: Antecedents of Redevelopment
Cape Verdeans migrated to Roxbury in the late 1970s and continued their cultural traditions
in their adopted environs. Cape Verde, an archipelago located off the northwest coast of Africa,
had been Portuguese colony from 1460 until 1975 when an armed rebellion expelled the
Portuguese.203 Independence from Portugal and expanded immigration opportunities in the
United States facilitated migration in the 1970s. After 1975, Cape Verdeans moved to the Boston
area, and in particular the Roxbury and Dorchester neighborhoods.204 Buoyed by independence,
the neighborhood life of Roxbury sustained cultural practices such as independence day and
holiday festivals like the So-Sabi Festival.205 Many in Boston identify as “Cape Verdean” rather
than black, white, Portuguese, or African. In Cape Verdean society, elders encouraged younger
people to “tell their story,” a symbolic call for Cape Verdeans to assert their individuality and
ethnic pride.206
Women drove activism in the city’s Hispanic community. The 1980 census recorded 36,000
individuals of “Spanish origin” in Boston with the largest concentration of residents in Roxbury,
North Dorchester, and Jamaica Plain, with Puerto Ricans comprising the largest subgroup.
According to the census, forty percent, or around 14,400, of these residents lived in poverty. 207
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Poverty and low socioeconomic status functioned as a barrier for Latinx residents to become
players on Boston’s political scene. By 1988, there were only four elected Hispanic officials in
all of Massachusetts, all serving on school committees.208 Boston’s Latina community, viewed
“taking a stand” as an essential function in life, from voicing one’s opinion in family discussions
and decision-making to joining activist and community organizations. Latina communitycentered focus had “profound causes and consequences” because it facilitated connections with
community members and collective methods of organization. Sociologists and political scientists
argue that Latina concept of political participation facilitated personal and community
involvement in Boston.209 While Hispanics played a limited role in statewide politics, women
formed the majority of membership of groups such as La Alianza, helping to enlarge their stature
during the 1980s.
In 1981, La Alianza, Nuestra Communidad, and MIT’s Urban Planning Department produced
From the Ground Up: A Strategy for the Dudley Street Neighborhood. The publication
contended that city, state, and federal organizations direct funds to resident-owned businesses
and organizations for community development. From the Ground Up advocated for the creation
of a resident-directed organization to lead community improvement endeavors. This group would
focus on creating and sustaining green space, in particular the development of urban agriculture.
Publicly owned land and vacant lots would be converted into community owned farms that
produced high yield cash crops. A home building committee would help residents to attain
homeownership, provide employment, and stimulate the local economy. Its authors employed the
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Community Land Trust (CLT) framework for acquiring land. 210 From the Ground Up marked the
key turning point in redevelopments efforts, as experts who participated in Dudley’s resurgence
helped residents articulate ideas and develop their own strategies for neighborhood improvement.
Despite the challenges posed by environmental racism, residents saw potential in themselves
and the community. In 1981, students at Roxbury Community College completed an assessment
of the area based on interviews with residents. Interviewees noted that pride in the community
and the built environment, particularly the Dudley Block’s architectural character, could serve as
a foundation for improvement efforts. In addition, homeowners’ maintenance of their property,
in spite of the vacant lots and illegal dumping, demonstrated a sense of perseverance. As one
person put it: “the neighborhood is still alive. It is a unique neighborhood in Boston because
several races and language groups live in the same neighborhood in peace together.” Echoing the
Boston Black United Front a decade earlier, a student argued that residents must create a “united
front” across “common interests” to “find the cause of the problems, attack the targets, and go on
to build one strong community within clear boundaries.”211
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Figure 4.5: Dudley Square, 1978. (Image: Boston City Archives)

Mel King’s 1983 campaign for mayor of Boston facilitated the rise of the DSNI. The effort
brought together socialists, feminists, progressive blacks, and minority ethnic groups. King
forged a “Rainbow Coalition” in Boston politics, a model Jesse Jackson emulated in the 1984
presidential campaign. At the campaign’s outset, King promised legislation that would reverse
economic and political policies that worked against the average Bostonian. The campaign
defined issues facing minority communities: “in national and international contexts.” King
contended that the “giant triplets” of racism, materialism, and militarism connected conditions in
Boston, to those in Detroit, and South Africa. King won the primary and faced Ray Flynn, city
councilman from South Boston, in the general election.
King lost to Ray Flynn, but as a result of his strong finish politicians realized the strength of
the city’s minority community. The campaign provided important lessons for both activists and
city politicians. Newspapers, television, and the radio outlets obscured King’s message by
126

portraying his campaign as divisive for “injecting” race into the election. Members of the
campaign reflected that softening the message did little good, because black politicians were
portrayed as troublemakers when advocating for progressive causes. In order to advance their
agenda, neighborhood groups concluded that they needed to employ different strategies beyond
participating in mainstream politics in order to advance their agendas. The campaign had
brought many residents into the activist fold, and its conclusion made its participants eager to
launch self-help initiatives. The table had been set for a group to bring the interests of the
community to the fore.212
The Birth of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
In 1984, academics, activists, philanthropic institutions, and leaders of neighborhood agencies
convened as the “Dudley Initiative” in order to plan a comprehensive community development
program. In September, the Riley Foundation, a local small-scale charity, facilitated the
initiative’s first meeting at the Shirley Eustis House in Roxbury. By November, members forged
a preliminary governance structure and mission statement. It proposed a 21-seat board: four from
the primary ethnic groups in the neighborhood: black, Cape Verdean, Hispanic, and white, one
city official, one state official, five non-profits from health and human services, two Community
Development Corporations (CDC), two small businesses, two larger businesses, two members of
the religious community, and two at-large seats.213
The group declared self-determination in redevelopment of the community as its mission. The
initiative began important work in its first sessions, as members identified interest groups and
people that needed to participate; developed protocols to facilitate discussions between groups
Melania Bruno and Mauricio Gaston, “Latinos For Mel King: Some Reflections” in
Radical America, 67-80; Candace Cason, “The Mel King Campaign and the Black Community”
in Radical America, 41-46.
213
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and engage in a collaborative decision making processes; designed methods to acquire
information and disseminate it to the community; and devised ways to “enhance the capacity of
existing groups.” In January 1985, the group drafted The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative:
An Overview, which functioned as a constitution for the organization. On January 16th, members
ratified the guidelines and protocols of its founding document and adopted the name Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative. 214
The first public meeting at St. Patrick’s Church on Dudley Street helped residents overcome
their fears of “renewal” projects. Che Madyun, a classically trained dancer and educator, and
others in attendance reported their concerns, including: enhancing coordination between existing
neighborhood groups, enlarging the participation of ordinary residents, and expanding property
ownership for the community. According to Madyun, the DSNI board claimed: “we're gonna
have community input, we're gonna rebuild this neighborhood, it's a comprehensive plan.”
Madyun stood up and asked: "How many of you live in the neighborhood? And nobody raised
their hand.” To her, the DSNI appeared like so many of the other so-called renewal projects:
“You always have people from downtown or somewhere else coming and telling you what you
need in your neighborhood.”215
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Figure 4.6: Che Madyun. Circa mid 1980s. (Image: Rudy Bruner Award)

Rather than consisting of outsiders, the DSNI functioned as a coordinating organization for
existing neighborhood groups. Nuestra Comunidad and La Alianza jointly published the plan for
the Dudley Street in 1981 that served as a springboard for the initiative’s first work. 216 The DSNI
developed its organization and governing philosophy directly from existing neighborhood groups
that also received funding from the Riley Foundation. Melvyn Colon and Nelson Merced
pioneered the DSNI’s early work, and they led Comunidad Nuestra and La Alianza respectively.
Colon, who lived on School Street in Roxbury, earned a B.A. from Yale and an M.A. in City
Planning from MIT, focused on housing issues for Nuestra, negotiating with city officials to
increase affordable housing opportunities. Nuestra proved instrumental in maintaining
community control of the block at 375 to 385 Dudley Street, the buildings viewed as the “heart”
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of improvement efforts. Before it had its own space, the DSNI held its first meetings at La
Alianza and Nuestra.217 The efforts that brought the DSNI to fruition had been developing for
two decades, but the meeting sparked broader public participation that proved critical to its early
work, including enlisting Che Madyun.
In July 1985, the DSNI held a retreat on Thompson Island in Boston Harbor to determine the
practical considerations of community self-determination. These sessions helped the group to
prioritize projects, determine ethical and responsive procedures for handling residents’ needs,
devise ways to empower community members, and develop systems for functioning as a
clearinghouse for important information. The members of the retreat, including Madyun, Colon,
and Merced, identified the specific steps necessary to achieve its goal, including: acquiring land,
augmenting train and bus service to the area, enlarging existing housing and increasing
affordable housing options, developing the political strength of the area, increasing recreation
opportunities, and expanding green space in the neighborhood.218 As a sign of its ascendant
status, the DSNI obtained the designation of Planning Advisory Committee (PAC) from the
BRA. The BRA’s agreed to “undertake all planning and development efforts in conjunction with
the community” as a result of the DSNI’s classification as a PAC.219
The DSNI empowered residents and integrated the community’s priorities into the mission of
the organization. Women formed a majority of its leadership and helped the DSNI expand to 500
members.220 Che Madyun viewed her election as president of the DSNI in 1986 a turning point
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in Dudley’s history, noting: “planning never happens with the people who are going to have to
live with the day to day result of whatever is planned or built or designed, involved from the
beginning.” Peter Medoff, executive director of the DSNI, offered that: "building leadership in
the community is our biggest accomplishment."221 To expand participation, the DSNI created
focus groups consisting of between eight and fifteen residents. The focus group asked
participants general questions about neighborhood life and encouraged residents to respond
through stories rather than through data acquisition. Using a moderator and discussion protocol,
residents discussed their everyday activities and concerns, such as shopping or interactions with
law enforcement.222 Through conversations with the community, the DSNI identified focus areas
including: childcare, job training, recreation and athletics, community centers, tenant assistance,
and educational programs.223
The DSNI enlarged the stature of existing residential groups. In 1985, La Alianza obtained
rights to a vacant lot adjacent to its property at 413 Dudley Street where it converted 10,000
square feet of land to a community garden. Nuestra Comunidad provided financing for the
project in addition to funds for rehabilitating the home adjacent to the vacant lot. La Alianza
obtained a Neighborhood Development and Economic Authority grant of $28,000 to help
construct a vegetable garden, playground, and sitting area. Roxbury Community College
instructor Peter Del Tredici's, assisted the project and enlisted Anne Winston Spirn’s landscape
architecture class at Harvard to participate in a design competition from which La Alianza
selected the winner. 224 The DSNI worked with Nuestra to obtain an agreement from the city’s
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Boston’s banking and insurance communities to participate in the rehabilitation of nearly 9,000
housing units and to provide financing for 3,400 new units. In addition, Nuestra Comunidad and
three other CDC’s redeveloped 17 buildings, converting them into 84 housing units.
Collectively, CDC’s convinced the BRA to provide mortgage financing for credit-worthy
residents.225 In 1986, La Alianza sponsored a Youth Week to foster the notion that: “we are not
isolated in this area. We want to stay and be a part of it." The event assembled youth leaders
from the four ethnic groups and the program’s agenda facilitated an understanding of the
common problems and experiences that challenged the community.226
Collecting Victories: Don’t Dump on Us!
Peter Medoff, hired by Madyun, instituted, short-term campaigns so residents could realize
they possess, “some power and can have some victories.” 227 The group immediately turned its
attention to pollution and polluters who operated in the neighborhood. Companies that housed
buses and large equipment in the neighborhood, which, along with its location next to a
bottleneck on Interstate 93, caused Roxbury to have the worst air quality in the city. In 1986, a
proposed garbage incinerator slated for Roxbury demonstrated “a lack of understanding of air
quality issues and, at worst, a total lack of concern for the health of the powerless minorities in
the area." Gail Lattimore of the DSNI declared, "we are simply tired of being used as a dumping
ground." More than 500 DSNI members voted unanimously to reject the city’s proposal. In 1987
the DSNI began its opposition to repeated proposals for an asphalt plant in Roxbury. 228
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The “Don’t Dump On Us!” campaign organized residents to demand essential environmental
protections from the city. In 1986, 1,000 vacant lots in the Dudley area made the community
vulnerable to illegally dumped items. 229 Nelson Merced declared that “The Don't Dump On Us!”
served as a message to city hall and the media that were “trashing” the neighborhood. The DSNI
translated the slogan to unify ethnic groups behind a shared goal: in Cape Verdean Creole, nos
somos lixo means, “we're not a garbage can;” no somos un basurero in Spanish means "we're not
a dumpster." 230 Fifty residents and community activists blocked the entrance to the K&C trash
transfer station in Roxbury, one of three companies that illegally operated in the area. The city’s
claim that it attempted to shut down these transfer stations without success left residents
incensed. The 650 families that lived in the Orchard Park housing development took matters into
their own hands. Melvyn Colon led the protest with a bullhorn, shouting: “they pick this
community to do their illegal dumping. Do they think we can't fight back? I think this action
demonstrates that we're gonna fight back.” Like CORE had during the 1960s, protesters
threatened to dump garbage at city hall if the mayor’s office refused to assist them. 231 The DSNI
created a publicity campaign to intensify its message and define issues facing the area for the
broader metropolitan area.
Don’t Dump On Us! efforts forced the city to stop illegal dumping in the neighborhood. The
group facilitated a meeting at which residents demanded Mayor Flynn halt illegal dumping. Over
100 residents attended and “put all the city officials on the hot seat.” Witnesses reported that an
aide left the meeting to phone Mayor Flynn. Soon after, Flynn pledged to assist with cleaning up
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the vacant lots by providing money and “any kind of help you want.”232 The city installed gates
on Robey and Howard Streets that prevented large trucks from gaining access to the area. 233 In
all, Boston officials ordered the shutdown of six transfer stations and so-called recycling
centers.234 Che Madyun remembered the experience, “was like a symbol of hope. You couldn't
tell us that we weren't going to make big changes!” 235
In 1986, the BRA proposed a revitalization plan for Dudley, spurring fear of another round of
what residents called “negro removal.” A project that included a hotel and office buildings
echoed previous urban renewal schemes that relied on experts in bureaucracies to dictate the
direction of neighborhoods. Che Madyun noted that it: “sounded like a plot for gentrification,”
fearing the BRA was “gonna go right down Dudley Street and we're only a hop, skip and a jump
from downtown.” Residents in Roxbury rallied to the cry of “Don’t Let Roxbury become another
South End.” Byron Rushing observed: “most people in the DSNI neighborhood, certainly the
activists, had the experience of urban renewal in other parts of the city.” 236
The DSNI confronted the issue, publicized residents’ concerns, and organized collective
action to counter speculative real estate practices and forced evictions.237 In 1987, about 100
residents held a rally to declare an area along Washington Street an "eviction-free zone," that
included 2,000 apartments and 8,000 residents. A protestor spoke out against: “the potential for
greed and excessive profit and against exploitation of the powerless."238 At public hearings held
by the BRA, DSNI members and Roxbury residents recalled their dislocation from the South
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End and spoke out against issues with the BRA’s plans. To avoid the same fate as the South End,
the BRA needed to respect the community’s ideas for development. After reflecting on the
process, BRA director Stephen Coyle noted the plan was an “A paper” but a “D minus in terms
of reality.” Coyle concluded that: “There's nothing like getting taken to the woodshed publicly
for you to think clearer.”239 The DSNI challenged the BRA to provide Roxbury residents the
support and autonomy they desired.
DSNI in the Vanguard: The Plan for Eminent Domain
In the mid 1980s, the DSNI used organizational success and political movements to advance
its agenda. The 1986 city of Boston election featured a non-binding ballot question that intended
Roxbury, Mattapan, Dorchester, and parts of the South End and Jamaica Plain to secede from
Boston. If the initiative passed, developed into a binding ballot question, and passed a citywide
election, a new city called Mandela would be formed within the confines of Boston. The
Mandela plan argued that community control, including progressive housing initiatives, schools,
and medical care would greatly improve communities long neglected by the city. This plan drew
its name from the struggle for black liberation across the world, particularly South Africa. The
Mandela initiative suffered from sustained attacks by the media and politicians, losing 33,609 to
12,349 in November 1986. Despite its defeat, the vote provided a signal to the mayor’s office:
minority residents were determined to redevelop their own community. 240
With the DSNI offering the city a more palatable option than secession, the DSNI hired DAC
International to help draft its comprehensive plan for the redevelopment of the Dudley Square
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area. Che Madyun reflected that to improve the neighborhood: “on our own terms, we hired
urban planners who would look to us for solutions.” David Nesbitt, technical director for DAC,
helped the DSNI to prioritize the issues and strategies necessary for community redevelopment.
More than 200 residents participated in the creation of plans that centered on building an urban
village in Dudley Square. As expressed in the final plan, residents determined that improvement
efforts must address: augmenting job opportunities, developing local businesses, increasing
affordable housing options, expanding social services, and improving education. Cynthia Lopes
Jefferson noted that the plan “stresses services to rebuild the spirit of this community, as well as
to develop the neighborhood." The DSNI celebrated the release of its comprehensive plan in
September 1987 with a gathering that included 200 residents, Mayor Flynn, and City Council
President Bruce Bolling. Che Madyun declared: “the neighborhood has decided what it wants
and is now ready to put it into action."241
The first step of the comprehensive plan focused on increasing affordable housing options for
local residents. The DSNI divided this work into committees: one evaluated proposals to ensure
they fit with the urban village model while another worked with federal bureaucracies, such as
Freddie MAC, to obtain funding. 242 These efforts entailed advocating for residents to acquire
affordable mortgages, assisting with the application process, and facilitating resident interactions
with banks. Beyond facilitating residents’ communication with the financial world, the DSNI
bought properties in order to sell them to residents and converted buildings into affordable rental
units. To augment these efforts, the DSNI offered counseling services and shelter for residents
impacted by temporary displacement due to housing rehabilitation efforts. In total, the plan
called for $134 million in public funds to assist with Dudley’s rehabilitation.
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The DSNI gained the use of eminent domain to enact its housing vision, a first in the nation
accomplishment for a CDC. Nelson Merced argued that the “fragmented” arrangement of vacant
lots in the neighborhood inhibited redevelopment plans.243 Instead, the DSNI’s eminent domain
initiative targeted 131 property owners in the neighborhood. According to this plan, landowners
would sell property at the current market rate, totaling 15 acres, while the city would contribute
an additional 15 acres.244 Che Madyun proclaimed the need to work from “the bottom up and
have City Hall work with us so together we can determine our own fate." Resident Harold
Hughley felt a boost of confidence that “with these people, it'll be hard for anybody to step on
this community again." 245 The group’s slogan, “take a stand and own the land,” reflected the
long-term goals of minorities in the area. “Taking a stand” constituted the foundation of political
activity in the Hispanic community while “owning the land” directed African American
improvement efforts since the 1960s. Winning eminent domain provided a symbolic victory as
well. The BRA employed eminent domain to evict minority residents from the South End; the
DSNI used it as a tool to protect and enhance minority property ownership.
“The Force” Drives Community Development
With organizational momentum building, the DSNI commenced “a dramatic, visible, and
grass roots” effort for environmental improvement. The DSNI proposed an initiative called “the
Force” that functioned as a “unifying strategy.” 246 The endeavor built off the popular Star Wars
phrase “May the Force be with you," however the DSNI stressed: “The Force is with you.”
Described by leadership as the foundation for “a massive effort to change the neighborhood,” the
Force enlisted resident participation in improvement plans and interactions with the city
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bureaucracy. The phrase helped form a network of “spiritual, emotional and physical” support
among residents. In time, the Force evolved into a “cadre of community residents,” who
provided a “source of pride, dignity, energy” in community redevelopment. Public educational
programs engaged and recruited residents who forged a self-help organization that assisted the
DSNI’s housing programs and job development efforts.247
The Force facilitated artists who painted murals to create an “alternative channel” to
broadcast the cultural productions of the area. Communities employ murals to represent their
culture, the history of the area, and portray future aspirations. 248 By displaying “our dreams in
the neighborhood,” murals resisted economic inequality and confronted negative media
portrayal. A DSNI muralist commented at the unveiling of the Nubian Roots mural in 1990 that,
“Channel 4, 5, 7 and 56 should be out here now. But I bet you if I got shot and I was laying there
bleeding, they would come real quick and show that.”249 The Nubian Roots mural displayed
“different faces of actual people in the community doing ordinary everyday things.” Its creators
intended to “symbolize and capture as much of the community as possible.” Murals in the area
portrayed immigrant homelands such as Cape Verde, while others connected injustices the
community faced with issues faced in African nations.
The murals that dotted the Dudley area helped forge bonds across ethnicity, age, and class.
Working on murals recruited aspiring artists and provided residents a means of self-expression.
A Roxbury muralist commented: “black people (are) painting murals about themselves and their
situation. Black art is not a decoration. It’s a revolutionary force.” 250 DSNI muralists reflected
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that they “liked the idea of them being a part of history and part of change.” 251 During the
summer of 1988, La Alianza facilitated the work of twenty high school dropouts age thirteen to
twenty-one on a mural project.252 That same summer, black teenagers created music and murals
to commemorate 350 years of African Americans living in Massachusetts. 253

Figure 4.7: Puerto Rican muralist, 1984. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
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Figure 4.8: Puerto Rican muralist, 1984. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
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Figure 4.9: Nubian Roots Mural, Dudley Square. (Image: ResearchGate.org)

Completing Winthrop Estates
To facilitate the Winthrop Estates housing program, the DSNI hired Gus Newport to navigate
the political system and establish connections “outside the [Dudley] triangle.” 254 Newport, the
former mayor of Berkeley, California, had been a civil rights leader in Rochester, New York, in
the 1960s, receiving mentorship from Malcolm X. Newport arrived at the position known for his
fundraising abilities. The Boston Globe announced Newport as “Roxbury’s New Progressive
Populist” when he joined the DSNI in late 1988.255 Completing the Winthrop Estates set the table
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for the remaining “urban village” plans to reach fruition. At the behest of the DSNI, Boston's
Public Facilities Commission designated 12 developers to build 266 units of affordable housing
on 145 vacant, city-owned lots in Roxbury and Dorchester. 256

Figure 4.10: Winthrop Estates plan in Dudley Triangle. (Image: Dudley Neighbors Inc.)
The DSNI surmounted major obstacles while redeveloping the Dudley Square community.
For example, upon granting eminent domain to the DSNI, one BRA board member was
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overheard saying: "do you realize we're giving this land to foreigners?" Negative stereotypes and
the effects of low socioeconomic status still colored perception, as evidenced in banks’ continued
avoidance of loan servicing to Dudley residents and businesses. In 1989, Boston police arrested
six DSNI members at a protest outside of the Bank of Boston on Dudley Street. Protesters sang
slave spirituals and held signs that stated "REDLINING = RACISM,’ Roxbury, Mattapan, and
North Dorchester.”257
Developers wanted residents and the city of Boston to prove the neighborhood was “safe.”
The DSNI took upon itself the task of cleaning up Mary Hannon playground in Dorchester, one
of the most prominent public places in the DSNI triangle. The so-called “safety” of the park
correlated to an increase in funding sources for construction. Che Madyun observed that
residents “were not able to use the park because of the drug activities." Most of the drug arrests
in Boston’s minority neighborhoods were suburban white men. During 1990 and 1991, Boston
Police arrested 243 individuals from Quincy in Roxbury and Dorchester on drug related charges,
along with 53 from Weymouth, 51 from Brookline, 130 from Cambridge, 33 from Winthrop, 39
from Newton, 68 from Somerville, 39 from Braintree, 60 from Malden, 56 from Medford, 14
from Saugus, and 92 from Lynn. 258 In order to attain a normal service-funding for construction
and mortgages-DSNI members and community members overcame problems not of their
making.
Racist lending practices long impeded minority-driven community development efforts. In
1989, a study commissioned by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston reported that minority
groups in Roxbury and Dorchester received mortgage loans at 76 percent the rate of whites.
Another study conducted by the city of Boston found that mortgage lending to white
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neighborhoods compared to black neighborhoods occurred at three to one ratio. 259 In addition,
banks offered loans to minority groups and businesses for the purchase but not the development
of land, a signal of the risk banks associated with minorities. A different Federal Reserve study
revealed that Boston banks had the highest disparity between blacks and whites in obtaining
mortgage loans in the nineteen largest metropolitan areas in the United States. 260 A leading
Boston banker observed: "The facts in the report are accurate. Banks are not doing enough on
their own. That really reflects that they're not doing loans of any type." 261
The lack of access to financial institutions degraded the quality of life for Roxbury and
Dorchester residents. A Boston banker reported that residents of these communities, “don't have
access to banking, so non-reputable things fill the void. You get these shady mortgage brokers
and the check-cashing places and otherwise legalized loan-sharking that happens because people
are locked out of access to regular sources of financing."262 Elrette Marion, human resources
director at Polaroid and a longtime resident of Roxbury recalled that as a youth a lack of banks in
the area made it virtually impossible to cash checks and access basic banking services: "There
were no banks. No cash machines. You couldn't find a pharmacy. There was no grocery store.
Can you imagine?"263 Retail stores, such as supermarkets, followed the indications of financial
risks broadcast by banks and refused to locate in the area. Food choices were limited because
many residents relied on convenience stores for basic staples, including produce, milk, and meat.
Roxbury residents who had transportation options travelled to Star Markets on the MattapanDorchester line or in the Fenway area. 264 However, in the early 1990s, Roxbury did not have a
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train or trolley line. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) refused to service
the area while proposed improvements to Dudley Bus Station were stalled. 265
The city failed to rectify the inequities in mortgage lending practices. In early 1990, Mayor
Ray Flynn and banking leaders announced that $30 million in mortgage loans for low and
moderate-income homebuyers would be made available. 266 However, by July, the pool of
potential mortgage money had become an “issue of contention.” Boston area banks, save for
BayBank and Bank of Commerce, only offered variable rate mortgages. Interest rates for
variable rate mortgages reflect market changes on a month by month basis, creating an unstable
situation for potential homeowners. 267 Furthermore, groups designed to advocate for minority
residents proved deficient. Residents protested that the members of the Boston Fair Housing
Commission consisted of white men who made decisions often to the detriment of the city’s
minorities. City Councilor Bruce Bolling of Roxbury noted that Mayor Flynn “is at a crossroads
in terms of his relationship with communities of color."268
Rather than respond to problems posed by Hannon Park in isolation, the DSNI expanded its
activist role. At the start of the 1990s, DSNI activists demanded the city remove abandoned
vehicles and coordinated clean up days for specific vacant lots. DSNI members pressured city
officials for increased street lights and green space, in addition to improved community services.
This included assisting residents in understanding their housing options and listing available
properties to rent or own. Finally, the DSNI developed tenants’ rights workshops, homeowner
buying workshops, programs to rehabilitate viable structures, and strategies to purchase land in
the DSNI triangle. The master plan vision proclaimed that unleashing the “human potential” of
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residents would allow them to address the environmental issues that challenged the area. In
1991, Che Madyun delivered the Presidential Address to DSNI leaders, members, and
community residents. The DSNI forged a “common destiny” among the various ethnic groups
through “sincerity, purpose, and community collaboration.” Madyun ticked off the
accomplishments and plans for the next few years, intoning: “this is our community and by
working together we shall overcome…together we shall prevail.”269
In the summer of 1991, the DSNI sponsored a Summerfest at Hannon Park that resulted in the
DSNI obtaining a $2 million loan from the Ford Foundation at 1% interest. The DSNI’s Human
Development Committee (HDC) proved instrumental to organizing and executing activities at
the park. The group set up week-long programs for each ethnic group to celebrate its literature,
history, art, dance, theatre, music, and writing. Arts and crafts activities offered another avenue
for youth participation. Gus Newport observed that the activities became “infectious," 270adding:
"We're going to start having block competitions for beautification. People want to do the right
thing."271 The HDC facilitated an intergenerational project that enlisted youth to conduct an
interview with an older member of their ethnicity and produce a video memorializing the
interviews. Members of the committee also worked with the Cape Verdean community to
develop and maintain its community house, or social service center/agency.272 The HDC
provided professional training through its Young Architects and Planners project to assist with
the development of Winthrop Estates. It trained ten participants in architecture and concepts of
urban design. One participant, Gevel Merrero became a professional architect. Merrero’s father
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reflected: “DSNI came and told us we're not only going to build houses, we're going to build
people. Gonna build our community.”273

Figure 4.11: Floor Plans for Winthrop Estates. (Image: Dudley Neighbors Inc.)

The DSNI seized on the momentum built by the Ford Loan to address issues facing residents.
The so-called “agency collaborative” functioned as a full-time lobbyist for the DSNI efforts, as it
petitioned legislators to demand youth development, health care, literacy, educational, and
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vocational training services for Roxbury and North Dorchester. The collaborative called for a
decentralized service distribution system based on resident need. The “Dudley Pride” effort
continued revitalization efforts by enlisting the assistance of Harvard students with
neighborhood/vacant lot clean up. In addition, it reported illegal dumping and created the Lead
Poisoning Prevention Project that canvassed neighborhoods to recruit and create a record of lead
pollution. Pride created “Green Teams” to connect neighborhood youth with the Massachusetts
Horticultural Society and other environmental groups. They initiated activities to curb drug
dealing, developed a youth committee, connected with City-Year volunteers to assist with
cleaning up vacant lots, and initiated summer programs at Hannon Park. 274
To facilitate the development of Winthrop Estates, the DSNI created Dudley Neighbors
Incorporated (DNI) to negotiate the eminent domain transfers. The DNI formed a community
land trust (CLT) to lease the land underneath Winthrop Estates for 99 years to developers,
homeowners, and cooperatives. Employing the CLT model allowed residents to retain “control
over the development and future of the community” under the slogan, “Take a stand and own the
land!” Standing committees devoted to real estate acquisition, development, and marketing as
well negotiating the $2 million loan with the Ford Foundation helped execute the process. DNI
efforts distributed funds, and met the administrative, accounting, and oversight reporting
requirements of the Ford Loan. In addition, the DNI provided legal advocacy to oppose sellers
within the eminent domain hoping a court might overturn the ruling or the city failed to enforce
the claim.
In 1992, the DSNI transitioned to the role of “full developer” in the Winthrop Estates project.
To assist with this, the DNI developed homeowners’ workshops to assist first-time homeowners.
“Statement to Massachusetts Elected Officials from the Agency Collaborative of the
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative.” Records GMA: Box 1, Folder 9.
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The group developed awareness, knowledge of opportunities, and training for home ownership
responsibilities. It also maintained and protected vacant lots during the process of building. In
addition to positive public perception and more access to capital, creating affordable housing had
functioned as a central pillar of DSNI activity since its inception. In March 1993, the DSNI
began work on Winthrop Estates, as the loan had been secured and architectural plans completed.
The project began with six units consisting of 38 duplex houses on Dennis Street adjacent to
Blue Hill Avenue and Dudley Street. The DSNI offered home buying classes to help new
homeowners manage their investment. 275 Through its construction of Winthrop Estates the DSNI
established credit, accessed funding from a variety of sources, and cultivated support from city
officials.

Figure 4.12: Dennis Street before Winthrop Estates project. (Image: Dudley Neighbors Inc.)
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Folder 18: “Grants Management Associates Monitoring Reports, 1990-1994.” The DSNI sent
out letters to groups and individuals in the surrounding area of Winthrop Estates. They also
compiled reports recording recent events and planning for the future of Winthrop Estates; Boston
Globe, 3/28/1993; Boston Globe, 4/1/1993.
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Figure 4.13: Dennis Street after Winthrop Estates project. (Image: Dudley Neighbors Inc.)

Figure 4.14: Winthrop Estates project area before construction. (Image: Dudley Neighbors
Inc.)
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Figure 4.15: Winthrop Estates project area after construction. (Image: Dudley Neighbors Inc.)

Conclusion
The DSNI mimicked earlier iterations of democratic striving in United States history.
Lawrence Goodwyn’s The Populist Moment examined the four steps democratic movements
engage in to enhance participation, increase access, and promote the autonomy of ordinary
individuals. Dudley-area activists area knew and understood these steps; participants in Mel
King’s election bid used this book as a guidepost for its own actions. First, the DSNI created an
“autonomous institution where new interpretations can materialize that run counter to those of
prevailing authority.” Second, the Don’t Dump on US! effort recruited new members into the
world of activism. Third, the development of comprehensive plan for the neighborhood and
public meetings functioned as “the movement educating.” Fourth, after the DSNI earned eminent
domain to reclaim and rebuild the neighborhood, the DSNI created an institutional means
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whereby the new ideas can be expressed in an autonomous political way.” 276 In doing so, the
DSNI challenged prevailing assumptions in society and redeveloped their community under their
own direction.
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CHAPTER 5
"WE MAKE THINGS HAPPEN THAT CAN’T HAPPEN:”
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN BOSTON
During the 1990s, activists in Boston defined their own strand of environmental justice. In the
early part of the decade, the DSNI began to identify as members of the environmental justice
movement. In 1992, Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE) formed as residents
worked with academics and lawyers to confront environmental racism. These groups coupled
with the growth of Community Development Corporations (CDC)s, constructed a systematic
response to environmental racism through civic environmentalism: an effort to improve social
and environmental problems as an interconnected set of issues. The group’s rhetoric and actions
helped to define a key difference between urban environmentalism and its mainstream brethren:
in order to improve urban environments, social capital must be developed. Rather than
preserving natural environments, urban environmentalists must generate the human potential to
improve the natural and built environments of its ecosystem: the neighborhood.
The DSNI, ACE, and CDCs completed the urban village in Dudley Square, which had been
the overall mission of activists for decades. The “town commons” green space area operated as a
focal point for the encircling mixed-used built environment of stores, shops, markets, and
restaurants, beyond which lay a variety of housing projects undertaken by area groups. Economic
development and environment amelioration worked hand in hand to enliven the cityscape. The
brand of environmental justice endemic to the area involved four components: deterring and
defending; restoring; controlling and building; and changing perceptions. ACE and the DSNI led
multiple campaigns to improve air quality and prevent unwanted land uses from scarring the
neighborhood. Restoration of old industrial sites still contaminated with pollution offered a
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chance for environmental cleanup and economic development, particularly when government
policy facilitated the sale of the properties for as low as one dollar. Controlling and building
involved augmenting property ownership and the entrepreneurial capabilities of residents, while
also enhancing cultural institutions such as theatres, street murals, and community gardens.
Changing the perception of the community buttressed it against outside renewal projects and
gentrification by projecting a well-developed framework of terms that groups used in an
increasing share of media exposure.
Alternatives for Community and Environment and Just Sustainabilities
In 1992, a group of Roxbury and Dorchester residents teamed up with academics and formed
ACE. Dubbed “new social entrepreneurs” by the Boston Globe, ACE workers extended the
strategies of EJM activists in Boston with respect to legal action, political mobilization, and
educational initiatives. The group included the Community Representation Project, the Roxbury
Environmental Empowerment Project, the Massachusetts Environmental Justice Network, and
the Alternative Resource Center. Much of ACE leadership drew upon expertise at the nation’s
top universities. The staff included William Shutkin, a graduate of Brown and Virginia Law;
Charles Lord from Yale and Virginia Law; Jo-Anne Henry, a graduate of Penn and CaliforniaBerkeley’s law school; and Penn Loh, a graduate of MIT and Cal-Berkeley. ACE employed their
professional skills and social leverage to help residents access grant money and interact with the
courts, police, and government agencies.277 Rather than treating residents as the object of studies
in which they had little or no input, Penn Loh and others at ACE provided residents with relevant
resources and literature so "they become their own experts on the things going on in their own
neighborhoods." Michelle Alvarez of the Massachusetts Environmental Justice Network noted
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that “the success of our cases depends on that partnership, because the residents are the eyes and
ears of the community.”278 ACE’s efforts continued the trend regarding how experts empowered
residents of Roxbury and North Dorchester.
ACE leadership merged the philosophies of the sustainability movement, associated with
mainstream environmental groups, and the environmental justice movement in an effort it called
“just sustainabilities.” The group’s adoption of the word “just” incorporated the fundamental
ideas of environmental justice: the environmental movement must address the problems posed by
unequal protection from hazards and access to amenities based on race and class. The word
sustainability, as it relates to environmentalism, derived from a 1992 conference on development
strategies sponsored by the United Nations. At this conference, participants developed the
concept of a “futurity principle” and/or “intergenerational equity” as a guiding principle for
sustainability efforts. Development should proceed, participants insisted, “without compromising
the ability of future generations” to improve their own lives in terms of “economic vitality,
ecological integrity, civic democracy, and social well-being.” 279 ACE chose the plural
“sustainabilities” to reflect that groups bring different perspectives on how to achieve
sustainability based on cultural background. The plural sustainabilities also acknowledges that
the term describes a process, a product, a practice, and a goal to be achieved. This ambiguity,
coupled with the term’s top-down dissemination, led to limited popular understanding of the
term. As philosopher Roger JH King observed: “often nothing is said about the internal
dimension of sustainability. How much must people’s aspirations, perceptions, attention, desires,
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knowledge, consciousness change?” 280 Seeking to clear up this ambiguity, ACE employed the
civic environmentalist framework to adapt sustainability efforts to endemic environments and
culture.281
Deterring and Defending: The Fight for Clean Air
During the 1990s, ACE and DSNI efforts improved air quality in the Dudley area. By the
mid-1990s, the effects of air pollution claimed about 64,000 lives in the United States and 1,136
lives in Massachusetts per year. Dudley residents breathed the most polluted air in the state, as
the square stood within 1.5 miles to 15 bus and truck depots that housed approximately 1,150
diesel vehicles. The MBTA owned the largest number of vehicles in the area, with several bus
terminals and storage areas in the immediate vicinity of the square. Dudley Square abuts South
Bay, next to Interstate 93, making it attractive for construction companies to house equipment in
the area. In 1987, the MBTA terminated the elevated Orange Line train that ran through Dudley
Square, leaving only bus service. Buses at the Dudley Square station often idled for between 30
and 40 minutes.
Studies identified the components of diesel fuel contribute to poor air quality, as its exhaust
accounted for 80 percent of particulate emissions from vehicles. Two components of exhaust
make it toxic to humans: particulate matter and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH). PAH
bonds with pollen, a process that allows deeper absorption into the lungs, making its effects
worse. Asthma rates for African Americans in Roxbury ran five times higher than whites in other
locations in the state, with minorities suffering from hospitalization due to respiratory problems
at increased rates. As a result, asthma was the number one reason for children's hospitalization
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and school absenteeism. Some residents had to rely on nebulizing machines and restrictions on
rugs and other dust-creating household items.282
In 1993, when Todesca Construction proposed an asphalt plant in the South Bay area, DSNI
members unanimously voted against it and organized opposition to implementation proposals.
Ros Everdale of the DSNI argued: "Todesca is asking the community to take some
environmental risks, some health risks” that were unnecessary given the area’s documented air
pollution issues. The DSNI cited research conducted by Robert Bullard that revealed a
correlation between asphalt plants and increased occurrences of asthma among residents in the
surrounding area. Everdale noted that the entire area would be negatively affected, because
residents “have no control over what routes the trucks take. The asphalt on the trucks is the big
concern."283 Spilled asphalt would contaminate the ground and air on surrounding streets and
subject residents to environmental hazards. Ro Whittington of the DSNI viewed the proposal as
an impediment to economic development: “We are really rebuilding a community. We don't
think it's compatible with the use of that land." Everdale concluded, the DSNI’s work
represented an attempt to “put value into the community and we don't want to have an asphalt
plant as a neighbor.”284
The DSNI’s Dudley Pride organization led a multi-pronged effort to fight implementation
plans for the asphalt plant. Pride marshalled community members to form the Coalition Against
the Asphalt Plant (CAAP) to protest at a city zoning board meeting in July of 1993. To that
point, the zoning board had taken consideration of the plant without input from residents, a status
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that the CAAP reversed. The CAAP efforts continued after the zoning meeting to expand
participation by informing residents about the negative implications of an asphalt plant. The
DSNI produced a pamphlet featuring arguments from the Massachusetts EPA, the neighborhood
associations in Roxbury, Dorchester, the South End, and South Boston, the American Lung
Association, and the Massachusetts Office of Environmental Affairs. The pamphlet illustrated
how the asphalt plant would violate EPA standards, increase pollution, introduce harmful
chemicals into the neighborhood, and create odor and traffic problems from 18-wheel trucks
driving through the neighborhood. Todesca already ran a profitable business, the pamphlet
argued, and did not need the plant to stay in the black.285 The effort united residents across class,
racial, ethnic, and geographic boundaries. While the confrontation took five years to resolve,
CAAP efforts bore fruit in 1998 when the city's Board of Health unanimously rejected plans for
the asphalt plant in South Bay, citing air pollution concerns.
In 1996, fourteen-year-old Walter Kirnon of Roxbury died an asthma attack, and this spurred
the community to action. Penn Loh of ACE worked with residents to reduce asthma rates among
Boston’s minority residents.286 Kalare Allen, a teacher and co-founder of ACE, created a student
generated an inquiry-based curriculum with fourth and fifth grade classes in Roxbury to
understand and analyze air quality and propose solutions to air pollution. ACE then enlisted the
participation of researchers from the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH). Together,
residents, students, members of ACE, and the HSPH measured air pollution at specific intervals
over the course of 24 hours in various parts of Dudley Square. The HSPH, Allen’s students, and
area residents gathered, organized, and interpreted air quality data. The resulting study
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established a link between traffic congestion and air pollution, especially during the early
morning and late afternoon rush hours. The evidence in the study bolstered residents’ claims
regarding poor air quality.
The air pollution study provided a springboard for community activism to improve air quality
in Dudley Square. Allen and her students developed the Clean Buses for Boston (CBB) program
to “define what the issues are and, more so, what they want to do about it.” 287 The CBB mounted
a campaign that pressured the MBTA to convert its diesel powered bus fleet to more fuel
efficient motors that emitted lower particulates and carbon dioxide. The group argued that the
MBTA, as a taxpayer funded organization, should be responsive to the needs of its constituents
and emulate other metropolitan areas by converting to natural gas.288 A group of students from
local schools held a press conference attended by every major news outlet in the city where they
discussed their experiences with air pollution, asthma, and respiratory issues. Students created
signs and placed them around Dudley Station that reminded bus drivers that idling led to air
pollution. ACE lawyers and student research volunteers uncovered a 1972 Massachusetts state
law limiting the length of vehicle idling to five minutes. On chosen days, students handed out
“tickets” to bus drivers that spent too long idling at Dudley Station. In 1997, students dedicated
an anti-idling protest to the memory of Walter Kirnon, the teenager from Roxbury who died from
an asthma attack the previous year. 289 In 1998, the Conservation Law Foundation argued that the
state of Massachusetts violated the Clean Air Act when it ignored $450 million offered to the
MBTA to increase transportation options and decrease air pollutants. ACE demanded the
withheld federal funds should purchase fuel and emission efficient buses and subway cars.
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Residents charged that state and local officials acted with “indifference” to the needs of minority
residents.290
By the year 2000, activism in the Dudley area had brought about improvements in air quality
through a number of initiatives. The Massachusetts Port Authority and other bus-fleet companies
began using biodiesel fuel that was 80 percent refined petroleum and 20 percent soybean,
rapeseed and other oils. Advocates of biodiesel noted that its higher oxygen content allowed the
fuel to burn more completely, thus reducing carbon dioxide emissions and noxious fumes. In
addition, ACE helped to broker a deal between residents and Mario Susi's excavation, road
resurfacing, and gravel crushing company. In 1996, after six years of negotiations, Susi
formalized an agreement that he claimed cost him $1.5 million to bring his property up to
environmental standards. Finally, the MBTA purchased 358 new clean fuel buses in 2001 due to
pressure from the CBB. To ensure air quality, AirBeat monitoring systems installed in the
Dudley Square area allowed residents to track information from their personal computers. 291
Restoration: Greening the Brownfields
The DSNI and its associates amplified clean-up efforts of the 56 toxic waste sites located in
Roxbury and North Dorchester, the highest ratio in the city. Former gas stations, dry cleaners,
factories, and transfer stations contaminated with hazardous waste are referred to as brownfields.
The 30,000 brownfields in the United States ranged from heavy to mild toxic contamination,
usually from petroleum spills, asbestos, and/or industrial solvents. Lead paint on walls and in the
ground posed significant health risks. 292 Most of the 7,500 brownfields in the state catalogued by
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) were in Boston or other
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former industrial areas such as Fall River, Lowell, and Worcester. Owners of brownfield
properties found that declaring bankruptcy had more fiscal advantages than detoxification of
their properties. The 7,500 contaminated properties in Massachusetts discouraged development,
since new owners would assume responsibility for removing any toxins left behind. However,
federal funding in the 1990s provided the “opportunity for economically disadvantaged
communities to begin the process of reclaiming their environment and economy." 293 For those
who decided to invest, brownfield clean-up cost less than expected, as evidenced by the 75
percent drop in the cost of environmental insurance over a four year period at the beginning of
the 1990s.294
The DSNI used brownfield acquisition and development as an opportunity to build its urban
village. In 1993, the DSNI convinced the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to sell
the former Scott & Duncan furniture factory for one dollar. Until 1989, the factory stood as “one
of the prime economic assets” of Dudley Square, but it had been shuttered due to an economic
downturn. The FDIC considered the factory an undesirable property because of hazardous waste
on the site, but the DSNI viewed the abandoned factory as an opportunity to establish resident
owned businesses, housing, and light manufacturing. After acquiring the property, DSNI
officials characterized the FDIC sale as a “better way to work with the community."295 The
DSNI prevented speculators and/or non-residents from purchasing the property. Local businesses
supported the effort, given the DSNI’s had applied for a $1million grant to detoxify and
repurpose the factory.296 In 1995, the DSNI received a $200,000 federal grant to clean up
brownfields in Dudley Square. Mayor Thomas Menino, echoing the ideas of DSNI leadership,
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noted that "vacant lots should be looked at as resources for community development." That same
year, the DSNI, ACE, and others pressured local officials to dismantle the decommissioned
South Bay Incinerator in Roxbury, providing community groups with $20 million to fund the
project, while the EPA removed asbestos ahead of standard demolition procedures. 297
As brownfields grew in importance, funding for remediation projects reflected racial and class
biases. President Bill Clinton proposed two billion dollars in tax breaks for brownfield clean-up
in low-income areas, while the MDEP proposed $30 million to assist investors in
decontamination. In 1997 William Weld, Republican governor of Massachusetts, proposed tax
breaks designed to reduce brownfield acquisition costs by 20 percent and reduced the legal
liability for additional pollutants discovered after the initial cleanup. While such a strategy made
targeting lightly contaminated areas more attractive, residents of Roxbury decried the lack of
attention paid to heavily polluted areas. Weld’s proposal offered nothing to residents concerned
about the former Modern Electroplating metalworking plant in Dudley Square that became one
of the worst pollution problems in Massachusetts. Without government funding, the most
contaminated brownfields would remain financially unattractive projects. When, in March of
1998, a brownfields law passed the Massachusetts legislature that cut funding to economically
disadvantaged areas, critics charged the bill “took money from areas that really needed it and
ladled it around the Commonwealth."298
Despite lowered funding expectations, the DSNI approached brownfields as means to apply
innovative solutions to community development issues. Focus groups gathered input on
residents’ vision for the reconditioned factory and other locales around Dudley, creating an
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“Economics with People in Mind” program to elicit support from the community. 299 The group
proved a disruptive force in real estate and development in Boston. A DSNI spokesperson
possessed an optimistic view of its role in brownfield work: "We make things happen that can't
happen. We make up new rules as we go along." 300 To that end, the DSNI compiled a map and
database locating and cataloguing environmental hazards so that residents could expand urban
agriculture. Volunteers mapped vacant lots available for conversion to garden plots, cleaned up
yards, and put down fresh soil. 301 Che Madyun’s daughter, Yaqana Madyun, and other
neighborhood youth worked in conjunction with Drumlin Farm, owned by the Massachusetts
Audubon Society, in Lincoln, about 40 minutes west of Boston. On Tuesdays, the Drumlin Farm
participants sold their produce at a farm stand adjacent to the DSNI main headquarters. 302
Controlling and Building
In late 1994, the city of Boston announced it would provide 1.2 million dollars to fund the
DSNI’s “Dudley Commons” project on the corner of Dudley Street and Blue Hill Avenue. Trudy
Coxe, formerly of the DSNI but by 1994 working as state Environmental Secretary, and Ro
Whittington of the DSNI proved instrumental in seeing the project through. At the behest of the
DSNI, architects and planners designed the urban village that had long been the group’s goal,
with the commons as its centerpiece. The proposal included an indoor recreation and health care
center at Orchard Park. With input from residents, the DSNI developed governance structures for
each community center in the triangle. 303 Plans for Dudley Commons considered a wide range of
factors, including population density, housing for elderly people, and green space, while other
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studies prepared financial and marketing plans for new properties. Across the various subjects,
the authors’ considered “vitality” and “diversity” essential to a revitalized Dudley community.
Trish Settles of the DSNI proclaimed: "Diversity brings stability. Diversity is enthusiasm." 304 To
the language and tactics of the civil rights movement, DSNI members added an ecological
understanding that diversity and resilience functioned as the essential elements of a healthy
ecosystem.
By the late 1990s, the community development movement in Boston was flourishing as
resident-directed plans facilitated service delivery that reflected the culture of the area. Mayor
Menino saw the construction of new housing cooperatives as sources of “stability to this
community."305 The DSNI also obtained a grant from the federal government for a complete
renovation of the Orchard Park subsidized housing complex, adding a new health center, teen
center, and offices for a tenant task force. 306 In 1999, the Development Corporation of Grove
Hall began construction of a retail mall that included a supermarket and drugstore at a former
brownfield. The Blue Hill Task Force hired Stull and Lee, the architectural and planning firm
instrumental to DSNI projects, to create an "urban design vision" for the avenue. Plans included
“macro level” designs for overall streetscape improvements along with specific projects designed
to improve individual lots and small sections of property such as shared storefronts. “High
visibility interventions” such as acquiring city-owned and private vacant property, were at the
forefront of its efforts, along with improvements in public safety, sanitation, and infrastructure.
Local business development and residential construction, the task force report argued, would
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generate a safe and clean environment and reestablish Blue Hill Avenue as a desirable and
"unique" shopping district.307
During the 1990s, the proliferation of Community Development Corporations (CDCs)
coupled with increased government funding spurred economic growth in Roxbury and North
Dorchester. For example, three CDC’s obtained two million dollars in grants, loans, and
assistance from architectural firms to upgrade and repair thirty businesses. The Blue Hill Avenue
Superette used $60,000 for renovations while M&M Variety did the same with a $51,000 grant.
The 50,000 square foot Grove Hall Mall project secured $7.5 million in block grant funds.
Nuestra Comunidad obtained $550,000 to redevelop a building that housed a Caribbean
restaurant. Many of the entrepreneurs embraced a socially conscious ethic. Joseph Carpineto
opened the Log School in Dorchester, which helped students enrolled in a GED program earn
money and gain career training skills. Putnam Investments donated $35,000 to develop the
company’s businesses and marketing plans. Cheryl Straughter grew up in the Grove Hall area of
Blue Hill Avenue, moved away in 1971, and returned in 1996 to open Keith's Place, a forty-fiveseat restaurant. Straughter recalled, "I wanted to set an example. You have to show people." In
1999, David Lopes, chairman of the Blue Hill Avenue Task Force, observed that “more has
happened in the last six years than has happened in the last 30 years."308 In addition, the DSNI
instituted an economic task force that conducted workshops on entrepreneurship, including
developing business plans, understanding and accessing credit, and interacting with banks to
obtain loans and financing. The task force offered classes in which residents created skills
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inventories and developed professional resumes while interviewing and job search classes
provided a second level of support.309

Figure 5.1: Dudley Street, 2011. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

309

Records GMA, Box 1, Folder 1.
166

Figure 5.2: Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative building, 2011. (Image: Wikimedia
Commons)
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Figure 5.3: Intersection of Dudley and Warren Streets, 2011. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

168

Figure 5.4: Moreland Street, Roxbury 2011. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

The DSNI driven renovation of the Strand Theatre in Dorchester “turned the neighborhood
around." In 1993, the Strand received a prestigious grant from the National Endowment for the
Arts that provided the theatre “a new kind of respect.” Built in 1918, the theatre had a 1,400person capacity and retained much of the ornate furnishings, tapestries, and portraits from its
early years. Theatre officials estimated that about 130,000 people used the Strand each year. The
theatre hosted a Vietnamese New Year’s celebration, a hip-hop and jazz festival, as well as
community meetings and political gatherings, making it a “critical piece” of the community.
According to Susanne Beaton, deputy director of the DSNI, because “there are black artists,
Hispanic artists who reflect the community and the kids viewing them," the theatre helped local
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young people seek positive outlets. The low cost of involvement brought in a wider audience,
allowing participants to “express themselves in different ways." Beaton viewed the Strand’s
resurgence as a message “to those who felt the inner-city neighborhoods were dead or dying.” In
addition, the Strand demonstrated that “culture and art were important.” 310 The DSNI patronized
various artistic mediums as a means to improve the community. Urban Arts created public art
installations as “a catalyst for urban revitalization and a means to get people really involved in
community building." The “Blue Hill: Avenue of the Arts” project created public art to make
Blue Hill Avenue the “cultural Mecca” of the black community. In addition, the DSNI conducted
a series of artist-led workshops that engaged neighborhood teens in video production,
photography, creative writing, and urban planning workshops.311
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Figure 5.5: Handbill for “Auction of Souls.” Strand Theatre, 1919. DSNI efforts helped to
revitalize the Strand. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)
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Figure 5.6: Interior of the Strand Theatre after renovations. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

The DSNI expanded its networking capabilities to enlarge clean-up efforts in Roxbury and
Dorchester. With the assistance of a $46,000 grant from the EPA, Roxbury Community College
created an Environmental Education Center, the first institution of this type in New England. The
center would offer classes about environmental stewardship, particularly with respect to
preserving, regenerating, and sustaining the nearby civic environment. In 1994, a cadre of over
60 environmental lawyers from the Massachusetts Environmental Justice Network (MEJN)
connected with low income and minority communities around the state to fight illegal dumping
and other sources of pollution. The network employed “the enormous amount of legal protection
that does exist on behalf of communities that don't have the money to hire lawyers." The MEJN
also integrated a network of health professionals with environmental experts. 312 Many of these
lawyers, health professionals, and academics also participated in the ascent of ACE.
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Conclusion: Changing Perception
In 1993, the DSNI began to employ the term environmental racism to characterize the issues
facing the neighborhood. The group pointed to federal studies that demonstrated poorer
communities bore the brunt of pollution, toxic waste, and other types of environmental hazards.
Trish Settles of the DSNI viewed halting pollution as a rigged competition in which affluent
areas resisted environmental degradation at the expense of poorer regions. Marginalizing
minority groups’ concerns about the environment compounded the problem because it
contributed to the stereotype that minorities are unconcerned with environmental stewardship. 313
Instead, the DSNI forwarded a well-defined terminology and philosophy as a bulwark to
confront negative perceptions that had deep roots in societal thought patterns. As environmental
justice efforts in Boston evolved, activists moved beyond simply halting pollution in their own
community. Recognizing that one community’s pollution prevention efforts can create a
pollution problem in a different location, the DSNI, ACE, and others used civic
environmentalism adopted the notion of “just sustainabilities,” aimed at reducing pollution in
equitable ways.
Environmental justice efforts in Boston challenged the negative stereotypes of minorities—
the premises behind the marginalization of environmental concerns affecting minority
communities. Trish Settles argued that viewing urban areas as “already contaminated" failed to
consider city space as an environment: “It's not going to look like rural Vermont, but there are
people here using this soil and breathing this air." The DSNI wanted both the general public and
mainstream environmental groups such as the Sierra Club to recognize inner city residents’
stewardship. Settles noted that the “Save the Bay” movement sponsored by more affluent
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environmental groups enjoyed widespread publicity, but the DSNI messages that they stenciled
on sewers: "Drains to Boston Harbor - Don't Dump," received little if any attention from media
outlets and the general public. 314 Settles felt the unequal attention paid to similar efforts reflected
how minority-based environmentalism was treated as an aberration rather than the sustained and
dynamic movement it had become.
The DSNI, ACE, and the CDC movements contributed to a changed public discourse
regarding the minority community. For example, a 1994 Boston Globe editorial announced the
birth of the MEJN with the title “Environmental Justice.” The Globe also began using
“environmental racism” at the same time the DSNI began employing the term. 315 Most important
to the DSNI, the Globe’s coverage helped to forge a common language related to environmental
justice efforts. In doing so, the paper provided signals to other media outlets and helped the
general public understand EJM efforts according to the ideas, language, and actions of its
participants. Rather than the general public receiving messages from print and television about
trouble and problems in the minority community, activists in Roxbury and North Dorchester took
a share of media attention to their redevelopment initiatives. Such developments continued the
collective mission across organizations: self-determination in community development. These
groups had learned that in order to accomplish those objectives, residents needed to define the
issues facing them and propose their own solutions. The portrayal of residents and their
community in media and government bureaucracies normalized inhumane treatment. That had to
stop for purposeful renewal projects to begin.
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CONCLUSION
RECLAIMING POWER THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The preceding chapters trace how the major institutions that shaped environmental racism and
environmental justice movement itself changed over time. The notions that certain ethnic
minorities degraded their surroundings and that a cordon sanitaire would limit the inimical
effects of these individuals created policies that instituted and enforced environmental racism in
Boston. In the early 1900s, these conflicts played out in the struggle to control the cultural
institutions of the mixed-use environment, but later these assumptions justified urban renewal,
dislocation, and the alienation of African Americans and Latinx residents from the South End. In
response, activist organizations in Roxbury focused on rebuilding the institutions they had lost, a
vision that culminated in the “urban village” in Dudley Square. Because the story in Boston
unfolded in this fashion, the role of experts, participation of government, environmental factors
of inequality, and focus of activist groups will be explored over time to bring this narrative to a
close.
Nodes of Power Untangle through Environmental Concerns
In turn-of-the-century Boston, settlement houses acted as the key intermediary between
academics and policy makers. Settlement houses drew their ideas and practices from a
Puritanical worldview that saw cities as sources of vice. This orientation motivated them to tamp
down the variety of spontaneous behaviors that enlivened life in the South End. As a result, its
leaders as well as its rank and file made decisions and conducted daily activities that operated
from the assumption that ethnic minorities posed a danger to society. Academic studies such as
Robert Woods’ The City Wilderness appeared to verify and expound upon these assumptions.
When policy makers looked to settlement houses of the South End and Roxbury for direction,
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these organizations viewed government funds as an opportunity to improve the neighborhood by
favoring dislocation of its poorest residents. They organized studies that favored the interest of
incoming middle-class residents, received funds for removing working-class residents, and
helped direct planning agendas. Settlement houses helped cement the argument that urban
renewal would improve the social fabric and physical environment of cities.
For minorities, further alienation resulted from the machinations of Boston’s political system
and bureaucracies. As the federal government expanded during the New Deal, it created
numerous and far-reaching policies in a short period of time. These programs reshaped urban
environments and relied on the assumptions of academics and middle-class organizations that
studied or served those populations. The resulting laws, regulations, bureaucracies, and funding
mechanisms reflected the notions that ethnic minorities failed to uphold social norms and
maintain property. Such reasoning failed to consider the causes of minorities’ living conditions
and economic status as well as the effect of forced dislocation. Dominant white politicians
operated with the inherent assumption that minorities would mismanage direct aid, so they
funneled it to politicians’ own interests and constituencies. During the 1960s, the largest influx
of federal funds exacerbated dislocation in minority communities. Without money and legal
protection, Boston’s minority residents saw a decline in status as a result of efforts ostensibly
designed to help them.
Predispositions among policy and political leaders regarding ethnic minorities created a blind
spot in urban renewal that caused paradoxical economic development in Boston. Urban renewal
both regenerated Boston and contributed to a decline in status for minorities. Environmental
concerns about minorities drove urban renewal legislation to improve designations of space
rather than improve the fortunes of residents. In most cases, planners and financial institutions
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made decisions at odds with minorities interests. Legislation designed to facilitate economic
development and the progress of society forced working-class residents to the margins of the
economy and society, a condition they felt in environmental terms on an everyday basis in the
“Bantustan” of Roxbury.
An Urban Village as a Cradle of Democracy
The connection between the working-class ethnic minority and the social fabric of ethnic
neighborhoods proves key to understanding environmental racism and environmental justice in
Boston. During the early 1900s, the South End’s eateries, taverns, ethnic associations, and
theatres sustained life for residents by protecting ethnic culture and providing social structure.
Both sides of the class and racial divide in Boston understood the importance of the South End to
migrant and black populations. Civil rights groups and community development activists argued
the reconstitution of these institutions would create the conditions necessary for racial equality in
Boston. Because of this, groups such as the Congress for Racial Equality focused on housing and
the social organizations that proved key to developing a viable community. The Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) formulated the notion of self-determination in community
development in the 1970s. Activism in Boston stayed consistent in that it reacted to
environmental conditions and responded to inequality by focusing on environmental
considerations.
Civic environmentalists argue that urban villages serve as ideal models for residents to make
informed decisions about living within their own natural limits, because such places contribute to
both individual autonomy and communitarian practices. The multitude of groups operating out of
the Dudley area expressed this ethic by forming cooperative housing and businesses to interact
with economic markets and government agencies. Through their work as activists, Dudley
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residents forwarded the mission of civic environmentalism. As this work unfolded, the DSNI
facilitated the development of democratic leadership and a new generation of community
leaders. EJM efforts in Boston developed roots, a philosophy, and objectives through its focus on
community institutions, cultural identity, and environmental protection. The organizations
employed an inclusive approach to stand in opposition to the traditional power structure that had
worked against them.
The movement that culminated in a durable urban village in Dudley Square drew up on
several cultural influences. African Americans had long-standing framework of environmental
ethics that emerged from Africa and from the slave plantations of the antebellum American
South. In migrating to northern cities like Boston they forged a sense of “turf” as a means of
cultural protection and identity building. Experiences with urban renewal led many in the black
community to reject the prevailing ethic of American society, instead identifying with anticolonial African organizations engaged in nation building. African Americans in Boston and
Africans suffering under the yoke of colonialism concluded that “high-statism,” or large-scale
government interventions, worked against the interests of people with dark skin color. Latinx and
Cape Verdean residents augmented these transnational perspectives, particularly with respect to
building oppositional organizations designed to protect local residents.
Activists in Dudley also considered their work in terms of the progressive democratic striving
that was long part of the American experience. Groups operating out of Roxbury and North
Dorchester adopted an outlook similar to radicals, socialists, and unionists who had struggled
against social injustice throughout American history. The environmental justice efforts in Boston
most closely align with the efforts of the Populists of the 1890s, albeit not on the same scale.
Farmers in the American West attempted to create a mass democratic movement that defined
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itself in opposition to mainstream culture. Rather than passively accept circumstances, they
moved to change the way people thought about politics, economy, and society so that they could
create a more just society. The civil rights movement adopted this type of political organizing
with a great degree of success in the 1960s. At that time in Boston, environmental groups were
likewise adopting oppositional strategies to achieve their own agendas.
Civic environmentalism and environmental justice efforts revived the long-standing goals of
American radicals—democratic equality. The notion that environmental degradation and
persistent social inequality work hand in hand implies a solution in opposition to the status quo
culture; it means reconceiving and redesigning the systems that produce everyday life. Global
agriculture and economic markets, to name a few examples, create greater inequality and
degrade the environment. To counter the problems that they pose requires an alternative view of
economic development and environmental stewardship. The EJM in Boston applied this
perspective to the democratic striving of marginalized peoples by increasing property ownership,
influencing government policy, and accessing economic development opportunities.
The leadership of Latina and African American women drove the organizational success of
EJM efforts in Boston. Feminist theorists argue that to analyze the lower statuses women held in
in various societies, ethnicity, sexuality, class, and religion, to cite a few prominent factors, must
be viewed in conjunction with the idea of gender. In Boston, women proved essential to minority
activism. They expanded the membership and outreach of La Alianza and Nuestra Comunidad.
Che Madyun’s leadership helped the DSNI represent the minority community, in addition to
helping the organization to establish itself and its street credibility in the area. Kalare Allen’s
work with students, residents, and ACE leadership improved air quality in the Dudley and South
Bay area.
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Enlisting the help of experts proved to be the turning point in efforts to improve minority
status and living conditions. The “Tent City” protest of 1968 brought MIT students to the
assistance of South End residents, a relationship that Mel King nurtured in the 1970s to produce
Community Development Corporation (CDC) legislation. La Alianza and Nuestra Comunidad
collaborations with MIT produced From the Ground Up, which brought together many of the
principal players in the creation of the DSNI. The DSNI went on to apply many of the strategies
and objectives of From the Ground Up. In the critical years of the group’s development, a
combination of experts and residents provided the organization with solid footing and
institutional momentum. ACE continued and enlarged the trend in the area of public health
issues.
Environmental Justice Affirmed
Some analysts still deny that communities of color are targeted by polluters and charge that
environmental justice groups are unwilling to face “inconvenient facts.” According to this line of
thinking, the EJM exaggerates the effects of pollution, especially when it focuses on one source.
Focusing only on external sources of pollution, critics argue, shifts residents’ attention away
from other factors, such as diet, smoking, and alcohol consumption that are more easily
controlled and contribute to positive health outcomes. Opponents conclude that the EJM lacks an
intellectual foundation and produces rhetoric that incites passion rather than an informed
analysis.316 However, examining how minority neighborhoods and minority activism changed
over time in Boston demonstrates the soundness of EJM analysis, goals, and tactics.
Members of ACE argued, when determining health impacts on people, that the burden of
scientific proof belied a “multifactorial” reality. Penn Loh and Jodi Sugerman-Brozan penned an
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essay about the air pollution study that Kalare Allen’s class led around the Dudley Station area in
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. They argued that scientific
information should provide a “guide to action...that takes into account moral values and
democratic principles.” For example, science provides clues as to why there are so many
environmental health risk factors in minority neighborhoods. It substantiates the impact of these
factors on everyday life. If a teenager with respiratory problems lived by a bus depot, went to
school on a street that stood at a busy intersection, and lived in a house that failed to keep
dampness out, then one specific cause of poor respiratory health might not be attributable. In
many cases, exposures to different types of pollutants affected residents, and exposure was
dispersed rather than concentrated. 317 For Sugerman-Brozan and Loh, scientific information
should function as a catalyst, rather than an inhibitor, for activism.
Documenting the experiences of residents and the changes to the South End and Roxbury
provides evidence of the validity of these environmental concerns. Racism prescribed a cycle of
geographic and social alienation, denial of city services, degradation of the built environment,
increased pollution, and decline of essential services such as banks and supermarkets in
twentieth-century Boston. In the first half of the twentieth century, the South End was a minority
archipelago enjoying a period of salutary neglect from the city of Boston. While mired in the
doldrums economically, individuals shaped the contours of their existence through the cultural
institutions and daily life of the neighborhood. The conclusions of “experts” justified the
isolation of South End, charging that its residents and institutions degraded the city as a whole, a
perception augmented by media portrayals of the neighborhood as a “skid row.” Isolation created
a vulnerability that enabled absentee landlords to forego repairs and unscrupulous contractors to
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dump discarded appliances without legal repercussions. In Roxbury, a similar situation played
out. However, the new built environment existed to contain and subordinate the agency of its
residents while new civic structures projected brute strength. Environmental racism explains why
conditions failed to improve, even while Boston experienced substantial economic growth
between 1950 and 2000.
When environmental historians approach the city, they need to consider how policy initiatives
and popular perceptions influenced neighborhood and citywide ecologies. As the field of
environmental history evolved into a distinct subdiscipline, it challenged the prevailing view that
the natural world was simply a backdrop for human events. Likewise, urban historians at first
ignored environmental considerations. Since the 1980s a robust urban environmental history
field has developed. If one is concerned about the environment and “environmental issues” then
any part of the environment is worthy of consideration. Beyond that, the fundamental point this
work drives home is that “anti-urban” thinking drove the racism that shaped urban policy in the
United States during the twentieth century. Therefore, if one makes the argument that the cities
fail to meet the standard of environmental history, they must square with the racism imbued in
that assertion.
Afterthought
It is interesting to consider how Boston’s development might have occurred without
environmental racism shaping its course and consequences. A mixed-use and ethnically diverse
South End and Roxbury would look quite different without the specific interventions of urban
renewal. An African American section of the South End still operating as a “jazz mecca” that
sustained music and cultural institutions would function as a leading indicator of a broader social
strength. With housing rehabilitation and community development loans provided to the
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residents that needed them, Boston’s non-white community could have realized economic
independence as real estate values increased. The continuation and enhancement of cultural
institutions that served minorities would have enhanced social fabric and provided a means for
residents to put down roots. Such a process would have allowed for African American and
Latinx residents to take part in the increasing affluence of the city, so that, as Bluestone and
Stevenson put it in The Boston Renaissance, a “rising tide” could have lifted “all boats.” 318 A
long-functioning black enclave in the South End would also provide a means for the community
to realize wealth through entertainment ventures such as concerts and festivals.
In Roxbury, a new environment that did not express the raw sinews of power might have done
the opposite: empowered and enriched the community. Housing development, civic institutions
that enhanced community interaction, economic development opportunities for minority
residents could have allowed Roxbury to stand on equal footing with nearby neighborhoods such
as South Boston, Charlestown, East Boston, the North End, and Brookline as neighborhoods
with a majority ethnic population. City leaders most likely would have taken less aggressive
measures to quarantine a gainfully employed minority working class and an enlarging and
empowered middle class. Basic environmental protections and services would have allowed
residents to retain control over the community and avoid spiraling real estate prices and arson.
Such a status would have allowed for greater African American and Latinx voice in political
events impacting the city. However, a specific set of concerns based on environmental factors
blocked events like this from occurring, and it is precisely what activist in the Dudley area built.
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